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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed by three chapters evolving around the role
of deindustrialization in the process of growth and development. This first
chapter focuses on the manufacturing’s share of employment, which is known
to follow a hump-shaped pattern as economies structurally transform. Mo-
tivated by the observation that capital intensities in manufacturing increase
over the development process, this chapter examines whether such changes
are important in accounting for the hump-shaped pattern in manufactur-
ing employment shares as well as the decline in agriculture and the rise in
services. It does this by putting forth a model of the structural transfor-
mation that allows for varying rates of technological rates, long-run Engel
curves, international trade, as well as time-varying capital intensities. The
model is calibrated to the experience of South Korea between 1970 and 2010
and the importance of these four factors for the structural transformation is
analyzed. The main finding is that whereas heterogeneous rates of technolog-
ical change, long-run Engel curves and international trade are important for
accounting for various elements of the structural transformation, only time-
varying capital intensities are critical for generating the hump-shaped pattern
in manufacturing employment fairly close. Time-varying capital intensities
are the additional “labor push” needed to explain the observed movement of
labor out of manufacturing.
The second chapter provides quantitative evidence of the Ricardian Effect,
namely the replacement of labor in the production process when capital is
introduced. Based on a unique plant-level longitudinal dataset for Colombian
manufacturing establishments for the period 1982-1998, this article exploits
the disaggregation of the labor force between non-production (managers) and
production (workers) employees to test whether there is supporting evidence
of the Ricardian Effect in Colombia; whether this effect varies between two
qualitatively different types of labor; and whether this effect was influenced
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by the so-called “market oriented reforms” that Colombia experienced during
the early 1990s. After estimating input demands for capital, managers, and
workers instrumenting output with demand shocks, I found that the output
elasticities for the three inputs are close to 0.6, while the price elasticities
for capital, managers, and workers are -0.28, -0.32, and -0.21 respectively.
Based on a simulated arrival of cheaper capital goods, these input demand
coefficients are used to predict that, on average, when a plant increases its
capital stock by about 67 per cent, it will reduce its payroll by one manager
and 4 workers. Capital replaces labor, and this replacement is stronger for
employees that perform routine tasks in the work place. This replacement is
significantly stronger during the post-reform years since these reforms turned
input demands to be more elastic with respect to prices. Importantly, these
effects are not driven by plant’s observable characteristics.
The last chapter, written in collaboration with Cesare Buiatti and Joao
Duarte, seeks to explain labor productivity differences of the service sec-
tor between Europe and the U.S. through the labor allocation taking place
within the service sector. We are interested in understanding why is Europe
falling behind the United States in terms of aggregate labor productivity.
We measure labor productivity levels using a multi-sector structural trans-
formation model that decomposes services into 11 sub-sectors comparable
across Europe and the U.S. It is well known that the underperformance of
Europe vis-a´-vis the U.S. is related to services. We use our structural trans-
formation model to find which service sectors are largely responsible for the
lagging behind. We identify wholesale and retail trade as well as business
services as the two sectors responsible for most of the lack of catch up in
labor productivity between Europe and the U.S.
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To Rebekah, who redefines the concept of unconditional support.
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CHAPTER 1
TIME-VARYING CAPITAL INTENSITIES
AND THE HUMP-SHAPED EVOLUTION
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN
MANUFACTURING
1.1 Introduction
A puzzle in economic development is to explain why manufacturing shares of
employment have a hump-shaped pattern among countries that have under-
gone structural transformations. Figure 1.1 shows this pattern by plotting
manufacturing employment shares as a function of income for several coun-
tries during the period 1950 through 2010. The manufacturing employment
share rises during early stages of development, but during later stages, its de-
clines while services take off and dominate the employment participation. For
countries that started their structural transformations during the 19th cen-
tury, such as the United States and Great Britain, manufacturing employ-
ment shares were already in their declining phases during the post-WWII
period, but for late starters, such as Korea, both the rising and declining
part of the hump are evident. For India, a country that started its structural
transformation even later, the employment share in manufacturing is still
rising.
This paper proposes a new theory whereby changes in capital intensities
across time in manufacturing account for the hump-shaped pattern in man-
ufacturing employment shares as well as the decline in agriculture and the
rise in services. The theory is motivated by an observation of time-varying
capital intensities in the manufacturing sector, which is consistent with the
modernization observed during industrialization that is documented exten-
sively by researchers such as Rostow (1960) and O’Donnell (1973). To test
my hypothesis, I use the workhorse model of the structural transformation
process developed by Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014)), to which
I adapt the preferences crafted by Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2015). The
advantage of adding this preference structure is that the implied Engel curves
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generated in the model do not level off as long as an economy grows richer.1
With this model structure, it is possible to consider income effects driven
by non-homothetic preferences, price effects due to varying rates of techno-
logical rates, and the role of trade in shaping the structural transformation
separately. Although extant literature considers these factors as plausible
candidates to understanding labor reallocation across sectors, the possibility
of time-varying capital intensities in each of the three production sectors as
an additional driver of the structural transformation has not been considered,
and is the novel feature of this paper.
The conclusion of the analysis is that time-varying capital intensities are
the missing component needed to generate the manufacturing hump-shaped
pattern; it is the additional driver necessary to generate deindustrialization
observed after the manufacturing peak. Accounting for the growing bias to-
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Figure 1.1: Manufacturing employment shares worldwide, 1950 – 2010.
Manufacturing employment is constructed as the sum of total employment
in mining, manufacturing, utilities, and construction. Income per capita is
measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. Sources: Timmer et
al. (2014); The Maddison-Project (2013).
1A recurrent problem with extant models of structural transformation is that most rely
on Stoney-Geary preferences to account for income effects, and Engel curves generated by
these preferences level off quickly.
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ward capital in the production of manufacturing output, the model generates
the additional “labor push”2 of (redundant) workers out of manufacturing to
explain the declining part of the hump. Whereas income effects through non-
homothetic preferences, trade effects, and differences in technological growth
rates across sectors are important to explaining the rise in the manufacturing
employment share, they are unable to generate a hump-shaped pattern that
follows the data closely. This paper closes this gap in macro-development
literature.
I reach this conclusion by calibrating the model to the development expe-
rience of South Korea between 1970 and 2010. I use independent estimates
of income and price elasticities, and calibrate the model to match the em-
ployment shares of the initial period perfectly. I then feed in capital income
share values for each sector to identify the capital intensities, combined with
data on growth in sectoral labor productivity and aggregate time-paths for
consumption, wages and the real interest rate obtained with a shooting al-
gorithm, to compute the model’s predictions for the time-paths of the em-
ployment shares of agriculture, manufacturing, and services. I find that with
time-varying capital intensities, the model is capable of generating the ob-
served hump-shaped pattern in South Korea. I also show that in absence
of time-varying capital intensities, the model fails to account for the decline
of the manufacturing employment share. My results confirm the conclusion
of Buera and Kaboski (2009) that the standard theories of structural trans-
formation cannot explain the steep decline in manufacturing observed in the
data. Time-varying capital intensities are the additional “labor push” needed
to explain the observed movement of labor out of manufacturing.
Using a set of counterfactual experiments, I demonstrate that traditional
drivers of the structural transformation (i.e., Engel curves, heterogeneous
technological rates, and trade) do not deliver the hump-shaped path of man-
ufacturing share of economic activity, though they do matter when matching
other dimensions of the structural transformation. I conclude that time-
varying capital intensities are necessary but insufficient to address the evo-
lution of economic activity in manufacturing. In particular, a counterfactual
experiment for trade illustrates that South Korea would need to have been a
2Consistent with Alvarez-Cuadrado and Poschke (2011), labor push is a driver of the
structural transformation in which redundant units of labor are released out of manufac-
turing.
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net importer to account for the observed deindustrialization, without changes
in capital intensity. As a further test, I calibrate the model to the United
States to illustrate that time-varying capital intensities help account for U.S.
labor share paths. A trade counterfactual with constant capital intensities
over time suggests that the United States would have needed to more than
double its trade deficit to account for the observed manufacturing employ-
ment share in 2010.
Recently, several models have been constructed to reconcile the structural
transformation’s stylized facts documented by Kuznets (1966) with the so-
called Kaldor facts where the shares of labor and capital income, the capital-
output ratio, the growth of capital and output per worker, and the real
interest rate are constant (Kaldor, 1961). The notion of different capital in-
tensities over time and across sectors that is supported in this paper does not
contradict the Kaldor facts since rising capital intensities in manufacturing
are accompanied by changing capital intensities in the service sector, and
a greater prevalence of services in the economy. Consequently, the capital
income share in manufacturing represents a smaller fraction of the aggregate
capital income share. More specifically, capital income shares are not grow-
ing at the same pace in each sector. For Korea and the United States, the
capital income share as a whole in the service sector is declining, and services
are dominating participation of employment in the economy.3
Several articles relate to this paper.4 Noted above, from the income side
of the structural transformation, the non-homothetic structure used here de-
parts from standard use of Stoney-Geary preferences that were pioneered
by Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001), and follows Comin et al. (2015).
With the introduction of long-run Engel curves, Comin et al. (2015) do ac-
count for the rise in services during later stages of development, but their
model does not generate a steep deindustrialization after the peak of the
hump-shape. These preferences also relate to Boppart (2014), who considers
different marginal propensities for goods and services between rich and poor
households, and to Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller (2008), who introduced hierar-
3See Section 1.2 for details on the relationship between time-varying capital intensities
and the Kaldor facts.
4Literature on structural transformation stands on the shoulders of the traditional
development literature, such as W. A. Lewis (1954), Chenery (1960), Rostow (1960),
Kuznets (1966, 1968), Baumol (1967), and Harris and Todaro (1970), among many others.
For a detailed survey, see Matsuyama (2008) and Herrendorf et al. (2014).
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chic preferences raking the income elasticity of each good to deliver structural
transformation as households gets richer.
This paper belongs to supply-side explanations of the structural transfor-
mation, which focuses mainly on disparities in rates of technological changes
and their influences through price effects, but has overlooked the observa-
tion of capital intensities changing over time. The seminal contribution in
this area is Ngai and Pissarides (2007), who formalize the “Baumol cost dis-
ease” to explain labor reallocation due to heterogeneous technological rates
in each production sector. It also relates closely to Acemoglu and Guerri-
eri (2008) who introduced differences in capital intensity as a static feature
across sectors that delivers structural transformation through heterogeneous
increments in the capital-to-labor ratio. Echevarria (1997) also considers
a model in which sectors have differences in technology growth rates and
time-invariant but heterogeneous factor intensities.
This paper also investigates the connection between trade and structural
transformation, a research agenda influenced heavily by Matsuyama (2009).
Uy, Yi, and Zhang (2013) recently claimed that the hump-shaped manufac-
turing employment share in South Korea is a consequence of greater open-
ness and international trade. Their argument incorporates income and price
explanations for the structural transformation in an open economy with a
variation of the Ricardian theory of comparative advantages developed by
Eaton and Kortum (2002). Although their model explains salient features of
the structural transformation, it fails to generate the hump-shape for manu-
facturing employment. Betts, Giri, and Verma (2013) also account for trade
liberalizations in a structural transformation model calibrated for Korea.
Trade and trade reforms are quantitatively relevant when accounting for the
structural transformation, but the model still fails to deliver the hump-shaped
pattern in manufacturing employment.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides empirical support
for the relevance of time-varying capital intensities for the structural trans-
formation and its relation to the Kaldor Facts. Section 1.3 describes a model
economy that accounts for structural transformation with varying capital in-
tensities over time and across sectors. Section 1.4 presents the calibration
strategy, discusses the test of the theory, and illustrates the prediction of the
model for South Korea and the United States. Section 1.5 describes alter-
native hypotheses to account for the structural transformation, and employs
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the model to address numerical experiments to recover the time series of cap-
ital income shares of other countries that display a well-defined hump-shape
in manufacturing employment, but for which no comprehensive measures of
capital income shares across sectors exist. Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
1.2 Empirical Support
1.2.1 Structural Transformation Stylized Facts: The
Hump-Shaped Manufacturing Employment Share
The process known as structural transformation is characterized by sweeping
changes in the structure of its productive apparatus from agricultural activ-
ities toward manufacturing and later toward services at advanced stages of
development. Figure 1.2 illustrates the structural transformation patterns,
known in the literature as the Kuznets facts.5 The solid line plots the fitted
values from a regression of the labor share of each sector on the level, square,
and cube of income per capita to summarize the structural transformation
patterns in the data. Each panel of Figure 1.2 presents the coefficients of the
estimation used to plot the fitted curve. Panel 1.2a shows that as long as
economies grow richer, the participation of employment in agriculture falls
asymptotically converging to employment shares below 4 per cent. Panel
1.2b illustrates that while economies grow richer, the employment share of
services grows and even accelerates after an economy reaches, on average,
over 9,000 international (Geary-Khamis) dollars of 1990.
Panel 1.2c shows the object of interest of this paper: A well-defined hump-
shaped pattern for the employment share of manufactures with respect to
the level of development: At early stages of development the industrial em-
ployment share grows and at later stages – above the 9,000 International
(Geary-Khamis) dollars of 1990 mentioned before – it declines. In spite of
the heterogeneity observed across countries,6 the fitted values are capable
5Kuznets (1973) considered the labor allocation out of agriculture as one of the six
critical characteristics observed in the growth of developed nations. Quoting Kuznets
(1973, p. 248), “(...)[m]ajor aspects of structural change include the shift away from
agriculture to nonagricultural pursuits and, recently, away from industry to services”
6Including country fixed effects would have the effect of controlling for levels and
therefore the residuals would be closer to the fitted line.
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Figure 1.2: Structural transformation patterns. Employment shares of
agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Manufacturing employment is
constructed as the sum of total employment in mining, manufacturing,
utilities, and construction. Services is the sum of whole sale and retail
trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage, and communications;
finance, real state, and business services; and community, social, and
personal services. Income per capita is measured in 1990 international
Geary-Khamis dollars. Sources: Timmer et al. (2014); The
Maddison-Project (2013).
of summarizing the main patterns of structural transformation that nations
experience in their development paths.
Figure 1.3 distinguishes the manufacturing employment shares by regions.
Panel 1.3a shows that the United States and most of the European economies
are already in their “postindustrial era” (the declining part of the hump-
shape) while most African and some Asian countries are at their early stages
of development where the hump is rising. The case of Latin America as a
region is not conclusive: it does not display a clear pattern as a whole, since
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Figure 1.3: Manufacturing employment shares by regions, 1950 – 2010.
Manufacturing employment is constructed as the sum of total employment
in mining, manufacturing, utilities, and construction. Income per capita is
measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. For plotting panel
1.3b, the criteria of selection is that the country displays a well-defined
hump in the manufacturing share of employment. The Asian economies
selected are Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Hong Kong and
Singapore were excluded because in spite of their well-defined hump-shape
in manufacturing employment, these economies are city-states with
negligible agricultural sectors. The Latin American countries selected are
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Sources: Timmer et al. (2014); The
Maddison-Project (2013).
there are countries such as Bolivia and Colombia for which a manufacturing
peak is not evident.
To shed some light on the Latin American case, Panel 1.3b plots a set of
Asian and Latin American countries that do have a well-defined manufactur-
ing hump-shape in the data and plots the fitted curve for each set of countries
derived from a regression of manufacturing labor shares on a cubic polyno-
mial of income per capita. The evidence supports Rodrik’s (2015) claim that
Latin America’s industrial experience has been a case of “premature dein-
dustrialization”, namely a process in which the industrial share peaked at a
modest stage of development – far below the 9,000 dollars discussed above
– compared with advanced economies and with late starters such as Japan,
Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan. The message delivered by the comparison of
the fitted curves should be taken with a grain of salt since they do not capture
the heterogeneity observed for each country, but one can compare each case
in Latin America individually and realize that indeed this region experienced
8
a premature deindustrialization.
1.2.2 Capital Income Shares as Evidence of Time-Varying
Capital Intensities
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) proposed a theory of structural transforma-
tion based on static differences in factor proportions across sectors and sug-
gest that capital income shares reflect the proportion, or intensity of capital
in the production function.7 Following a long tradition in macroeconomics,
I consider as well capital income shares as evidence of the capital intensity
in the production function. As in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), I measure
the capital intensity of each industry as the ratio of value added minus total
labor compensation to value added in each sector.8 The critical departure
here is that I do not consider averages across time for these measures to
interpret them as evidence of static differences in factor proportions, but I
illustrate the time series of factor shares as evidence of time-varying capital
intensities.
Figure 1.4 provides evidence for the main building block of the paper: Cap-
ital income shares across sectors do change over time. Panel 1.4a illustrates
that in the United States the manufacturing capital income share – defined
as the non-labor income share of value added – was falling from about 34
per cent in 1948 to levels below 30 per cent in the early 1980s both for man-
ufacturing and for the whole industrial sector composed by manufacturing,
mining, construction and utilities. In the mid-1980s the capital income share
rose sharply and by 2010 the capital income share was above 47 per cent
while the whole industrial sector had a capital income share of 42 per cent.
The capital income share in the manufacturing sector since the late 1980s
rose over 50 percent in the United States in less than three decades.
Panel 1.4b considers the case of South Korea. From the 1970s up to the
early 1990s the capital income share was also declining, although at a faster
pace compared to the United States (from about 60 per cent to levels below
7As Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008, p. 468) write: “(...)[d]ifferences in factor propor-
tions across sectors (i.e., different shares of capital) combined with capital deepening lead
to nonbalanced growth because an increase in the capital-to-labor ratio raises output more
in sectors with greater capital intensity.”
8The data comes fromthe World KLEMS project, available at http://www
.worldklems.net/.
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Figure 1.4: Manufacturing capital income shares for United States and
South Korea. Capital income is computed as the value added per sector
minus the total labor compensation. Manufacturing is constructed as the
sum of mining, manufacturing, utilities, and construction. The dashed lines
represent the trended capital income shares using the Hodrick–Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter of λ = 100. Source: The World KLEMS.
45 per cent), but after the early 1990s the manufacturing capital income share
started a rising trend and the capital income share rose above 55 per cent
for the manufacturing sector and about 53 per cent for the whole industry.
Overall, after the 1990s the capital income share in South Korea increased
about 25 per cent. Capital intensities in manufacturing do change over time,
and the order of magnitude of these changes is substantial.
It is worth emphasizing that heterogeneous capital income shares across
sectors but fixed over time as a sufficient measure of capital intensity is
misleading because it assumes that one sector in particular can be ranked
as more (or less) capital intensive compare to another sector. Figure 1.5
presents the trended capital income shares for United States and Korea for
agriculture, manufacturing and services and shows that for both countries the
capital income share for services was higher at early stages of development,
and sometimes even higher that the capital income share in manufacturing.
Using a measure of capital income shares that neglects the time variation
provides an inaccurate ordering of the capital intensity across sectors.
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Time-Varying Capital Intensities and the Kaldor Facts
Is the notion of time-varying capital intensities consistent with the Kaldor
facts? Kaldor (1961) suggested that the shares of labor and capital income,
the capital-output ratio, the growth of capital and output per worker, and
the real interest rate are roughly constant over time, and several studies in
modern macroeconomics argue that indeed once the economy abandons the
Malthusian trap and enters into a period of modern economic growth, the
capital and labor shares remain constant.9
In fact, Gollin (2002) argues that much of the variation observed in labor
income shares across countries is due to mismeasurement problems mostly
in agriculture. In particular, for poor countries the official statistics used
to compute labor income shares are based on employee compensations and
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Figure 1.5: Capital income shares for United States and South Korea in
agriculture, manufacturing and services. Capital income is computed as the
value added per sector minus the total labor compensation. Manufacturing
includes mining, utilities, and construction. Services is the sum of whole
sale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage, and
communications; finance, real state, and business services; and community,
social, and personal services. The lines represent trended capital income
shares using the Hodrick–Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of λ =
100. Source: World KLEMS.
9The seminal work is in this area is the unified theory of development by Hansen
and Prescott (2002), which integrates in a single framework a model that explains the
stagnation during the Malthusian era and the transition to Solow technologies (the modern
period of economic growth). Hansen and Prescott (2002) show that once the economy
abandons the Malthusian trap, the economy converges asymptotically to the neoclassical
growth model where aggregate capital income shares are constant.
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Figure 1.6: Structural transformation and the Kaldor Facts for United
States and South Korea. Capital income shares from World Klems are
computed as the value added per sector minus the total labor
compensation. The weighted average from World Klems is the sum of the
observed capital income shares for agriculture, manufacturing and services
weighted by their respective employment shares. Capital income shares
from Penn World Tables are computed as one minus the reported labor
income shares. Source: The World KLEMS and Penn World Tables 9.0.
attributes the self-employment compensation as capital earnings. This mis-
measurement is more problematic in rural activities where self-employment is
more prevalent. Once labor income shares are adjusted using operating sur-
plus to account for self-employment earnings, Gollin (2002) shows the labor
income shares fall in the range between 0.6 and 0.85 and labor income shares
seem to be stable across countries regardless of their level of development.
In line with Gollin (2002), Figure 1.6 suggests that the variation observed
for capital income shares across sectors is consistent with the constancy of
aggregate capital income shares. Panel 1.6a compares the observed capi-
tal income shares in the United States from Penn World Tables and World
Klems to a weighted average of capital income shares across sectors using the
labor shares of employment, i.e. the structural transformation, as weights.
Aggregate capital income shares are roughly constant over time, and their
levels are similar to the findings of Gollin (2002). Time-varying capital in-
tensities across sectors and the Kaldor facts are consistent for the United
States’ development experience precisely because, as this paper suggest, the
increasing capital intensity in manufacturing is an additional push of labor
out of manufacturing balancing the effects with the absorption of labor in
12
services, which is more labor intensive, as the data suggests.
Panel 1.6b considers the Korean case. The Kaldor facts seem to hold only
after 1990, but before this date there is important variation in aggregate cap-
ital income shares between the different sources. As Gollin (2002) suggests,
this could be because of the prevalence of self-employment in agriculture
together with its weight in the economy at early stages of development.10
Nevertheless, Panel 1.6b shows that if one neglects the agricultural sector
and computes the capital income share as the weighted average of the cap-
ital income shares of manufacturing and services the “rough” constancy of
the aggregate capital income share is back. As Hansen and Prescott (2002)
suggest, the constancy of capital income shares in line with the neoclassical
growth model do hold for periods of modern economic growth in which the
participation of agriculture is shrinking. Whether observed capital income
shares are constant when the economies still have an important participation
of labor in agriculture is still open since it can be either measurement error
in agriculture or simply that the constancy of capital income shares are a
feature of modern economic growth but not necessarily a stylized fact that
holds for Malthusian periods where land is still an important production in-
put. Either way, the key message of Figures 1.5 and 1.6 for the purposes of
this paper is that capital income shares do change over time and across sec-
tors, and this fact does not necessarily contradict Kaldor’s (1961) observation
that on aggregate, the capital income share is roughly constant.
Is There A Global Decline in the Labor Income Share?
Recently, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) contribute to the discussion on
factor income shares following Gollin (2002) and analyse the labor shares
within the corporate sector, arguing that mismeasurement problems are far
beyond the agricultural sector. The virtue of the corporate labor share is
that “(...) aggregate labor share measures are influenced by the methods
10The direction of the bias in capital income shares in agriculture is positive due to
self-employment since the remuneration is accounted as capital income, but there are
also negative biases on the capital share in agriculture due to the treatment of land and
natural resources, which are not considered in World Klems as capital inputs. It is hard
to conclude which bias dominates, although the evidence presented here suggests that for
World KLEMS it is the self-employment nature of agriculture the most prevalent bias at
early stages of development whereas for Penn World Tables the measures under estimate
the role of capital when agriculture is still an important share of the economy.
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Figure 1.7: Capital income shares in services for United States and South
Korea. Capital income shares from are computed as the value added per
sector minus the total labor compensation. The lines represent trended
capital income shares using the Hodrick–Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of λ = 100. Source: The World KLEMS.
used to separate the labor and capital income earned by entrepreneurs, sole
propriertors, and unincorporated businesses. The corporate labor share is
not subject to such imputations” Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014, p. 62).
Unlike Gollin (2002) however, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) interpret
their findings as a 5 percentage point decline in the labor share over the
past 35 years globally and argue that the aggregate labor share is falling due
mostly to the decline in the relative price of investment goods.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) estimate that labor shares are declin-
ing in the manufacturing sectors, in transportation, and to a lesser degree in
whole sale/retail and public services, while they are growing in agriculture
as well as in financial and business services. With the exception of trans-
portation, all the sectors experiencing important declines in the labor share
belong to manufacturing, whose participation in the economy is declining
at later stages of development. It is not straightforward to extrapolate the
evidence of time-varying capital intensities in the industrial sectors (and in
some but not all services) as evidence against the Kaldor facts. In line with
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), this paper also presents evidence sug-
gesting that labor shares are falling in some sectors, but not in all of them.
And it is precisely in those sectors that are not experiencing a decline in the
labor share the ones that are increasing its employment share participation
in the economy.
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Figure 1.7 shows the capital income shares (the complement of the labor
income shares) and provides further evidence on the heterogeneity observed
within services to support the argument presented above. Time-varying cap-
ital intensities in manufacturing does not mean that labor income shares
falling in each and every sector in the economy. In the United States the
services that are experiencing an increase in the capital income share (or
a decline in the labor income share) are hotels and restaurants; transport,
storage, and communications and to a lesser degree whole sale and retail
services, whereas finance and business services experienced a decline in cap-
ital income share up to 2000, confirming the finding of Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014) for this particular sector. Other services, which include com-
munity, social, and personal services have had experienced an increase in the
labor income share as well.
For Korea, hotels and restaurants display the most dramatic reduction in
the capital income share, closer to a 50 percent decline. Whole sale and retail
trade also experienced an important reduction in its capital income share
since the 1980s. The sectors in which capital income shares are growing are
finance and business since the 1990s as well as transportation, storage and
communications and other services. As Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
suggest, there are sectors outside manufacturing experiencing increments in
the capital income share, like transportation, but this fact does not imply
that the aggregate capital income share in the economy is growing, as the
evidence suggest for United States after WWII and for Korea if one excludes
agriculture or only considers the period after 1990s where the employment
share in agriculture was similar to the agricultural employment shares for
the United States in the 1950s.11
Biases in Levels of Capital Income Shares
A common concern in Gollin (2002) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
is that factor income shares are potentially biased if one attributes self-
employment earnings as capital income. The data on capital income shares
from World KLEMS are constructed as the value added minus the labor
compensation after correcting the self-employment bias by assuming that a
11See section 1.4 for the time series of employment shares in agriculture, manufacturing,
and services in United States and Korea.
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self-employed worker does receive an hourly wage equal to an employee.12
In principle, the measures of capital income shares used here capture the
concerns Gollin (2002) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). Neverthe-
less, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) show that once they use corporate
labor shares, the correction of the biased measures of labor income shares
is in levels,13 and even if the levels of capital income shares are biased, the
key tenet of this paper is that capital income shares do change over time.
In other words, even with biased levels for the measures of capital income
shares, one can address their changes over time as evidence of a heterogeneous
and dynamic process of capital intensity across sectors. The next subsection
explores whether the variation in these measures of capital intensity are as-
sociated with the manufacturing labor shares of employment.
1.2.3 Time-Varying Capital Intensities and Manufacturing
Labor Shares
The critical element of the theory proposed in this paper is that capital in-
come shares and labor shares in the manufacturing sector are related. The
theory suggest that increases in capital intensity in the production of man-
ufacturing output – measured with manufacturing capital income shares –
are negatively associated with the employment shares in this sector, pos-
ing time-varying capital intensities as a candidate to explain the observed
deindustrialization patterns. Figure 1.8 shows a scatter plot for these two
variables. Panel 1.8a illustrates the plot for Korea and United States. There
are important differences in levels between these two countries, although the
patterns are similar. These differences are possibly due to the fact that the
Unites States is at a more advanced development stage during the sample
period, in which labor manufacturing shares are lower compared to South Ko-
rea. Therefore, Panel 1.8a illustrates that a scatter plot with more countries
will not deliver useful insights because the association between capital in-
come shares and manufacturing employment shares will be performed across
different development stages.
12See Ja¨ger (2016) for detailed description of the EU KLEMS database, which shares
the same methodology used in World KLEMS.
13Gollin (2002) also discusses the bias of labor income shares in terms of the differences
in levels across countries.
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Panel 1.8b plots the partial residuals of a correlation between manufac-
turing employment shares and capital income shares for Belgium, Canada,
Spain, Great Britain, Japan, South Korea and the United States.14 Con-
trolling for country fixed effects, as a first crude approximation to account
for differences in the stage of development,15 yields a correlation between
capital intensity and manufacturing employment negative and statistically
significant. The point estimate is -0.47 and the standard error is .07, which
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Figure 1.8: Manufacturing labor shares vs. capital income shares. Capital
income is computed as the value added per sector minus the total labor
compensation. Manufacturing labor is computed as the sum of hours
employed in mining, manufacturing, utilities, and construction. Panel 1.8a
plots the capital income shares against the manufacturing employment
shares for United States and South Korea. Panel 1.8b plots the partial
residuals of a correlation between capital income shares and manufacturing
employment shares after controlling for country fixed effects for the
following economies: Belgium, Canada, Spain, Great Britain, Japan, South
Korea and the United States. Panel 1.8b also plots the fitted line of the
residuals.
14The selection of these particular countries is limited due to data availability from the
World KLEMS (http://www.worldklems.net/). There are a few more countries avail-
able with time series of capital income shares across sectors (Austria, Germany, Finland,
France, Italy and The Netherlands) but I decided not to use these observations because
some of their values for the agricultural capital income share are negative. It is important
to emphasize however that the values of the capital income shares in manufacturing and
services are positive, but negative capital income shares in agriculture indicate either im-
portant biases in the construction of labor income measures or agricultural sectors highly
subsidized to sustain a value added inferior to the labor income.
15Since it is a fixed effect this control can be interpreted as the time invariant condition
that describes whether the country entered to a modernization stage early or late compared
to the United States as well as all the time invariant characteristics of a country that might
have a role in the structural transformation.
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documents a substantial negative association, as the theory suggest.
Table 1.1 uses the World KLEMS data for countries that display positive
capital income shares in agriculture as well as in the aggregate manufac-
turing and services. The countries used in the panel are Belgium, Canada,
Spain, Great Britain, Japan, South Korea and the United States. All the
columns from Table 1.1 are estimated with the employment share of total
hours per sector (agriculture, manufacturing and services). The manufac-
turing sector includes construction, utilities and mining whereas the service
economy includes whole sale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; trans-
port, storage, and communications; finance, real state, and business services;
and community, social, and personal services.
Column 1 of Table 1.1 considers the capital income share and its interac-
tions with the binary identifiers of manufacturing and services as independent
variables. The binary variables are also included in order to interpret cor-
rectly the interactions. For the first three columns country fixed effects are
included to be able to control for time invariant characteristics such as the
starting date of the modernization relative to the leader. Year fixed effects
are excluded. The elasticity for capital income share is positive and sta-
tistically significant. This result should be interpreted with caution. This
positive elasticity is present only when the binary variables of manufacturing
and services take zero (when the sector in question is agriculture). Most of
the economies of the sample display very low agricultural employment shares
at late stages of development which are not controlled for in Column 1. The
coefficient of interest is the interaction between capital income share and the
binary variable for manufacturing. The elasticity is negative and statistically
significant, and it counteracts the positive elasticity for agriculture. The ef-
fect of being in manufacturing alone is positive, but the interaction yields an
overall negative effect as long as capital income shares grow. The effect of
the interaction between capital income shares and services is also negative
although less strong, which suggest that the observed rise in services should
be consistent with reductions in the capital income share in services, which
is precisely what Figure 1.5 documents for the cases of United States and
Korea. For the case of services, the effect of the binary variable alone seems
to be stronger than the case of manufacturing
Column 2 of Table 1.1 includes the GDP per capita and its square following
Herrendorf et al. (2014) and Rodrik (2015) in order to capture the effects of
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Income Share 0.259∗∗ 0.0830 0.0271 0.398∗∗∗ 0.0876 0.0322
(0.127) (0.051) (0.049) (0.118) (0.054) (0.051)
Capital Income Share × -1.173∗∗∗ -0.622∗∗∗ -0.617∗∗∗ -1.153∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗
Manufacturing (0.140) (0.066) (0.064) (0.126) (0.069) (0.067)
Capital Income Share × -0.997∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -1.052∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗
Services (0.180) (0.085) (0.084) (0.184) (0.088) (0.087)
Manufacturing 0.376∗∗∗ -12.82∗∗∗ -13.70∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ -12.36∗∗∗ -13.14∗∗∗
(0.134) (2.649) (2.766) (0.124) (2.906) (2.987)
Services 1.276∗∗∗ 10.64∗∗∗ 4.437 1.277∗∗∗ 11.30∗∗∗ 5.200
(0.190) (3.235) (3.533) (0.201) (3.204) (3.490)
GDP pc 3.717∗∗∗ 2.894∗∗∗ 2.054∗∗ 1.223
(0.579) (0.588) (0.816) (0.840)
Squared GDP pc -0.273∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.047) (0.048)
GDP pc × Manufac- 1.690∗∗∗ 1.874∗∗∗ 1.590∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗
turing (0.586) (0.611) (0.639) (0.656)
Squared GDP pc × -0.0270 -0.0369 -0.0219 -0.0307
Manufacturing (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036)
GDP pc × Services -3.869∗∗∗ -2.534∗∗∗ -4.016∗∗∗ -2.701∗∗∗
(0.713) (0.776) (0.705) (0.766)
Squared GDP pc × 0.307∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
Services (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042)
Trade Balance 1.205∗∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗
(0.323) (0.360)
Trade Balance × -0.347 -0.301
Manufacturing (0.270) (0.266)
Trade Balance × Services -2.034∗∗∗ -1.976∗∗∗
Services (0.344) (0.353)
Constant -2.945∗∗∗ -13.33∗∗∗ -9.523∗∗∗ -2.092∗∗∗ -6.189∗ -2.349
(0.115) (2.589) (2.644) (0.315) (3.587) (3.714)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 852 852 852 852 852 852
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.97 0.97 0.85 0.97 0.97
Table 1.1: OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the employment share of total
hours worked per sector. Manufacturing is a binary variable that takes one for
manufacturing sectors, zero otherwise. Services is a binary variable that takes one for
services sectors, zero otherwise. The countries included are Belgium, Canada, Spain,
Great Britain, Japan, South Korea and the United States. All remaining variables are in
logs. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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development on the structural transformation process.16 The positive elas-
ticity of capital income share for agriculture is no longer significant while the
elasticities of capital income shares for manufacturing and services are neg-
ative and statistically significant, although less strong compared to Column
1. Adding the terms for manufacturing the income elasticities deliver the
hump-shaped pattern for employment with a positive income elasticity and
a negative elasticity for its square. Additionally, for agriculture income also
predicts a hump-shape which is at odds with the stylized facts of structural
transformation, but recall that these countries display very low agricultural
shares throughout the sample period with the exception of South Korea. For
services, the rising patter is captured reasonably well by the income elastici-
ties.
Column 3 of Table 1.1 includes the trade balance to control for openness,
which plays an important role in the theory to follow closer the observed
labor shares. The coefficient of interest, capital income shares in manu-
facturing, does not change with this control. The elasticities suggest that
trade is important to understand the process of structural transformation,
although seems to be less important for manufacturing compared to agricul-
ture or services. This result is at odds with the notion that trade is more
important in manufacturing for late starter countries. However, this sam-
ple is not representative of countries for which, arguably as a consequence
of greater openness, trade played an important role in shaping the struc-
tural transformation. The only two countries whose period of modernization
started relatively late are Japan and South Korea. Nevertheless, Column
3 does reveal that including trade does not change the elasticity of capi-
tal income share for manufacturing, which suggest that time-varying capital
income shares rather than trade are critical to understand the process of
deindustrialization at late stages of development.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 1.1 repeat the exercises of Columns 1, 2
and 3 respectively controlling for year fixed effects as well as country fixed
effects. Column 6 presents the most complete exercise with country and
year fixed effects and with controls for development levels and trade. Once
time effects are included, the trade elasticities are roughly the same while
16I excluded the cubic term for income in these estimations with the purpose of pre-
senting a cleaner interpretation of the income coefficients with regards to the structural
transformation paths between agriculture, manufacturing and services.
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Figure 1.9: Manufacturing labor shares vs. capital income shares. Partial
residual plots. The residuals are computed from the OLS estimation of
equation of Column 6 of Table 1.1 in order to capture the correlation
between capital income shares and employment shares for the
manufacturing sector after isolating the controls suggested. Notice that the
coefficient of the fitted line is the same as the coefficient for capital income
shares for manufacturing sectors, as demonstrated by the
Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem.
the income elasticities for manufacturing are no longer useful to generate
the hump-shaped pattern for industrial shares (the squared term loses its
significance), and more importantly, the capital income share as a source of
deindustrialization is robust.
Overall, the evidence suggest that there is a negative and statistically
significant association between time-varying capital intensities and the em-
ployment shares in the manufacturing sector. This correlation is robust to
controlling for time and fixed effects, for levels of economic development and
for proxies of trade. Figure 1.9 uses partial residual plots to visualize the co-
efficient of interest presented in Column 6 of Table 1.1. An increase in 10 per
cent in the manufacturing capital income share will lead to a reduction of the
manufacturing employment share in about 6.5 per cent. These elasticities are
just statistical associations and should not be interpreted as casual links, but
it is clear from the scatter plot that there is a negative association between
capital income shares and manufacturing labor shares. Time-varying capital
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intensities seem to be a plausible candidate to understand the mechanics of
deindustrialization. The next section presents a model of structural trans-
formation to understand such mechanics.
1.3 A Model of Structural Transformation
Motivated by the evidence on capital income shares in manufacturing and its
relation with the manufacturing employment share, in this section I present
a theory whereby the process of labor allocations between agriculture, man-
ufacturing and services depends on time-varying capital intensities in each of
the three production sectors. The setup of the model borrows from Comin
et al. (2015), who introduced long-run Engel curves to account for the de-
mand side explanation of the structural transformation and include hetero-
geneous technological rates and differences in factors proportions to account
for the supply side mechanisms of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu
and Guerrieri (2008) respectively. There are two important departures from
Comin et al. (2015). First, factor proportions do change over time as well as
across sectors to capture time-varying capital intensities as an additional sup-
ply driver. Second, there are only three sectors in the economy – agriculture,
manufacturing, and services – and each of these sectors produce consumption
and investment goods, as opposed to Comin et al. (2015) and Herrendorf et
al. (2014) who consider that investment goods are produced in a separate
investment sector. I assume differences in the production technologies be-
tween agriculture, manufacturing, and services, but that the same technology
is used regardless of the destination of the output (toward consumption or
investment goods). This assumption is important to be able to reconcile the
theory of structural transformation with the two-sector neoclassical growth
model.
I proceed in three steps. First, I describe the two-sector neoclassical growth
model and show that if consumption and investment goods are produced us-
ing the same factor proportions, one can aggregate and reconcile the struc-
tural transformation theory with the one-sector neoclassical growth model
that is consistent with the Kaldor facts.17 Second, I disaggregate the con-
17Or at least with the constancy of the real interest rate, which as weaker concept
known in the literature as the generalized balanced growth path (GBGP).
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sumption bundle between agriculture, manufacturing, and services to account
for the labor allocations across sectors. Last, an additional step is required
for the open economy implications of the model. Following Comin et al.
(2015) and Sposi (2015), I consider trade in a reduced form to discipline the
market clearing conditions when trade is not balanced and I assume that the
only tradable good in the economy is produced in the manufacturing sector.
1.3.1 Two-Sector Neoclassical Growth Model
This section follows closely Herrendorf et al. (2014) exposition of the two-
sector neoclassical growth model. In each period, there is an infinitely lived
stand-in household of measure L. Households supply labor inelastically and
are endowed with a positive but small capital stock at the beginning of the
period. There are two constant-returns to scale sectors devoted to the pro-
duction of consumption and investment goods respectively. Labor and capital
are perfectly mobile across sectors.
Households
Each households is endowed with one unit of labor supplied inelastically
in competitive labor markets and their income stream is generated through
wages and capital rents product of their capital accumulation. Capital goods
are the only means available to transfer present income to future consump-
tion. The preferences over the consumption sequence {Ct} are described
by
∞∑
t
βt logCt, (1.1)
where β is the discount factor and belongs to the open interval (0, 1). The
objective of the household is to maximize their utility subject to its budget
constraint described by
PtCt +Xt = WtLt +RtKt − 1XNt, (1.2)
where Pt is the relative price of the consumption bundle in terms of the
investment good, Ct represents the consumption bundle, Xt stands for in-
23
vestment in period t, Wt is the real wage, Rt is the real interest rate and Lt
and Kt are the aggregate labor and capital in the economy respectively, 1
is an indicator function that takes 1 when the economy is open (zero oth-
erwise) and XNt represents the net trade balance (exports minus imports).
This last terms takes the country’s net export position, when the economy
is open and trade is not balanced, and credits (or debits) the household’s in-
come. Asymptotically, this terms vanishes either due to a no-Ponzi condition
that impedes that the economy continues with a trade deficit indefinitely,18 or
simply because in the long-run the economy converges toward services, which
is a closed sector. The inter-temporal household’s problem is described as
follows:
Household’s (Inter-Temporal) Problem
max
{Ct,Kt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt logCt s.t. i) PtCt +Kt+1 ≤ (1− δ +Rt)Kt +Wt − 1XNt
ii) Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt
iii) K0 > 0,
(1.3)
where δ reflects the aggregate capital’s depreciation rate in the law of mo-
tion for capital (restriction ii) in (1.3)). I assume interior solutions, so the
budget constraint binds with equality and the first-order conditions are suf-
ficient to characterize the optimal solution to the household’s problem. The
combination of the first order conditions yield the Euler equation
1
β
Pt
Pt−1
Ct
Ct−1
= 1− δ +Rt (1.4)
Firms
There are two constant-return-to-scale technologies with equal factor propor-
tions for the production of consumption and investment goods. As Herrendorf
et al. (2014) suggest, it is convenient to impose Cobb-Douglas production
functions with the same capital shares in both sectors. I let the aggregate
18A continued surplus also violates the no-Ponzi condition because it implies another
country having a negative trade balance indefinitely.
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capital share to vary over time to generalize the aggregate production func-
tions for cases in which the agricultural sector is still important in the econ-
omy and the constancy in the aggregate capital income share is not evident,
but in the steady state the capital share converges to a constant.19 For the
remainder of the paper, upper case letters reflect aggregate variables whereas
lower case letters are sectoral variables unless specified otherwise. The su-
perscripts c and x denote consumption and investment sectors respectively
whereas the subscript i ∈ {a,m, s} indicates whether the sector in question
belongs to agriculture, manufacturing and services respectively. The produc-
tion functions of aggregate consumption and investment goods are
Ct = Act(k
c
t )
Θt(lct )
1−Θt
Xt = Axt(k
x
t )
Θt(lxt )
1−Θt
where Act (Axt) is the total factor productivity (TFP) in the production of
consumption (investment) goods, kct (k
x
t ) is the capital used in the produc-
tion of consumption (investment) goods and lct (l
x
t ) is the labor demanded for
consumption (investment) goods. Imposing equal capital shares for the con-
sumption and investment sectors implies that one only needs to account for
the allocation within the consumption bundle between agriculture, manufac-
turing and services to explain the structural transformation. I now formally
state this proposition.
Proposition 1. For a closed economy, if the production function of consump-
tion and investment goods are Cobb-Douglas with the same capital shares, ac-
counting for the structural transformation in consumption goods is sufficient
for explaining the structural transformation of the entire economy.
Proof. Define the aggregate capital income shares in the production of con-
sumption and investment goods as the weighted average of the capital income
shares in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, namely θct =
1
lct
∑
i l
c
itθ
c
it
and θxt =
1
lxt
∑
i l
x
itθ
x
it, i ∈ {a,m, s}. Using the assumption of equal capital
shares for consumption and investment (θct = θ
x
t = Θt) then
1
lct
∑
i l
c
itθ
c
it =
1
lxt
∑
i l
x
itθ
x
it. Recall that the output of agriculture, manufacturing, and ser-
vices is used as consumption and investment goods but it is produced with
19Even with the extreme and implausible case of singularity presented by Nordhaus
(2015), the capital income share converges to one in the steady state.
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the same production technology regardless of the destination of the output.
Therefore, θcit = θ
x
it for all i. For the equality of the consumption and in-
vestment capital shares to hold, it must be true that the labor shares in
consumption and investment are equal, namely
lcit
lct
=
lxit
lxt
= lit
Lt
for all i.
Proposition 1 is silent on the levels labor demand devoted to consumption
and investment goods. lcit does not have to be equal to l
x
it nor the total l
c
t has
to be equal to lxt , but only the labor shares across sectors within consumption
and investment must be equal so in aggregate the capital income share of
consumption and investment goods is equal to θt, which converges to θ in
the long run.20
Note that if one imposes equality in factor proportions for the production
of consumption and investment goods, the only difference between these two
sectors is driven by differences in their respective TFPs.21 The problem of a
representative firm in consumption and investment is defined as follows:
Representative Firm’s Problem in the Consumption Sector
max
kct ,l
c
t
PtCt −Wtlct −Rtkct . (1.5)
The first-order conditions yield the equation for the capital-to-labor ratio
in the production of consumption goods.
kct
lct
=
Θt
1−Θt
Wt
Rt
(1.6)
Representative Firm’s Problem in the Investment Sector
20The differences in capital income shares between investment and consumption goods
is an interesting topic of its own, but comes at the expense of not being able to aggregate
these two sectors into a neoclassical production function without further assumptions and
additional parameters to account for. In addition, the data from World KLEMS identifies
observations across sectors, but does not discriminate on whether the sectoral output was
devoted to consumption or investment, imposing additional challenges to the empirical
counterpart of the model.
21If the productivities in consumption and investment goods are different, they will
have effects on the overall use of labor in each sector, but not in the composition within
the sector. In the empirical counterpart I assume that both sectors have the same TFP
to keep track of the differences in productivity between agriculture, manufacturing and
services. Although theoretically it is possible to reconcile Proposition 1 with differences
in TFP between consumption and investment, the data does not allow for the possibility
of disentangling which output from agriculture, manufacturing or services is devoted to
either consumption or investment goods.
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max
kxt ,l
x
t
Xt −Wtlxt −Rtkxt , (1.7)
and first-order conditions yield a similar for the capital-to-labor ratio in the
production of investment goods
kxt
lxt
=
Θt
1−Θt
Wt
Rt
. (1.8)
Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing conditions are straightforward. The inputs used in both
sectors need to add up to the total supply of each input and the total output
is used between consumption and investment,22 namely
Kt = kct + kxt; Lt = lct + lxt; Yt = PtCt +Xt. (1.9)
For interpreting Pt in the market clearing conditions, Herrendorf et al.
(2014, p. 877) suggest that “(...) we can consider an aggregate produc-
tion function that produces a single good that can be turned into either
consumption or investment via a linear technology with marginal rate of
transformation equal to Pt”.
Equilibrium
The right hand side of equations (1.6) and (1.8) are the same, thus if one
assumes equal factor proportions and perfect mobility of inputs, the capital-
to-labor ratio for consumption and investment goods are the same and equal
to the aggregate capital-to-labor ratio Kt
Lt
. From the first-order conditions
one can obtain an expression for the aggregate price of consumption goods
in term of investment goods
Pt =
Axt
Act
. (1.10)
The aggregate price for the consumption bundle in terms of the investment
22I neglect the role of trade since the trade balance vanishes asymptotically and traded
goods are in the end nothing but either consumption or investment goods.
27
goods reflects differences in TFP.23 Using equations (1.6), (1.8) and (1.10)
one gets
PtCt = Axt
(
Kt
Lt
)Θt
lct,
and with the market clearing conditions in equation (1.9) the aggregate pro-
duction function is
Yt = Axt
(
Kt
Lt
)Θt
lct + Axt
(
Kt
Lt
)Θt
lct
Yt = AxtK
Θt
t L
1−Θt
t . (1.11)
As Herrendorf et al. (2014) conclude, assuming equal capital shares in the
production consumption and investment goods allows the model to aggregate
on the production side. This assumption also implies that one only needs to
account for the structural transformation of the entire economy by focusing
on the household’s choices for the consumption of goods produced in agri-
culture, manufacturing and services. Herrendorf et al. (2014) demonstrates
that in this setup a Generalized Balanced Growth Path (GBGP) where the
constancy of interest rates is the only condition does exist. This is possible
when the aggregate capital income share Θt has converged to its steady state
value of Θ. The next section presents the intra-temporal choice of the house-
holds to derive a system of structural transformation equations to account
for the observed labor (re)allocation across sectors.
1.3.2 Intra-Temporal Allocations
Proposition 1 argues that it is sufficient to account for the labor allocations
between agriculture, manufacturing and services used to produce consump-
tion goods to explain the structural transformation. This section uses this
result and focuses on the intra-temporal allocations within the consumption
bundle, once the inter-temporal trade-off between consumption and savings
23If one assumes that the output in the economy is produced with an unique technology
regardless of its final destination, and that the only differences are if the firm belongs to
agriculture, manufacturing or services, then it follows that Pt is equal to one in each and
every period. I use this assumption in the empirical counterpart of the model, but it is
not necessary in the exposition of the model.
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is optimally solved.
Additional assumptions are required to account for the intra-temporal al-
locations. Households are indifferent about the type of firm that hires their
labor services, even if the job takes place in the countryside as peasants.
There is a large number of perfectly competitive firms for the three main
sectors in the economy and each firms takes wages and capital rental rates as
given and combine capital and labor according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function whose input elasticities reflect the time-varying capital intensity of
each sector i. The firm produces output according to a constant returns to
scale technology and the differences between agriculture, manufacturing and
services are with respect to their TFPs and their capital intensities, both of
them changing over time differently across sectors.
Households
Each period a household receives instantaneous utility from its consump-
tion bundle. Borrowing from Comin et al. (2015), the CES non-homethic
preferences are described by the implicitly defined function
∑
i
Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ
t c
σ−1
σ
it = 1, i ∈ {a,m, s}, (1.12)
where Ωi are constant weights for each sector in the economy,
∑
i Ωi = 1, σ
is the elasticity of substitution, i is the income elasticity for each sectoral
output i, Ct is the aggregate bundle of consumption and cit stands for the
consumption from sector i. Multiplying Ct on both sides of equation (1.12)
yields a CES non-homothetic aggregator that takes the form
Ct =
∑
i
Ω
1
σ
i C
i
σ
t C
σ−1
σ
it , i ∈ {a,m, s}. (1.13)
The key element of equation (1.13) is the parameter i, which governs
the degree of the non-homotheticity. This parameter alone differentiates
the role of income across sectors, and unlike the non-homothetic parame-
ters from Stoney-Geary preferences, the income elasticity does not level-off
in the long-run. This feature is particularly relevant for the service sector
whose consumption grows more than proportional, especially at later stages
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of development.24 The non-homothetic CES aggregator provides a unified
framework to study the role of income on the structural transformation pro-
cess.
Another fundamental parameter is σ, the elasticity of substitution. Ngai
and Pissarides (2007) argue that to generate the observed patterns of labor
allocation described by Baumol (1967) in which workers are displaced from
more productive to less productive sectors, σ must be below the unity. In
this context, the elasticity of substitution also governs partially the effect of
growing capital intensities on the structural transformation, where workers
are displaced from sectors of low capital intensity to sectors of high capital
intensity. This displacement is stronger if σ is inferior to one. Given the
non-homothetic CES aggregator, the intra-temporal household’s problem is
as follows:
Household’s (Intra-Temporal) Problem
max
cat,cmt,cst
Ct s.t. i)
∑
i
Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ
t c
σ−1
σ
it = 1
and ii)
∑
i
pitcit ≤ WtLt +RtKt − 1XNt −Xt
(1.14)
where Xt reflects the optimal investments. Each period a household chooses
optimally the composition of its consumption bundle subject to the implicit
CES non-homothetic aggregator and its budget constraint. The first-order
conditions yield the expenditure shares for each sector i as
pitcit
PtCt
= Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ
t c
σ−1
σ
it , (1.15)
and multiplying both sides of equation (1.15) by pit
PtCt
one gets
24The Stoney-Geary preferences do a good job explaining the transition from agriculture
to non-agriculture activities (see for instance Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002) and
Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2007)) since this transition takes place at low levels of
development when the economy is starting its modernization process. However, the rise of
the service sector takes place at later stages of developments and to understand this fact it
is necessary that the income elasticity for services does not level-off. With Stoney-Geary
preferences the home production parameters play an important role only early stages but
its effect vanishes in the long-run (see the discussion on Stoney-Geary preferences and
home production for the service economy in Buera and Kaboski (2009)).
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cit = ΩiC
i
t
(
pit
Pt
)−σ
. (1.16)
Equation (1.16) illustrates both the supply and demand side mechanisms
for the structural transformation through the allocation of consumption be-
tween agriculture, manufacturing and services. First, the parameter i gov-
erns the income elasticity and generates long-run Engel curves. If i < 1, as
long as the household gets richer and affords a bigger consumption bundle,
the consumption of good i grows less than proportional. This is the case for
agricultural goods. If i > 1 the growth in consumption of good i is more
than proportional compared to the overall bundle Ct, as the stylized facts
suggest to be the case for services. Importantly, the Engel curves generated
do not level off at later stages of development.
On the other hand, the parameter σ governs the supply side mechanisms
of the structural transformation via price effects. For the empirical relevant
case of σ < 1, when the price of a good drops (relative to the price of
the aggregate consumption bundle) due to either increases in TFP or to
an increase in capital intensity, the change in prices is accompanied with
an increase in quantities demanded less than proportional, suggesting an
overall reduction in quantities demanded from sector i. Whereas increases in
TFP combined with a price elasticity of substitution below one account for
Baumol’s (1967) transition of labor from productive sectors (or progressive
as he refers) to less productive sectors, changes in capital intensity are an
additional supply side driver that reduces labor demand. As Adam Smith
(2000, p. 9) conjectured almost 250 years ago, “(...) every body must be
sensible how much labour is facilitated and abridged by the application of
proper machinery”.
Firms
For each sector i ∈ {a,m, s}, output is produced with a constant-returns to
scale technology
yit = Aitk
θit
it l
1−θit
it ; θit ∈ (0, 1), (1.17)
where Ait is the firm’s TFP, kit and lit are the firm’s capital and labor demand
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respectively, and θit is the capital intensity of sector i at period t. Given the
constancy in the returns to scale and the zero-profit condition, the capital
intensity the production process is reflected in the capital income share. The
firm does not have any inter-temporal choices, and each period solves the
following problem:
Firm’s Problem
max
kit,lit
pitAitk
θit
it l
1−θit
it −Wtlit −Rtkit, (1.18)
where pit is the price of output yit at period t. The first order conditions yield
the capital-to-labor ratio and the output price in terms of the time-varying
capital intensity parameters, the relative input prices and the firm’s TFP
kit
lit
=
θit
1− θit
Wt
Rt
, (1.19)
and
pit =
Rθitt W
1−θit
t
Aitθ
θit
it (1− θit)1−θit
. (1.20)
Equation (1.19) demonstrates that in presence of heterogeneous capital
intensities, the capital-to-labor ratios will not be the same across sectors.
Moreover, these differences change over time if one acknowledges the dy-
namic component of capital intensities. Equation (3.7) illustrates the inverse
relation between TFP and prices across sector, which is a key element in Ngai
and Pissarides (2007) to account for the structural transformation. Addition-
ally, one can show using (3.7) that prices are also fundamentally affected by
the presence of time-varying capital intensities. In particular, since the ra-
tio Wt
Rt
is growing in the balanced growth path, increasing capital income
shares have negative effects of prices. The following Lemma formalizes this
statement.
Lemma 1. In the balanced growth path, increasing capital income shares are
negative related with output prices.
Proof. Take logs on both sides of equation (3.7). Differentiating with respect
to the capital income share one gets
∂ log pit
∂θit
= − log
(
Wt
Rt
)
− log θit + log(1− θit).
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Since the ratio Wt
Rt
is assumed to be above one (and growing in the balanced
growth path) the first term on the right hand side drives down the price. For
the next two components of the right hand since, at low levels of capital
intensity the term − log θit+log(1−θit) is positive and could counterbalance
the negative effect of the first component. On the other hand, for high
levels of capital intensity the second part of the term dominates (negatively)
driving down prices even more. In fact, these two terms cancel each other
for a θit of 0.5. But, even increasing capital income shares around a small
neighborhood of low initial levels of capital intensity will have a negative
effects asymptotically on prices since the ratio Wt
Rt
is growing in the balanced
growth path.
Market Clearing Conditions: Closed Economy
In a closed economy, the expenditure shares and consumption shares are
equivalent. The output produced in autarky must be equal to the consump-
tion and investment for each sector. Additionally, sectoral input demands
are equal to the aggregate supplies of capital and labor and the aggregate
output, consumption and investment must be equal to the sum of output,
consumption goods, and investment goods produced in each sector respec-
tively. Therefore, ∀i, in each period t
yit = cit + xit;
lct =
∑
i
lcit; l
x
t =
∑
i
lxit;
kct =
∑
i
kcit; k
x
t =
∑
i
kxit;
Yt =
∑
i
yit; Ct =
∑
i
cit; Xt =
∑
xit.
(1.21)
Equilibrium: Closed Economy
Using the household’s optimal expenditure shares (equation (1.15)), the
firm’s optimal price (equation (3.7)), the production technology (equation
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(1.17)) and the market clearing conditions (equation (1.21)), one gets the
following expression
Wt
PtCt(1− θit) l
c
it = Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ
t c
σ−1
σ
it . (1.22)
With the assumption of equal production functions for consumption and
investment, and the optimal capital-to-labor ratio for sector i in equation
(1.19) one gets
cit = Ait
(
θit
1− θit
Wt
Rt
)θit
lcit,
and plugging this expression in equation (1.22) and solving for the labor
demand lcit one obtains
lcit =
(
Pt
Wt
)σ
ΩiC
i
t A
σ−1
it
(
Wt
Rt
)θit(σ−1)
(1− θit)σ
(
θit
1− θit
)θit(σ−1)
(1.23)
Equation (1.23) reflects consumption component of the absolute labor de-
mand across sector predicted by the model and illustrates the three main
drivers proposed to account for the structural transformation: Time-varying
capital intensities, non-homothetic preferences and heterogeneous TFP growth
rates across sectors. The income elasticity of sector i generates long-run En-
gel curves that do not level off, and as long as the elasticity of substitution
is below one the heterogeneity on TFP growth rates pushes labor toward the
sector experiencing lower productivity growth. In addition, increasing capital
intensities drive labor away from a sector with an elasticity of substitution
below one. I now proceed to formalize this statement.
Proposition 2. In the balanced growth path, the capital income share is
negatively related to the labor demand as long as the elasticity of substitution
is less than one.
Proof. Take logs on both sides of equation (1.23) and after differentiating
with respect to the sectoral capital income share the following expression is
obtained:
∂ log lcit
∂θit
= (σ − 1)
[
log
(
Wt
Rt
)
+ log θit − log(1− θit)
]
− 1
1− θit .
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Notice that only if the elasticity of substitution is below one the first
expression of the right hand side is below one (1 − σ) is negative and the
expression resembles the price effect as described by Lemma 1 where the
effect of increasing capital income shares is negative. In addition second the
term of the right hand side makes the negative effect on labor demand even
stronger.
Proposition 2 shows that the effect of capital intensity is mediated partially
by the price effect together with the elasticity of substitution similar than the
effect of the TFP on prices and labor demand, but there is also an additional
force that affects negatively the sectoral employment that is independent of
the price elasticity. With a price elasticity closer to the unity, time-varying
capital intensities still drives employment out as opposed with to the TFP
channel that depends solely on the elasticity of substitution.
Equation (1.23) describes the consumption component of absolute levels
of labor demand across sectors. In order to derive a system of structural
transformation equations I still need to account for the total labor demand
for production goods in the economy, lct , to construct sectoral labor shares.
Using the market clearing conditions
lct =
∑
j∈{a,m,s}
lcjt
=
(
Pt
Wt
)σ ∑
j∈{a,m,s}
ΩjC
j
t A
σ−1
jt
(
Wt
Rt
)θjt(σ−1)
(1− θjt)σ
(
θjt
1− θjt
)θjt(σ−1)
.
(1.24)
Recall that Proposition 1 states that accounting for the structural trans-
formation in consumption is sufficient in order to account for the structural
transformation in a closed economy. Therefore, since
lcit
lct
=
lxit
lxt
= lit
Lt
, the ratio
of equation (1.23) to the equation to equation (1.24) are the employment
shares in a closed economy model of structural transformation
lit
Lt
=
ΩiC
i
t A
σ−1
it
(
Wt
Rt
)θit(σ−1)
ξit∑
j∈{a,m,s}ΩjC
j
t A
σ−1
jt
(
Wt
Rt
)θjt(σ−1)
ξjt
, (1.25)
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where ξit = (1− θit)σ
(
θit
1−θit
)θit(σ−1)
.
Equation (1.25) delivers a system of structural transformation equations
for agriculture, manufacturing and services in a closed economy where the
(re)allocation of labor depends on time-varying capital intensities, Engel
curves and heterogeneous TFP growth rates across sectors. Two things are
worth highlighting from equation (1.25). First, notice that the term
(
Pt
Wt
)σ
observed in equation (1.24) for absolute labor demands is not part of the la-
bor shares, emphasizing that every element that does not play a differential
role across sectors will not affect the structural transformation. This rein-
forces the convenience of separating inter and intra-temporal trade-offs to
account for labor income shares across sectors. Second, and connected with
the previous argument, notice that the introduction of capital in a model of
structural transformation is only useful as long as different capital income
shares are considered across sectors (even if they don’t change over time as
in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)). Otherwise, (1.25) demonstrates that
constant capital income shares for every sector will not have effects on the
structural transformation. Following the tradition of Debreu (1959, p. 79),
the equilibrium for the closed economy model is defined as follows:
Definition 1: A structural transformation closed economy competitive equilib-
rium is a collection of exogenous time-paths {Ait}i∈{a,m,s} and {θit}i∈{a,m,s}
such that the labor allocations that define the structural transformation in
equation (1.25) are consistent with:
α) The firm’s optimization problem defined in (1.5), (1.7) and (1.18).
β) The household’s problem defined in (1.3) and (1.14).
γ) Resource constraints and market clearing conditions defined in (1.9)
and (1.21).
1.3.3 Opening the Economy: The Role of Market Clearing
Conditions
The labor demand predictions of equation (1.23) are based upon the notion of
autarky in which firms demand labor domestically responding to the house-
hold’s consumption and saving patterns across sectors given the state of their
production technology. However, it is evident that the role of trade across
nations is precisely to break the connection between domestic demand and
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production, and therefore in an open economy the structural transformation
patterns cannot be predicted with domestic labor demands solely. Without
loss of generality, the simplest way to consider a structural transformation
open economy model is to incorporate the effects of trade directly into the
market clearing conditions to discipline the labor demands across sectors.
In an open economy framework the domestic production for any given
sector should be equal to the domestic demand plus the net trade balance
for goods in that sector. In addition to satisfying the needs for the domestic
markets, now a firm belonging to a open sector needs to fulfill orders abroad
while exporting. Exports have positive impact on domestic labor demand
for that sector. On the other hand, domestic demand of goods can also be
fulfilled with imports and openness will have a negative effect on the labor
demand of a representative fir in a sector that faces competition from imports.
I assume that manufacturing is the only tradable sector in the economy.
The rationale of this assumption is twofold: First, the service sector has been
traditionally considered in the literature as a closed sector given the nature
of some services in which production and consumption takes place simultane-
ously.25 Second, Gollin et al. (2007) document that the fundamental element
to understand the transition from agricultural to non-agricultural activities
is the solution of the “food problem”, namely the state of development so
critical that a country uses a large proportion of its resources to the produc-
tion of food. In particular, according to FAO data, most countries at early
stages of development meet their food needs domestically (Gollin et al., 2007,
p. 1,234), thus it is reasonable to consider the agricultural sector as closed
in order to account for the movement of labor out of agriculture observed in
the data. Moreover, the sharp decline in agricultural labor share is a robust
stylized fact observed both in early and late starters regardless of the pattern
of trade. As Kuznets (1968) argues
With no absolute reduction in world-wide per capita use of agri-
cultural products and the prevalence of declines in the share of
agriculture in the labor force, reduced exports or increased im-
ports of agricultural products of country A only shift the question
to countries B, C, D, and so forth. How can these countries ad-
25See for instance Uy et al. (2013) and Betts et al. (2013) who consider a structural
transformation model for South Korea where services are not tradable.
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just to decreased imports from or increased exports to country A,
while their own per capita use of agricultural products does not
decline and agriculture’s share in labor does? This is not to deny
that international division of labor in agriculture (and other sec-
tors) and shifts in it are not important in the study of economic
growth. The only point here is that it cannot be used (...) to
explain trends in the distribution of the labor force and product
away from agriculture, observed in so many countries and not
offset by opposite movements in any (Kuznets, 1968, p. 27).
In addition, exports of good and other agricultural product are considered
as manufacturing output26 that uses agricultural inputs as raw produce.27
The model can be disciplined to account for other tradable sectors, such as
some subset of services tradable, but for the sake of simplicity I assume that
the balance of trade represents flows of manufacturing goods. Therefore, the
manufacturing labor demand has, in addition of a domestic component, a
foreign component given by the net position of the balance of trade
lmt = l
D
mt + l
F
mt, (1.26)
where lDmt represents the labor demand predicted in autarky (equation (1.23)
for i = m) and lFmt represent the adjustment due to the net trade position
due to the presence of foreign markets. The domestic economy shares the
same technology and capital income shares for producing output devoted to
either domestic demand or exports. If the economy is importing manufac-
tures, then the employment loses in the manufacturing sector would be as
if the imported output would have been produced with the domestic tech-
nology and capital income shares. In that sense, the production technology
26Uy et al. (2013) consider agriculture as an open sector, but in their empirical coun-
terpart they relabel some of the categories that belong to manufacturing – such as food,
beverages and tobacco – as agricultural goods. Since I consider agriculture as closed, I
kept these categories in manufacturing, as they are labeled originally in the data.
27Think for instance about the case of coffee beans in Colombia. The production of
coffee is not bound by domestic consumption, but the output that is not consumed do-
mestically is not immediately exported. After the coffee beans are collected from the
trees, they are subject to a process of washing, cleaning and drying and then this raw
produce is purchased by middlemen that sell the beans to manufacturing plants in charge
of threshing, packaging and labelling with the intention to export. In fact, even for do-
mestic consumption the coffee beans need a manufacturing process, meaning that for this
particular example the output of coffee farms is demanded almost in its entirety as an
investment good.
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(equation (1.17)) and the firm’s first order conditions (equation (1.19)) can
be used to determine lFmt as
lFmt =
XNt
Amt
(
θmt
1−θmt
Wt
Rt
)θmt , (1.27)
where XNt represents net exports. Equation (1.27) illustrates the positive
effect of the balance of trade on manufacturing employment. To account for
the manufacturing share in an open economy one can simply observe the net
trade position as an exogenous element in order to determine the adjustment
needed in the manufacturing labor demand. Notice that the trade adjustment
can potentially play an important at low levels of manufacturing TFP and/or
where the capital intensity is low. One can show that besides the observed
TFP growth in manufacturing, growing capital intensities decrease as well
the quantitative importance of the trade adjustment for the prediction of the
labor demand in manufacturing.
Lemma 2. In the balanced growth path, increasing capital income shares
decrease the importance of trade to account for the manufacturing labor de-
mand.
Proof. Take logs on both sides of equation (1.27) and when differentiating
with respect to the sectoral capital income share one gets the following ex-
pression:
∂ logLFmt
∂θmt
= − log
(
Wt
Rt
)
− log θmt + log(1− θmt)− 1
1− θmt .
As demonstrated in Proposition 2, this expression is overall negative for
increasing capital income shares in the balanced growth path.
Three additional considerations need to be addressed regarding the role of
trade on prices and trade frictions. First, if a country is exporting manu-
facturing products the prices are simply described by the firms’ first order
conditions since the country has a revealed comparative advantage in man-
ufacturing. However, when the country is importing manufacturing prod-
ucts, this does not mean that all the domestic production of manufactures is
outsourced since exports and domestic output coexist. Of course there are
possibly several specializations within the manufacturing sector that are not
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traced in this paper and merit further work, but there is no full specialization
in the sense that there will be no domestic employment in manufactures when
the balance of trade is negative. For this reason, due to the co-existence of
domestic manufactures and imports, the price of manufactures is driven by
arbitrage to be equal to the domestic firm’s optimal price. Imports compete
with domestic manufactures and share the domestic market.28
Second, given that there is only one sector involved in trade, the model
necessarily requires the existence of trade imbalances.29 As in Sposi (2015),
for each period the income of households is credited or debited based on the
country’s net exports.
Last, the introduction of trade ignores all sorts of distortions and trans-
portation costs explicitly because the goal is not to determine endogenously
the patterns of specialization but simply to discipline the labor income shares
under the presence of trade. The model takes the net exports as given after
all the trade frictions have played their role on the patterns of specialization
and investigates the effect of the trade position on labor shares. In other
words, all distortions are implicitly incorporated in NXt.
In an open economy the expenditure shares and consumption shares are no
longer equal in manufacturing due to the existence of net exports in this par-
ticular sectors. Recall that these imbalances credits (or debits) the household
each period. Therefore, all the remaining market clearing conditions remain
as if the economy was in autarky. Then, ∀i, t
yat = cat + xat; ymt = cmt + xmt +XNt; yst = cst + xst
lct =
∑
i
lcit; l
x
t =
∑
i
lxit
kct =
∑
i
kcit; k
x
t =
∑
i
kxit
Yt =
∑
i
yit; Ct =
∑
i
cit; Xt =
∑
xit.
(1.28)
28Under the presence of full specialization across sectors one would not even need to
consider international prices for imports to account for its labor demand since the sector
simply would not exist.
29Reyes-Heroles (2016) documents that due to the decline in trade costs, the surge in
net trade imbalances has been notable during the last four decades.
40
Equilibrium: Open Economy
Equation (1.23) accounts for the labor demand of each sector i in a closed
economy. Since manufacturing is the only open sector by assumption, in-
cluding trade reduces to accounting for the foreign labor demand in manu-
facturing. Using equation (1.27) for i = m and the open economy market
clearing conditions (equation (1.28)), the labor demand in manufacturing is
given by
lmt =
(
Pt
Wt
)σ
ΩmC
m
t A
σ−1
mt
(
Wt
Rt
)θmt(σ−1)
ξit +
XNt
φt
, (1.29)
where φt = Amt
(
θmt
1−θmt
Wt
Rt
)θmt
. The system of structural transformation
equations is described by
lit
Lt
=
ΩiC
i
t A
σ−1
it
(
Wt
Rt
)θit(σ−1)
ξit +Om
XNt
φt∑
j∈{a,m,s}ΩjC
j
t A
σ−1
jt
(
Wt
Rt
)θjt(σ−1)
ξjt +
XNt
φt
. (1.30)
where Om is an indicator function that takes 1 for manufacturing (i = m)
and zero otherwise. For the open economy model the concept of equilibrium
is defined as follows:
Definition 2: A structural transformation open economy competitive equilib-
rium is a collection of exogenous time-paths {Ait}i∈{a,m,s}, {θit}i∈{a,m,s}, and
{XNt} such that the labor allocations that define the structural transforma-
tion in equation (1.30) are consistent with:
α) The firm’s optimization problem defined in (1.5), (1.7) and (1.18).
β) The household’s problem defined in (1.3) and (1.14).
γ) Resource constraints and market clearing conditions defined in (1.9)
and (1.28).
1.4 Calibration
To address the plausibility of the theory, I calibrate the model to the de-
velopment experience of South-Korea between 1970 and 2010 and derive the
model’s predictions for the employment shares of agriculture, manufacturing
and services. For the computation of the aggregate allocations, I use the
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inter-temporal optimal choices and the fact that on aggregate the economy
is represented by the neoclassical growth model with one sector. I employ
a shooting algorithm30 to find the entire path allocations for aggregate con-
sumption, wages and the real interest rate since 1954, the first complete
year after the Korean War ended. For the shooting algorithm, a guess for
the value of Kt+1 determines the entire sequence for the aggregate capital.
With this sequence, I compute the time-series for {Ct,Wt,Rt} as a function
of {At, Kt} and the parameters of the model involved in the inter-temporal
optimization problem.
For the intra-temporal optimal allocations, I proceed in two steps. First, to
pin down the income and price elasticities, I use parameter estimates based
system of relative labor demands across sectors using the data from a panel of
countries with comprehensive measures of capital income shares.31 Second, I
normalize the productivity levels in agriculture, manufacturing and services
to 1 in 1970 and calibrate the distribution parameters of the preferences
(the non-homothetic CES weights) to match perfectly the labor shares of
employment for Korea in 1970. With the observed growth in sectoral labor
productivities across sectors, I independently feed in capital income share
values for each sector to identify the capital intensities and then compute
the model’s predictions to generate the time-paths of the employment shares
of agriculture, manufacturing and services.
1.4.1 Test of the Theory
The test of the theory is whether the model’s prediction follows closely the
observed hump-shaped evolution in manufacturing activity for South Ko-
rea. The Korean manufacturing employment share displays a well-defined
hump-shape during the post-WWII years, and World KLEMS provides com-
prehensive measures of sectoral capital income shares for the entire period.
A period in the model is a year in the data. Most countries that have com-
prehensive data on capital income shares across sectors are already at later
stages of development during the sample period where the manufacturing
shares of employment are declining. Thus, the Korean development expe-
rience is a well-suited laboratory with all the ingredients necessary to test
30Appendix A.1 describes the shooting algorithm in detail.
31These data was already introduced in Section 1.2.
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on whether the model is capable to predicting the observed hump-shape in
manufacturing.32
To consider the theory as plausible, the model’s predicted date (or income
level) of the peak of the hump should be in the neighborhood observed in data
and the model should be able to display the rise in manufacturing followed by
substantial decline in its labor share after the peak. In addition, the model
should continue to generate the observed decline in agricultural shares and
the rise in services. As I will show, the model does a good job predicting the
whole hump-shape (rising and declining part) with a manufacturing peak that
is fairly close to the data while delivering closely as well the agriculture and
services shares. The next subsection explain in detail the parametrization.
1.4.2 Parametrization
Table 3.2 presents the parameter values. The set of values are divided accord-
ing to whether they are needed to account for aggregate or sectoral alloca-
tions. Since the parametrization of the one-sector neoclassical growth model
for aggregate variables is standard in the literature, no further comments are
need to explain the parameter values. However, the parametrization of the
intra-temporal allocations is not common and requires a detailed explanation
since it involves four independent steps.
First, I use the model to derive equations for the ratio of labor demand of
agriculture and services relative to manufacturing as in Comin et al. (2015) to
estimate the income (i) and substitution (σ) parameters for the subsample
of countries with measures of capital income shares, as described in Section
1.2.33 This is an important step because as long as capital income shares are
changing over time, the introduction of fixed effect estimators will no longer
control for them.
Second, I normalize the initial levels for productivity and the aggregate
consumption as follows: The productivity levels Ai,1970 are normalized to 1
as suggested by Duarte and Restuccia (2010). This procedure “shuts-down”
the structural transformation mechanism described by Ngai and Pissarides
32Additionally, the Korean structural transformation process has been documented
in detail and has been used as a laboratory to test the role of trade in the structural
transformation. Thus far, the mechanisms proposed only generate the rising part of the
hump-shape (See for instance Uy et al. (2013) and Betts et al. (2013)).
33Appendix A.2 explains in detail the estimation procedure to obtain these elasticities.
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Parameter Value Target/Comment
Aggregate Allocations
Θ 0.5 Aggregate capital income share in 2010.
β 0.96 Preference discount factor in Connolly and Yi (2015).
n 0.01 Average population growth in Korea (1970-2010).
δ 0.06 Average capital depreciation rate in Korea (1970-2010).
γ 0.02 Long-run growth rate in the United States.
Aggregate Time-paths
A1970 1 Normalization, consistent with initial levels of sectoral productivities.
C1970 0.98 Consistent with TFP normalization and optimal aggregate allocations.
W1970
R1970
2.54 Consistent with TFP normalization and with 1−Θ1970
Θ1970
(
K1970
Y1970
) 1
1−Θ1970 .
{At} {·} At = (1 + γKOR)t, where γKOR is the average GDP per capita
growth rate in Korea (1970-2010).
{Ct} {·} Computed with growth rates of Ct, where Ct = f(At,Kt).
{Wt
Rt
} {·} Computed with growth rates of Wt and Rt, where Wt = f(At,Kt)
and Rt = f(At,Kt).
{XNt} {·} Observed trade imbalance (exports minus imports as a share of GDP).
Sectoral Allocations
σ 0.68 Estimation of price elasticity.
a 0.36 Estimation of income elasticity of agriculture relative to manufacturing.
m 1 Homothetic preferences for manufacturing.
s 1.27 Estimation of income elasticity of services relative to manufacturing.
Ωa 0.81 Chosen jointly with Ωm to match the labor shares for agriculture and
manufacturing for South Korea in 1970.
Ωm 0.11 Chosen jointly with Ωa to match the labor shares for agriculture
and manufacturing in South Korea in 1970.
Ωs 0.08 1− Ωa − Ωm.
Sectoral Time-paths
Ai,1970 1 Normalization.
{Ai,t} {·} Computed with observed growth rates of labor productivity.
{θi,t} {·} Observed time-paths for capital income shares.
Table 1.2: Parameter values and targets for the calibration to the South
Korean development experience, 1970–2010. i ∈ {a,m, s}, where a stands
for agriculture, m for manufacturing and s for services.
(2007) for the initial period.34 As a consequence of normalizing the sectoral
productivity levels, the aggregate TFP of the economy is also normalized to
1. With this normalization one also needs to discipline the initial level for
the consumption bundle Ct and the initial wage to interest rate ratio
Wt
Rt
. For
C1970, the aggregate resource constraint implies that aggregate output must
be equal to the total of consumption and investment goods. Therefore, using
the optimal choices for consumption and investment, the implied value for
C1970 with a normalized aggregate TFP is of 0.98. For the initial ratio
W1970
R1970
one can use the first-order conditions of the inter-temporal problem to derive
an expression for the wage ratio as
34However, recall that price effects due to differences in TFP are based on growth rates,
not levels, and the structural transformation process will not be affected if different initial
levels are chosen, as long as the growth rates are in line with the data.
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W1970
R1970
=
(
1−Θ1970
Θ1970
)(
K1970
Y1970
) 1−Θ1970
Θ1970
,
consistent with the TFP normalized to 1. With values for the aggregate
capital income share and the capital to output ratio in 1970,35 the initial
level of W1970
R1970
is 2.54.
Third, for the initial period I use the preference weights (Ωi) as free param-
eters to match perfectly the initial labor shares employment South Korea.
The preference weights Ωi only have level effects on the labor shares of agri-
culture, manufacturing and services once the time-paths for the TFP, the
consumption bundle and the ratio of wages to real interest rates are nor-
malized for the initial period. The role of the preference weights in the
computation of the model prediction’s is limited to match perfectly – by
construction – the model to the initial labor shares
Last, I use the growth rates obtained from the aggregate variables com-
puted in the shooting algorithm36 to compute time-paths for {Ct} and {WtRt }
starting in 1970. Additionally, I use the observed growth rates in labor pro-
ductivity and the measures of capital intensity to compute the time-paths
for the sectoral {Ait}. With time-varying capital intensities I cannot use the
observed growth rates neither from labor productivity measures nor from
direct data of sectoral TFPs because the notion of capital intensity has di-
rect implications on these two objects. Whereas the labor productivity –
defined as real value added per hour worked – includes the role of capital
intensity, the sectoral TFP is constructed as a residual in which the role of
time-varying capital intensity is neglected because the input elasticities used
in the construction of the Solow residual are time-invariant. In order to over-
come these measurement challenges, I compute the TFP growth as the labor
productivity growth adjusted by capital intensities changing over time.37
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1.4.3 Model’s Main Prediction: South Korea’s Manufacturing
Hump-Shape of Economic Activity
Figure 1.10 presents the main prediction of the model. It compares the
model’s manufacturing labor share to the observed manufacturing labor share
in South Korea. Panel 1.10a plots the manufacturing share with respect to
time while Panel 1.10b uses the income level as a reference, which is more use-
ful for cross-country comparisons across different stages of development. The
model successfully generates the manufacturing hump-shape for the South
Korean development experience. In 1970, the manufacturing labor share in
Korea was 17 per cent of the total employment. Whereas the observed trend
illustrates a continuous rise up to 1990 where the peak of the manufacturing
employment share was about 36 per cent, the model’s predicted labor share
rises to a peak level of 37 per cent for the same period. More important, the
model does generate a deindustrialization after the peak in line with the data.
After 1990, the observed manufacturing employment shares falls from 36 per
cent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 2010 whereas the model predicts a slightly
steeper deindustrialization, with an implied fall from 37 per cent in 1990 to
24 percent in 2010. Overall, the model behaves fairly well in comparison to
the data. The model does a good job predicting both the peak level and its
timing in the data when time-varying capital intensities are considered as a
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Figure 1.10: Manufacturing labor share in Korea, 1970-2010. Data vs.
model.
35These values are taken from Penn World Tables 9.0
36Recall that in the shooting algorithm Ct,Wt and Rt are functions of At and Kt.
37Appendix A.3 describes in detail the computation of the Sectoral TFPs.
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additional driver of the structural transformation.
Additionally, Panel 1.10b illustrates that when the manufacturing employ-
ment share is plotted with respect to the income level the message is virtu-
ally the same. The model does generate a manufacturing hump-shape that
resembles the data fairly close and predicts correctly the timing of the dein-
dustrialization. The peak of the model and the peak in the data takes place
about an income of 9.1 log points, or about 9,000 international (GK) dol-
lars. The model successfully generates the hump-shaped pattern of economic
activity in manufacturing for the Korean development experience.
Figure 1.11 plots the predictions of the model for agriculture and services
together with the manufacturing hump shape and compares the outcome of
the model with the data. The prediction of the manufacturing hump-shape
is consistent with the observed decline in agricultural employment share and
the rise in services.38 The model predicts a slightly lower decline during the
1980s and early 1990s, but the distance in the prediction closes after the
1990s. The model also generates the rise in services, although the model
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Figure 1.11: Labor shares in Korea over time, 1970-2010. Data vs. model.
38The model does a good job as well when the labor shares of agriculture and services
are followed with respect to the income level.
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takes longer to start generating the increase in the services’ share compared
to the data. The performance of the model under-predicts the allocation
of labor to the service sector in the 1980s, but the gap between the model
and the data closes after the 1990s as well.Whereas the steep rise in services
starts in the late 1970s, the model starts to generate a rise only after the early
1980s.39 Nevertheless, the model still generate a rise in services consistent
with the Korean development experience.
Figure 1.11 presents the three main stylized facts in the literature of struc-
tural transformation: declining agricultural labor shares, hump-shaped man-
ufacturing employment shares, and rising shares in services. The predicted
equilibrium allocations of labor hours illustrate that time-varying capital
intensities are an important additional driving force of the structural trans-
formation process to account for the core stylized facts of development.
1.4.4 Model’s Prediction for an Early Starter: The United
States’ Structural Transformation
Buera and Kaboski (2009) illustrates the puzzles for the theoretical literature
on structural transformation by using the United States as a laboratory.
They present long time series for the US value added shares starting from
1870 and show that there is also a hump-shape in the manufacturing sector.
However, the challenge for the US is that it is an early starter country and one
needs to go before WWII to find the hump in the employment manufacturing
share, for which unfortunately there is no comprehensive data for factor
income shares across sectors to test the capacity of the model to generate
the hump-shaped economic activity in manufacturing. Nevertheless, several
theoretical models have been tested in light of the United States’ development
experience in spite of the absence of the hump-shape. For instance, Duarte
and Restuccia (2010) show that with a production function whose only input
is labor and with Stoney-Geary preferences one can follow the labor shares
closely for the United States and several European Countries.
The absence of the hump-shape for the post-WWII development experi-
ence in the US makes this country an inferior candidate to test the theory.
However, after showing that the model does generate the hump-shape for a
39With long-run Engel curves, it is not surprising that the rise in services starts to
dominate at later stages of development.
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late starter country like Korea, it is important to show that the model still
does a good job when is confronted with the data of an early starter such as
the United States. For this purpose, I follow a slightly more parsimonious
calibration procedure. Instead of computing the optimal allocations for the
inter-temporal trade-off with a shooting algorithm, I use exogenous growth
rates for Ct and
Wt
Rt
to compute the aggregate time series. This procedure
yields very similar predictions for the Korean development experience when
compared with Figure 1.10a, as shown by Figure A.1 in the appendix. This
calibration is more parsimonious because it takes the inter-temporal trade-
off allocations as given exploits the the intra-temporal allocations, where the
structural transformation takes place.40
Figure 1.12 compares the prediction of the model for the United States
to the observed labor shares between 1948 and 2010.41 The labor shares of
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Figure 1.12: Labor shares in the United States over time, 1948-2010. Data
vs. model.
40One can simply feed the model with exogenous time-paths for Ct and
Wt
Rt
, which
is the same as taking the inter-temporal trade-off optimization as given and repeat the
parametrization procedure for the intra-temporal allocations.
41For the United States, the parameters that match perfectly the data for the initial
period are Ωa = 0.21 and Ωm = 0.25 with an initial aggregate consumption bundle C1948
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equilibrium follow closely the observed labor shares in the United States.
The decline in agricultural labor shares falls from 16 per cent in 1948 to 2
per cent in 2010. The model predicts a decline down to 4 per cent, following
the data closely throughout the period. The decline in manufacturing starts
at a higher level, from 31 per cent in 1948 down to 17 per cent in 2010. The
model’s predicted decline similar, and follows even closer the manufacturing
share, with a small gap opening during the last years of the sample, with a
prediction of the manufacturing labor of 21 per cent in 2010. Last, the model
slightly under predicts the rise in services. Whereas the observed labor shares
in services rise from 54 per cent up to 80 per cent, the predicted rise in services
is only up to 75 per cent of the labor force, and the gap starts to open during
the early 1950s. Overall, the model behaves reasonably well for the United
States, which is a late starter country whose manufacturing share is already
at the downward part of the hump-shape during the post-WWII years. A
model of structural transformation with time-varying capital intensities – in
addition to Engel curves, heterogeneous TFP growth rates and trade – does
account for the main stylized facts of the structural transformation for early
and late starters.
1.5 Alternative Hypotheses and Numerical
Experiments
What is the role of time-varying capital intensities on the structural transfor-
mation? As showed in the previous section, time-varying capital intensities
are the key missing ingredient to generate the hump-shaped pattern followed
by the manufacturing employment share. This section discusses some of the
competing hypotheses discussed in the literature as fundamental drivers of
the structural transformation in comparison with time-varying capital inten-
sities to illustrate that accounting for the changes in the bias toward cap-
ital in the production function is necessary to generate the manufacturing
hump-shape. Nevertheless, I show that the extant supply and demand side
mechanisms proposed in the literature are critical as well to follow closely
the observed labor shares. Time-varying capital intensities are necessary, but
of 1.5 and a wage to capital rental ratio W1948R1948 of 10.84.
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not sufficient to explain the evolution of economic activity in manufacturing.
In addition, I use the model to shed some light on the experiences of
other countries that in spite of having well-defined hump-shape during the
post-WWII years in their manufacturing employment share, data on capita
income shares across sectors are not available. For these countries, I use the
model as a measuring device to generate the implied time-paths of capital
income shares consistent with their structural transformation to see wether
their manufacturing humps are related to a bias toward capital in the pro-
duction function in the manufacturing sector, similar to the Korean case.
Additionally, I use the predicted time series of capital income shares to see
wether they are consistent with the aggregate constancy of the capital income
share.
1.5.1 Alternative Hypotheses
Heterogeneous Time-Invariant Capital Intensities
To discuss the role of time-varying capital intensities I consider a model for
the structural transformation a` la Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) with differ-
ences in capital intensities across sectors but constant over time. Figure 1.13
plots the predicted manufacturing employment share under this scenario and
compares it to the predictions with time-varying capital intensities. Panel
1.13a uses the average of the observed capital income shares for each sector
as a measure of its “constant” capital intensity while Panel 1.13b uses the
initial observation of the capital income share time series to measure this
constancy. For both cases, the model does generate the rise in the manufac-
turing employment share but not the observed decline after the peak. The
combined effect of Engel curves, heterogeneous TFP growth rates and trade
does play an important role for the rise in manufacturing employment shares,
but in absence of time-varying capital intensities, the model fails to generate
the deindustrialization observed after the peak.
When average capital income shares are used, the model over predicts the
manufacturing peak to reach a share of the labor force of 39 per cent, al-
though the observed peak is only 3 percentage points lower. The model does
generate the rise in manufacturing fairly closely in absence of time-varying
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capital intensities. However, Panel 1.13a shows that for 2010 the manufac-
turing employment share was above 36 per cent, which is a value higher than
the historical maximum share of manufacturing in Korea, observed in 1991.
The predicted deindustrialization with constant capital intensities is about
3 percentage points since the 1990s, which is a drop in the manufacturing
share of economic activity that hardly can be called a deindustrialization.
When the initial capital income shares are used to account for the con-
stancy in capital intensity, the model slightly under-predicts the peak of the
manufacturing employment share, but it is still fairly close. Nevertheless,
even with lower levels displayed at the peak, the model cannot follow the
deindustrialization path observed in the data. Whereas the peak of the pre-
diction in Panel 1.13b is above 34 per cent, the predicted manufacturing
employment share in 2010 was above 31 per cent, which again, is a modest
deindustrialization compared to the data. Not even with a lower prediction
for the manufacturing peak the model is capable to predict a close value
for the manufacturing employment share for 2010 in absence of time-varying
capital intensities.
As an additional exercise to highlight the importance of time-varying cap-
ital intensities, Figure 1.14 plots the predictions of the model for the United
States with constant capital income shares in the same spirit as Acemoglu
and Guerrieri (2008). The Figure suggests that in absence of time-varying
capital intensities the models performance is not as good as when this ele-
ment is considered explicitly. In particular, notice that the model does not
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Figure 1.13: Manufacturing labor share in Korea, 1970-2010. Data vs.
model with constant capital intensities a` la Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
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Figure 1.14: Labor shares in the United States, 1948-2010. Data vs. model
with constant capital intensities a` la Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
predict as closely the deindustrialization observed at later stages of devel-
opment compared to Figure 1.12. Figure 1.14 uses the average of capital
income shares to address the constancy of the capital intensity across sec-
tors, but the message with initial capital income shares is virtually the same.
Time-varying capital intensities are a critical additional driver to generate
the observed deindustrialization at later stages of development.
Figures 1.13 and 1.14 suggest that in addition to the traditional drivers
of the structural transformation, time-varying capital intensities are funda-
mental to account for the deindustrialization observed at later stages of de-
velopment, and should be considered as an essential ingredient in a theory
of structural transformation that aims to be consistent with the Kuznets
facts by following closely the evolution of manufacturing activity as long as
economies develop.
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Trade vs. Time-Varying Capital Intensities
In their concluding remarks, Uy et al. (2013, p. 681) suggest that addi-
tional trade features in their model such as the role of China as a competitor
could help to understand the declining part of the hump-shape. In their
words “[their model] does not explain the declining portion of the hump(...).
However, in our view, the key missing ingredient from the calibrated model is
China (...). China experienced manufacturing productivity growth and lower
trade costs that enabled it to essentially take market share in manufacturing
from Korea.”
If a proper treatment of trade, instead of time-varying capital intensities, is
the missing ingredient to account for the Korean manufacturing hump-shape,
a natural question that the model can answer is as follows: In absence of
time-varying capital intensities, what would be the implied balance of trade
in Korea to account perfectly for the observed deindustrialization? Figure
1.15 considers the heterogeneity in capital intensities a` la Acemoglu and
Guerrieri (2008)) and illustrates the implied balance of trade necessary to
account for the manufacturing hump in Korea.
Panel 1.15a uses the average capital income shares as a measure of the time
invariant differences of capital intensity across sectors while Panel 1.15b uses
the initial observations of the capital shares in agriculture, manufacturing,
and services. Notice that the model predicts in both cases an implausible
large balance of trade deficit for South Korea in absence of time-varying cap-
ital intensities as opposed to the observed balance of trade surplus in the
data. This exercise suggests that it is the growing bias toward capital in
the production of manufacturing output rather than trade the missing in-
gredient to generate the observed deindustrialization in Korea, although it
is important to emphasize that the treatment of trade in this paper is em-
bedded in the market clearing conditions assuming that only manufacturing
goods are traded and it plays not role in determining the patterns of trade
endogenously. Moreover, it is not clear whether one should consider trade
and time-varying capital intensities as separable phenomena. As Parente and
Prescott (1994, p. 319) conjecture, “() greater trade openness contributes
to development because it weakens the forces of resistance to technology
adoption”. This excersice simply shows that the counterfactual for trade in
absence of time-varying capital intensities delivers implausibly large trade
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Figure 1.15: Implied trade to account for the observed deindustrialization
in Korea, 1970-2010. Data vs. model with constant capital intensities a` la
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
deficits.
The role of trade on manufacturing has also been considered as a pri-
mary candidate to understand the observed deindustrialization in the United
States. For instance, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) suggest that import
competitions from China have played a sizable role in explaining the decline
in the US manufacturing employment. In that sense, it is natural to re-
peat the counterfactual exercise carried out for Korea to shed some light on
this debate for the United States. Figure 1.16 illustrates that without time-
varying capital intensities, the trade deficit in the United States would need
to be substantially stronger. For instance, the US trade deficit in 2010 in ab-
sence of time-varying capital intensities would need to double its size in order
to account for the observed deindustrialization. This counterfactual is not
necessarily inconsistent with the findings of Autor et al. (2013) but it does
suggest that trade alone is not the primary driver of the deindustrialization
in the United States.
Notice that Panels 1.16a and 1.16b are virtually the same in spite using
averages vs. initial values to account the time invariant value capital income
shares consistent with Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). As a validation ex-
ercise, Figures A.2 and A.3 from Appendix A.5 illustrate that indeed the
implied paths for the balance of trade do generate the observed manufactur-
ing employment shares in Korea and the United States respectively.
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Figure 1.16: Implied trade to account for the observed deindustrialization
in the United States, 1950-2010. Data vs. model with constant capital
intensities a` la Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)
Capital Intensity Over Time: Necessary but not Sufficient Condition
Are time-varying capital intensities a sufficient condition to generate the
observed labor allocations across sectors? Figure 1.17 illustrates the perfor-
mance of the model under difference scenarios. Recall that the equilibrium
allocations of labor hours across sectors are the result of four main drivers:
Time-varying capital intensities, Long-run Engel curves (Comin et al., 2015),
TFP heterogeneous growth rates across sectors (Ngai & Pissarides, 2007) and
trade. Therefore, the natural question that arises is related to the perfor-
mance of the model with time-varying capital intensities in absence of these
drivers. In addition, recall that the model considers trade in a simplistic
manner through the market clearing conditions, so it would be important to
address the sensibility of the model with respect to trade.
Panel 1.17a provides the benchmark prediction for which time-varying cap-
ital intensities operate together with long-run Engel curves, heterogeneous
TFP growth rates and trade. Panel 1.17b shuts down the mechanism de-
scribed by Ngai and Pissarides (2007). This scenario does not suggest the
absence of aggregate TFP growth but only that this process is the same for
each and every sector in the economy and therefore it does not have im-
plications on the structural transformation.42 Notice that the model over
42Putting it differently, in this counterfactual scenario the labor productivity compen-
sates the changes in capital intensity so that there are no differences in the relative TFP
across sectors.
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Figure 1.17: Manufacturing labor share in Korea, 1970-2010. Data vs.
model with time-varying capital intensities under alternative hypotheses.
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predicts the labor participation of the manufacturing sector but importantly,
without this mechanism the model still generates a hump-shape. While the
TFP differences are fundamental to account for the “Baumol’s cost disease”,
in which labor moves from more productive to less productive sectors when
the elasticity of substitution is below one, the hump-shape does not depend
on differences in TFP growth rates across sectors. The reason for the over
prediction is because the labor push toward services from the manufacturing
sector driven purely by differences in TFP growth rates is neglected with the
imposition of homogeneous sectoral growth rates of technology.
Panel 1.17c imposes homothetic preferences. The model under predicts the
role of manufacturing in the structural change but again, the hump-shape is
not driven by the implicitly additive isoleastic non-homothetic CES crafted
by Comin et al. (2015). The non-homotheticity is a fundamental mechanism
to account for the decline in agriculture at early stages of development and
the rise of services at later stages of development. In fact, the primary
reason for the under prediction of the manufacturing sector are the poor
performance in these two sectors. Nevertheless, with time-varying capital
intensities in absence of non-homothetic preferences the model still generates
the manufacturing hump-shape.
Panel 1.17d shuts down the net exports channel and reduces the model to
a closed economy setting, which has been a fruitful approach to document
the structural transformation for countries that started their transformation
early, such as the United States and Great Britain. Notice that trade does
matter fundamentally in order to understand the manufacturing employment
in South Korea. However, it is not due to trade in the market clearing condi-
tions that the model generates the hump-shape. As Uy et al. (2013) illustrate,
trade is an important mechanism to understand the rise of the hump, but
time-varying capital intensities provides the additional force needed to gen-
erate the decline of the employment share. Time-varying capital intensities
in absence of trade generate a manufacturing peak at a significantly lower
level compared to the data, but that peak is around the same time, and
more importantly it is followed by an important decline in the manufactur-
ing employment share unlike open economy settings that neglect time-varying
capital intensities, where the success in generating the rise is not followed by
a steep decline in manufacturing labor shares similar to the pattern observed
in Figure 1.13.
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Panel 1.17e excludes both Engel curves and the heterogeneity in TFP
growth rates and shows that the model with time-varying capital intensities
and trade, in spite of not using two of the main drivers of the structural
transformation proposed in the literature, still generates a hump-shape for
the Korean manufacturing sector, although its peak is observed at a much
higher level. Although the predicted labor shares predicted differ abysmally
from the data, the prediction is still hump-shaped.
Panel 1.17f constrains the model even further by shutting down the trade
mechanism as well. Notice that even when time-varying capital intensities
are the only explanation for the manufacturing hump-shape, the model still
generates a rise and a decline for industrial employment that is not observed
in without this mechanism. Of course, the predicted labor shares differ sub-
stantially from the data in absence of all the additional mechanisms but the
hump-shape is displayed even for this drastic scenario.
The main message of Figures 1.13 and 1.17 is that Engel curves, hetero-
geneous TFP growth rates and trade are fundamental forces to address the
development experience in Korea, but none of them – on their own or com-
bined – generate the manufacturing hump-shape in absence of time-varying
capital intensities. Accounting for the changes in capital intensity in the
production functions of each sector is necessary but not sufficient to gener-
ate to generate the hump-shaped evolution of manufacturing activity that
reasonable resembles the labor shares patterns observed in the data.
1.5.2 Numerical Experiments: Implied Capital Income Shares
for Other Countries
Figure 1.18 plots the data on employment shares and capital income shares
in manufacturing for South Korea with independent ordinate axes. The neg-
ative correlation between capital income shares and employment shares in
manufacturing shows that the hump-shaped evolution in manufacturing co-
incides with movements in the capital intensity in the opposite direction.43
More importantly, the pattern of deindustrialization observed after the man-
43Even though the time series of capital income shares look like the mirror image of
the employment share in manufacturing, recall that the axis are independent and one can-
not compare their levels directly. Moreover, time-varying capital intensities alone cannot
generate the observe path of employment shares, as demonstrated in the previous section.
59
ufacturing peak coincides with a period where the capital intensities in man-
ufacturing rise sharply and substantially. Table A.2 from Appendix A.6
shows that this is consistent with the development experience of South Ko-
rea where the industrialization moved rapidly from labor intensive industries
to capital intensive industries. As Gereffi (1990) argues, Korea pursued an
outward oriented industrialization relying first on light industries that were
labor intensive, and later on heavier manufacturing processes, that where
further removed from their factor endowments. At later stages of industrial-
ization East-Asian countries in general relied more on tech-intensive rather
than labor intensive exports, and Figure 1.18 suggest that this transition
is responsible in great deal for the hump-shaped pattern observed in South
Korea.
Is this pattern similar for other episodes of hump-shaped manufacturing
employment shares? The first-best approach to answer this question would
be simply to look for the measures of capital income shares directly, compare
them with the manufacturing share of employment, and use this informa-
tion and measures of labor productivity to calibrate the model directly with
time-varying capital intensities. Unfortunately, with the exception of Korea,
for most of the countries with well-defined manufacturing employment shares
during the post-WWII, there are no comprehensive measures of capital in-
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Figure 1.18: Employment shares and capital income shares in
manufacturing for South Korea during the period 1970-2010.
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come shares across sectors.
A second-best alternative is to use the model of structural transformation
presented in this paper, which allows for time-varying capital intensities, to
recover the implied capital income shares needed to account for the hump-
shaped evolution of manufacturing activity as well as for the decline in agri-
culture and the rise in services. For the sake of parsimony, I use exogenous
growth rates to compute the time series {Ct} and {WtRt } that are feed in the
model to avoid the computation of the inter-temporal trade-off as shown be-
fore in the U.S. calibration. Even though it is straightforward to derive these
time series endogenously from the model, one would need to account for the
starting date of the transitional dynamics on an individual basis and make
assumptions about the long-run steady state in each country individually,
and for the case of Korea it is clear that the hump-shape does not depend
on the computation of these aggregate time series.
Figures 1.19 and 1.20 use the intra-temporal allocations of the structural
transformation model to recover the implied time-paths of capital income
shares for Argentina and Japan respectively. In absence of information for
capital income shares, I need to impose values for Ωi, i ∈ {a,m, s, } instead
of calibrating them for each country individually. Following Duarte and
Restuccia (2010) I used the values obtained in the calibration for the US
after normalizing productivity levels to one. This procedure has a direct
effect on the implied levels of the capital income shares time-paths because
the initial labor shares of employment are targeted with the first values of the
series. Choosing different values for Ωi, i ∈ {a,m, s, } would yield different
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Figure 1.19: Argentina. Implied capital income shares
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starting levels of the capital income share time-paths. Thus, the object of
interest is the variation observed in capital income shares, rather than their
levels displayed. Panels 1.19a and 1.20a illustrate that, similar to the Korean
case, the capital income shares do exhibit an upward movement that coincides
with periods of deindustrialization, suggesting that for these countries time-
varying capital intensities can potentially help to explain as well their hump-
shaped evolutions in manufacturing activity.
Panels 1.19b and 1.20b use the implied capital income shares to generate
weighted averages as I did in for Korea and the United States in section 1.2
to address whether the predicted capital income shares are consistent with
the Kaldor Facts. Recall that the levels of these predictions should not be
interpreted. For this reason, I normalize the levels of the weighted averages
to match the initial observation of the capital income shares observed in Penn
World Tables to compare the variation of these two time series. Whereas the
prediction with agriculture, manufacturing and services seems to reject the
constancy of the aggregate capital income share, once I consider the caveats
of Gollin (2002) and exclude agriculture to compute the weighted averages,
the predictions are remarkably flat and close to the observed capital income
shares in Penn World Tables. This suggests that the predicted variation for
the capital income shares are reasonable and that the Kaldor facts seem to
hold only after substantial declines in agricultural participation even if capital
income shares are properly measured in the agricultural sector. Appendix
A.7 repeats this exercise for Brazil, Costa Rica, Spain, France, Italy, Mexico,
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
0.34
E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t
S
h
ar
e
(D
at
a)
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
C
ap
it
al
In
co
m
e
S
h
ar
e
(P
re
d
ic
ti
on
)
Right Axis
(a) Manufacturing
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Prediction
Prediction. No Agriculture
Data (PWT)
(b) Aggregate
Figure 1.20: Japan. Implied capital income shares
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Malaysia, Peru, Taiwan and South Africa.44 The results are similar.
In spite of their similar patterns over time suggested by Figures 1.19 and
1.20, it is important to emphasize Argentina and Japan are good examples
of divergent patterns of structural transformation for late starter countries.
To illustrate this point, Figure 1.21 shows the predicted manufacturing capi-
tal income shares (Panel 1.21a) and the observed employment shares (Panel
1.21b) with respect to the income level. Panel 1.21b clearly demonstrates
the point addressed by Rodrik (2015): Whereas Japan followed a pattern
of deindustrialization similar to other advanced economies and started to
deindustrialize after reaching an income per capita above 9,000 international
dollars of 1990, Argentina experienced a premature deindustrialization start-
ing its deployment of labor out of manufacturing at an income per capita
level slightly above 5,000 international dollars of 1990.
Panel 1.21a suggest that to understand this process of premature deindus-
trialization not only in Argentina but in several Latin American countries
(See for instance Figure A.4 from Appendix A.7 for the Brazilian case) the
process of time-varying capital intensities is critical. The numerical exper-
iments suggests that overtime, the growth in the capital income shares in
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Figure 1.21: Argentina and Japan. Divergent patterns of
deindustrialization. Implied capital income shares and observed
employment shares are trended using the Hodrick–Prescott filter with a
smoothing parameter of λ = 100.
44The data on implied time-paths for capital income shares in agriculture, manufactur-
ing and services for these countries are available at https://sites.google.com/site/
luisfelipesaenz/research.
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manufacturing after 1990 observed both in the United States and Korea
seem to be in line with the implied manufacturing capital income shares for
Japan and Argentina.
What is the main driver of a premature deindustrialization? Alvarez-
Cuadrado and Poschke (2011, p. 130) argue in favor of common techno-
logical trends over time. In their words “The importance of time periods
(...) suggests the presence of common trends in technology, most plausibly
in innovation and the diffusion of technology. However, a country’s current
stage in structural transformation also matter.” Similarly, one can think
about the presence of common trends in the bias toward capital in the pro-
duction of manufacturing output, as suggested by the data. After all, the
combination of inputs to produce a manufacture is nothing but a “recipe”
subject to diffusion across nations. The implied capital income shares needed
to obtain the observed deindustrialization suggest that, in line with Rodrik
(2015), openness is critical to address the premature deindustrialization, but
primarily due to its role in the diffusion and adoption of “recipes” that bias
the production toward capital. My conjecture is that the premature deindus-
trialization is largely due to a bias toward capital in manufacturing taking
place at different stages of development. Japan and Argentina experienced
similar evolutions in their manufacturing employment share over time, but
these processes took place at different stages of development. Since Argentina
started to structurally transform later, it was more likely for them to experi-
ence a premature deindustrialization in a world that is more integrated and
shares more knowledge about labor-saving technologies in manufacturing.
1.6 Conclusion
Motivated by the evidence on capital intensity changing over time in man-
ufacturing, this paper argues that the time dimension of capital intensities
across sectors is critical to understand the patterns of structural transfor-
mation, and puts forth a theory whereby time-varying capital intensities
account for the hump-shaped evolution in manufacturing. Extant drivers of
the structural transformation are fundamental to account for the structural
transformation in several dimensions, but only with the introduction of time-
varying capital intensities the theoretical model generates time-paths for the
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manufacturing employment share that follow closely the data. Time-varying
capital intensities are the additional “labor push” needed to generate the
movement of labor out of manufacturing and explain the declining part of
the hump.
This paper presents evidence suggesting that capital intensities across sec-
tors do change over time. This fact has been largely overlooked in the liter-
ature of structural transformation. I show that capital intensities changing
over time and across sectors are consistent with a roughly constant aggregate
capital income share at the aggregate level, which suggest that the Kaldor
facts are not inconsistent with time-varying capital intensities at the sector
level. In fact, the evidence presented here suggests that the bias toward
capital in the production of manufacturing output is accompanied by capital
income shares falling in the service sector as a whole.
Using the development experience of South Korea as a laboratory to test
the theory, I find that time-varying capital intensities are necessary but in-
sufficient for a complete understanding of the labor (re)allocations across sec-
tors. A model of the structural transformation that considers time-varying
capital intensities in addition to long-run Engel curves, heterogeneous TFP
growth rates and trade does captures well the Kuznets facts.
This paper suggests that changes in the capital intensity over time are fun-
damental to understand the development process, and are a plausible candi-
date to explain the divergent patterns of structural transformation observed
in developing countries. This paper considers such changes exogenously and
addresses their consequences. Given their importance for development, a
theory of capital intensity and its differences over time and across sector is
needed. Such a theory needs to reconcile the bias toward capital in manufac-
turing with the growing labor income share observed in the service sector.
65
CHAPTER 2
THE RICARDIAN EFFECT: WHERE
CAPITAL REPLACES LABOR. EVIDENCE
FROM COLOMBIA
“It is not easy, I think, to conceive that under
any circumstance, an increase in capital should
not be followed by an increased demand for
labour; the most that can be said is, that the
demand will be in a diminishing ratio.”
— David Ricardo. 1821
2.1 Introduction
In 1821, for the third edition of his 1817 masterpiece entitled On the Princi-
ples of Political Economy and Taxation, David Ricardo decided to include a
whole new chapter to his bestseller in which he wrote a mea culpa regarding
his previous ideas with respect to the role of machines. Ricardo confessed
that before writing “On the Machinery”, the 31st chapter of his classic, he
was not aware of any conflict between the interests of the laboring class and
the arrival of machines to the production process. In Ricardo’s own words:
(...)I have been of opinion, that such an application of ma-
chinery to any branch of production, as should have the effect of
saving labour, was a general good, accompanied only with that
portion of inconvenience which in most cases attends the removal
of capital and labour from one employment to another.(Ricardo,
1821, pp. 466-67)
David Ricardo devoted a whole new chapter in his Principles to reveal
his change of opinion. His new vision was that the application of machinery
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could reduce labor demand (Ricardo (1821), Samuelson (1989)).1 Regardless
of the virtuosity (or lack of it) of introducing machines for producing goods,
David Ricardo introduced a concept to the economic jargon: The Ricardian
Effect. In short, the The Ricardian Effect is the replacement of labor in the
production process when new capital units are introduced.
Sympathetic with Ricardo’s new chapter, Samuelson (1988) introduced
a “simple classical model”2 in which the invention of robots reduces the
demand for labor permanently, as Ricardo predicted. Contrary to the opinion
of several followers of Ricardo, Samuelson considered chapter 31st as the
best single chapter of Ricardo’s book. He provided a dramatic example to
illustrate that the invention of robots capable of replacing the entire human
labor in the production of corn will yield Ricardo’s prediction: human jobs
are replaced by machines. An interesting implication explained in detail by
Samuelson (1988) is that if robots are relative cheaper compared to labor,
even by just a small fraction, no labor will be demanded at all. Samuelson
crafted this overdramatic example of robots replacing humans as a way of
vindicating Ricardo’s reasoning as logically feasible, at a time when his new
chapter was in doubt and was considered as a logical fallacy (Samuelson,
1988). Lord Keynes also contributed in this debate coining a term to describe
the unemployment created by the introduction of machines: Technological
Unemployment. According to Keynes (1930, pp. 196),
We are being aﬄicted with a new disease of which some read-
ers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they will
hear a great deal in the years to come - namely, technological
unemployment. This means unemployment due to our discovery
of means of economizing the use of labor outrunning the pace at
which we can find new uses for labor.
The debate regarding the complementarity/substitutability between labor
and capital goods in the production process today is well and alive. Burke
and Rumberger (1987) compile a series of papers that address the impacts
of technology on work and education in the United States and Australia.
1The interest reader should consult directly Ricardo (1821) to understand the evolution
of his ideas with respect to the role of machines. The discussion of his arguments is beyond
the scope of this article, mainly because a preliminary discussion of the value labor theory
is imperative in order to address Ricardo’s concerns related with the distribution of income.
2As Paul Samuelson called it himself.
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The principal questions that are addressed in the collection or papers are
related with the job creation/destruction due to the increased used of new
technologies, and with what kinds of jobs will be created and what kinds
will be destroyed. They conclude that new technologies, especially those
associated with micro-electronics, are capable of further routinizing and sim-
plifying tasks into repetitive and machine operated-monitored functions, but
also new technologies enhance the decision role of employees and potentialize
the skills and education of the labor force.
Knights and Willmott (1988) consider that as long as economies are ex-
panding, the substitution of capital for labour due to the dramatic advance in
the use of new technologies is not reflected in unemployment figures instan-
taneously, but with the continuum arrival of new technologies, labor demand
suffers, specially during times of recessions where the technological expansion
is still supported by governments.
Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000) llustrate that changes in
observed inputs of production can explain most of the variations in the labor
skill premium from 1963 to 1991 in the United States. They identify the
following puzzle: The supply of skilled labor increased significantly during
this period but at the same time the skill premium, defined as the wage
of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor, grew grown considerably
since 1980. They argue that with a neoclassical production function whose
technology is capital-skill complementary, the puzzle is explained in terms
on input variations. In short, with the development of better and cheaper
capital equipment the wages of unskilled workers are (relatively) driven down
since unskilled labor is competing not only with skilled employees, but with
persistently cheaper and better machines.
Krusell et al. (2000) found that the substitution elasticity between un-
skilled labor and equipment is 1.67 whereas for skilled labor and equipment
is 0.67. They also found that the skill premium is driven by changes in
observed factor quantities. The supply of skilled labor puts a downward
pressure to the premium, while the capital skill complementarity effect puts
an upward pressure which ultimately dominates. Hanson (2001) considers an
exogenous growth model in which machines are complement to human labor
when they become more productive, but also machines are substitutes for
human labor by taking over jobs. The conclusion of this modeling exercise is
that in spite of the complementary effects due to increases in productivity,
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in the end the substitution effects are dominant.
Acemoglu (2002) contributes to this debate by addressing the direction
and bias of technical change, since in most situations technical change is not
neutral: it benefits some factors of production more than others. He develops
a workhorse to understand why technical change can be skill biased, and why
new technologies introduced during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries were unskilled biased. This framework provides analytically the
conditions for capital and labor to be gross complements or gross substitutes
based on the idea that firms can invest resources to develop technologies that
complement a particular factor. Acemoglu (2002) provides an explicit micro-
foundation to the complementarity/substitutability nature of technology and
production inputs.
More recently, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) proposed a framework called
“A Ricardian Model of the Labor Market” in which they explicitly incorpo-
rate a distinction between Workers skills and job tasks, and they allow the
assignment of skills and tasks to depend on labor supplies, technologies, and
task demands. They consider that the distinction between skills and tasks is
critical to understand how the set of tasks that workers perform responds to
changes in supplies or technology. According to Acemoglu and Autor (2011),
a task is a unit of work activity that produces output while a skill is the
worker’s endowment of capabilities to perform various tasks. They argue
that “(...) an explicit distinction between skills and tasks (...) will enable
the model to allow for certain tasks to become mechanized.” (Acemoglu &
Autor, 2011, pp. 1119) Therefore, in the task-based approach, tasks are ap-
plied to produce output, and skills have an influence in output through its
relation with tasks.
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) consider that the task-based framework can
be used to understand the displacement of labor out of tasks they previously
performed in the workplace when technology (embodied in capital) is used to
perform these tasks. The introduction of the concept of tasks in the produc-
tion function thus allows me to paraphrase the Ricardian Effect within this
framework: The Ricardian Effect is the mechanization of tasks when capi-
tal is introduced in the production function making some workers redundant
since their tasks can be performed cheaper by machines.3
3It calls my attention that Acemoglu and Autor (2011) coined their approach as “Ri-
cardian” without references to Ricardo’s Chapter 31st, where the discussion of the relation
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Roberts and Skoufias (1997) can be considered as the first attempt to
estimate input demand equations for labor using Colombian data for the
period 1981-1987. They divide the labor force between skilled and non-
skilled labor measuring the latter as a weighted sum of employees considered
as skilled workers, local technicians, and foreign technicians.4 They find that
the demand for skilled workers is less elastic than the demand for unskilled
workers, while the output response for skilled labor is greater compared to
unskilled labor. However, a serious limitation of this paper is that there is
no capital demand equation to estimate capital input demands, since their
definition of capital is a binary variable that takes 1 if the plant is owned by a
corporation and 0 if owned by a proprietorship or partnership as if the latter
plants were not demanding new technologies incorporated in their demands
of capital stock.
Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007) also consider demand inputs of labor,
materials and fuel for the US energy plants, but the plant’s stock of capital
available in the industry is not considered explicitly. They measure capital
input by a plant’s capacity and vintage, combining the establishment’s capac-
ity in megawatts with information of unit retirements to define plant-epochs.
Any time the capacity of the plant is significantly changed, they assume a
new plant-epoch specific effect. Instead of defining categorical variables to
measure capital, this paper considers explicitly the capital demand equation
exploiting the information of the physical quantities of capital stock that are
available in the EAM.
The purpose of this article is to provide quantitative evidence of the so-
called Ricardian Effect using a unique plant-level longitudinal dataset for
Colombian manufacturing establishments for the period 1982-1998. The data
requirements needed for establishing a relationship between different inputs
of production are very stringent. It must include at least information of labor
and capital at the plant level, which is the relevant unit of analysis, and it
must vary across time since this relationship is dynamic. This is precisely
between machines and workers is taken explicitly. Instead, they extend the concept of com-
parative advantages using workers (instead of countries) as the unit of analysis given the
differences across skills and tasks of the employees.
4Unfortunately these data is not available for the whole 1982-1998 period in the ‘Plant-
Level Price Indices for Output and Materials” database used in this paper. See section
2.2 for more details related to the data used in this paper.
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the information available in the Annual Manufacturing Survey (EAM5) in
Colombia. Moreover, the variable that measures the labor demand of the
plants in the EAM is disaggregated between production and non-production
workers, and therefore it is possible to disentangle the effects of capital into
the demand of workers (production workers) and managers (non-production
workers).
This paper uses this decomposition of labor force to test whether (i) there
is supporting evidence of the Ricardian Effect in Colombia; (ii) whether this
effect varies between two qualitatively different types of labor (managers vs.
workers); and (iii) whether this effect changed under a period of “market
oriented reforms” whose purpose was, among several others, to reduce dis-
tortions in the factor markets. Any evidence of the replacement of labor force
when new units of capital are introduced in the production process should
be stronger on workers, whose tasks can be more considered as routine.6
Colombia is a very interesting case of study mainly for two reasons. First,
the information at disposal is based on a uniquely rich and representative
data for Colombian manufacturing plants, derived from yearly plant censuses
over the period 1982-1998 with detailed information of physical quantities of
inputs. It is the most complete source of product-level information in a na-
tionally representative plant database in any country (Kugler & Verhoogen,
2012). Second, the Colombian experience can be considered as a “natural
experiment” of exogenous shocks to the relative prices of inputs, since during
the early 1990s, the country underwent countrywide market oriented reforms,
and thus the data provides a clean base for comparison between pre-reform
and Post-Reform periods (Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, & Kugler, 2004).
This paper is a relevant contribution for three reasons: First, up to my
knowledge, no previous attempt has been made to provide quantitative evi-
dence of the Ricardian Effect, mostly due to the stringent data requirements
imposed by the nature of the question. I have not found yet any attempt
to understand the effects of capital demand on managers and workers de-
mand where the unit of observation is a manufacturing plant. Second, this
paper is an empirical contribution to the “task-based approach” framework
5Acronyms in Spanish for “Encuesta Anual Manufacturera”.
6This is consistent with Acemoglu and Autor (2011, pp.1076), who state that “Routine
tasks are characteristic of many middle skilled cognitive and manual jobs (...) Because the
core job tasks of these occupations follow precise, well-understood procedures, they can
be (and increasingly are) codified in computer software and performed by machines.”
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developed by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) where the effects of capital de-
mand on labor differ depending on the tasks performed by the employees.
This article provides some sense of the orders of magnitude of the effects
of capital demand on labor of different qualities based on plant-level data
on a country that experienced structural changes after a “market oriented
reform” process. Third, this paper can be considered as a contribution to
the literature unleashed by Hamermesh (1993) who concluded that demand
estimates for heterogeneous group of labor based on micro-data were almost
absent in the empirical literature. Several papers have faced this challenge,
and this paper in particular considers explicitly the demand of managers and
workers, and its relation with capital demand with data at the plant level,
which is precisely the unit of observation where input demand decisions take
place place.
As Fabrizio et al. (2007) illustrate an important challenge to estimate input
demands is the measurement of input costs. Usually, the level of disaggre-
gation for wages and other costs are not at the plant level. In this paper I
exploited the detailed information for material prices at the plant to produce
relative costs for input together with the time series for wages and capital
costs. This approximation can be considered as a second best approach to
measure input costs given the lack of information on payroll and capital ex-
penditures at the plant level for the manufacturing census in Colombia for
the period 1982-1998.
In order to estimate input demands, I addressed the endogeneity problem
with output using demand shocks that vary across sectors as an instrument.
Output estimates are likely to be downward biased due to the simultaneity
with input decisions, but demand shocks are more likely to be correlated with
output. The planned decisions of inputs and output are taken simultaneously,
but the response to random demand (unplanned) shocks are more likely to be
correlated with output, since react producing immediately with the inputs at
disposal, and the latter effects on input demands are mediated only through
output decisions. This is particularly evident for plants that are below its
production capacity. Regarding input costs Roberts and Skoufias (1997)
argue that elasticities estimated with micro-data are less likely than aggregate
studies to suffer from simultaneous bias. In particular, they consider that
since the supply of labor to a single plant can be viewed as perfectly elastic,
the endogeneity of input costs at the plant level is not a problem. Based
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on the IV estimates, I simulated input demands for capital managers and
workers after a continuous drop in the capital input cost due to the arrival
of vintage and cheaper technology embodied in the capital stock.
Among the principal results, after estimating input demands for capital,
managers, and workers instrumenting output with demand shocks, I found
that the output elasticities for the three inputs are in the range of 0.58 to
0.65, while the price elasticities for capital, managers, and workers are -0.28,
-0.32, and -0.21 respectively. Output elasticities were in fact underestimated
with OLS estimations. This numbers are not only statistically significant but
of great economic importance since they imply that in fact input demands
respond to price changes in a sizable way. Additionally, compared to the
pre-reform period, the reaction for input demands with respect to input
prices during the post-reform era is stronger. The market oriented reforms
in Colombia turned input demands to be more elastic with respect to prices.
This can be considered as suggestive evidence that the goal of making factor
markets more competitive at least is reflected in labor and capital markets
with more elastic demands.
Based on a simulated arrival of cheaper capital goods, these input demand
coefficients are used to predict that, on average, when a plant increases its
capital stock by about 67 per cent, it will reduce its payroll by one manager
and 4 workers. Capital replaces labor, and this replacement is stronger for
employees that perform routine tasks in the work place. This replacement
was also significantly stronger during the post-reform years since reforms
turned input demands more elastic with respect to prices. In fact, the input
demand simulations suggest that after the arrival of cheaper capital goods, a
plant will increase its capital stock about 21 per cent during the pre-reform
period, compared to an increase of 111 percent based on post-reform elastic-
ities. On the other hand, for pre-reform periods a plant will demand one less
manager and two less workers, while for post-reform periods the cut will be
of 2 managers and 5 workers. After performing several robustness check, I
found that these effects are not driven by plant’s observable characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the
data and provides a brief description of the Colombian context in light of
the evidence. Section 2.3 illustrates the empirical strategy pursued in this
research. Section 2.4 presents the main results of the paper. Section 2.5
performs some robustness checks and section 2.6 provides some concluding
73
remarks.
2.2 Data
The database comes from the project “Plant-Level Price Indices for Output
and Materials” created under a technical cooperation between the Colombian
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE hereafter for its
acronym in Spanish) and John Haltiwanger from Maryland University. This
database have the same coverage period and most of the information that was
used in Eslava et al. (2004). The information gathered is taken directly from
the Colombian Anual Manufacturing Survey (EAM hereafter for its acronym
in Spanish).
The EAM is an unbalanced panel that has information since 1982 of any
industrial establishment in Colombia that employs ten or more employees,
or that its annual output is worth more than 65 million Colombian pesos
(around 35 thousand dollars) at the reference year. These reports are ad-
justed each year with the producers price index created by the Colombian
Central Bank. The dataset of Haltiwanger’s project contains information for
each establishment of the manufacturing sector for the following variables:
production, capital (buildings, structures, machinery, and equipment), em-
ployees (production and non-production personnel), hours worked (average
hours worked per employee times number of employees per sector per year),
materials (intermediate consumption), and energy consumption. Produc-
tion, capital and materials are in constant thousands of pesos of 1982, whilst
energy is in Kw per hour.
Eslava et al. (2004) and the technical document that accompanies the
“Plant-Level Price Indices for Output and Materials” database provide de-
tailed documentation of the construction of the variables. However, since the
measurement of capital, managers, and workers is critical for my purposes,
I will explain briefly the construction of these variables that is contained in
both documents.
2.2.1 Capital
The capital stock is constructed recursively based on the following formula:
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Figure 2.1: Input quantities. Index for machines and equipment, and for
buildings and structures: Both lines represent averages per year for the
plants of the manufacturing sector. 1982 = 100. Source: EAM.
Kit = (1− δ)Kit−1 + Iit
Dt
where Kit are the units of physical capital for plant i in year t, Kit−1 are units
of physical capital for plant i in year t − 1, δ is the depreciation rate, Iit is
the gross investment for plant i in year t, and Dt is the gross capital deflator
for year t.7 The capital stock series only includes equipment, machinery,
buildings, and structures. With the information on fixed assets reported by
each plant together with depreciation rates and inflation reported to adjust
fixed asset values, gross investment series for each plant are generated to
compute the capital series (Eslava et al., 2004).
Figure 2.1 illustrates the average per year of the components of the capital
for the plants of the manufacturing sector. The components of capital are
the buildings and structures, and the machinery and equipment reported by
the plant at any given year. The sum of these two components compose the
7See Eslava et al. (2004) and the technical document of the construction of variables
of the “Plant-Level Price Indices for Output and Materials” for the details regarding the
depreciation rates, deflators, the generation of the gross investment series for each plant,
and the assumptions for the initial capital stocks.
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capital of each plant. Samuelson (1988) considers that the ideas exposed in
his Ricardo’s chapter 31st should be extended beyond the concept of ma-
chines and include the entire capital stock held by the unit of production.
Therefore, I consider that the Ricardian effect should be understood in terms
of the capital stock, not only on the subset of capital reported as machines.8
The average capital for the manufacturing sector has increased since 1982 for
both of its components. The capital growth was slower before 1991, and no-
tice that it was rather flat during the period 1984-1990, and only after 1991
it recovered its pace of growth. During the period 1982-1998 the Buildings
and Structure Quantity Index had a four fold increment while the Machines
and Equipment Quantity Index multiplied by more than 7 times.
In the Colombian context, 1991 is a year that deserves special attention.
After the infamous murder of Luis Carlos Gala´n, the virtual winner for the
1990 presidential elections, Cesar Gaviria won the presidency for the period
(1990-1994). President Gaviria was a technocrat who worked in Gala´n’s
campaign as Chief of Staff. During his tenure several episodes marked dra-
matically the modern history of the country: Pablo Escobar was killed and
his entire drug cartel was dismantled after years of terror; the most em-
blematic left-wing guerrilla group, the M-19, signed an armistice with the
Colombian Government, and a new constitution in 1991 created a whole
new legal environment in every level of the State. Additionally, during the
early nineteens the Colombian economy underwent extensive structural re-
forms whose purpose were to enhance the role of productivity and undermine
the role of demand of factors, with special emphasis on artificially imperfect
competitive markets (Eslava et al., 2004). In particular, dismissal costs on
labor were reduced dramatically, the average tariffs fell significantly, capital
markets and banking legislation were modernized, and restrictions on FDI
were removed (Eslava et al., 2004). In spite of all the plant heterogeneity
across the manufacturing sector that Figure 2.1 is incapable to capture, it is
illustrative that the average capital has increased more dramatically precisely
during this “post-reform” environment.
8Moreover, if I decide to consider the components of the capital series individually,
I would need prices for each of these variables to estimate input demands. This is not
feasible for me with the data sources that I have at disposal, but further research on
this area would be enlightening to understand the effect of each of the components of the
capital on labor demand.
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Figure 2.2: Input quantities. Index for managers and workers based on
number of employees (left panel), and for manager hours and worker hours
based on number of employees times hours worked (right panel): Each line
represent averages per year for the plants of the manufacturing sector. 1982
= 100. Source: EAM.
2.2.2 Labor
The EAM divides the labor force between production and non-production
workers based the qualitative differences of the tasks performed at the work-
place. Appendix B.1 illustrates the taxonomy used by the EAM to classify
both production and non-production personnel. Workers are presumed to
perform more routine tasks than managers, since they are directly involved
in the production process, whereas managers are in charge of the decisions
to run the plant. From Appendix B.1 it is clear that there is a class of tasks
labeled as managers that involve more skills and are less prone to routine,
and this family of tasks is not found in the category of workers. However,
Appendix B.1 also illustrates that the task-based distinction is not as clear
as the separation between water and oil since there are some tasks labeled
as managers that can be thought of as routine. Nevertheless, I consider that
the distinction made by the EAM is a good approximation (with some mea-
surement error) to disentangle the labor force between managers and workers
based on what they do at their workplace.
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The left panel of Figure 2.2 plots the evolution for the average number
of managers and workers while the right panel plots the average number
of manager hours and worker hours employed. On average, both panels
illustrate that the the demand of workers has been consistently below relative
to the demand of managers, but with a wider gap during the post-reform
period. The Index for workers fell from its 100 base in 1982 to almost 80 in
1990. It rose back to 100 during the next two years but after 1994 it fell again
to levels even below 80. For worker hours the message is similar, although
this index was above 100 at is 1994 peak. On the other hand, the average
number of employees labeled as managers was more or less steady until 1990,
then it reached a peak of 130 in 1995, and later it fell again, but still above
its initial 100 base. When manager hours are considered, the amplitude is
bigger but the message is the same.
The comparison between the left and right panels of Figure 2.2 should not
be interpreted as a illustration between the extensive and intensive margins
for the demand of managers and workers. The EAM does not have hours
discriminated between managers and workers. In fact, the total hours worked
are not observed at the plant level. Following Eslava et al. (2004), I am
computing the total hours per worker from a given plant with the average
number of hours worked at the plant’s industrial sector at the three-digit
level.9 This measure of hours varies across sectors and years, not across
plats within a sector in a given period. The average hours per week worked
throughout the sample is 38, which is close to usual 40 hour schedule per
week observed in Colombia.
Since I am not capable of discriminating between the hours worked between
managers and employees, I am assuming that all the payroll of a given plant
shares the same working schedule. This is not an unreasonable assumption.
It is just saying that in order to operate, the plant needs both managers
and workers to be present at the workplace at the same time. However, this
approach is not capable of discriminating between the extensive or intensive
use of the labor force. It is just rescaling the labor force by the number of
hours employed in the sector where the plant belongs. A proper discussion
between extensive vis a` vis intensive employment of managers and workers
and its relation with the stock of capital demands data on manager and
9The sectors in the EAM are classified using the United Nations International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) of All Economic Activities, Revision 2.
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Figure 2.3: Input quantities. Index for managers and workers based on
number of employees (left panel), and for manager hours and worker hours
based on number of employees times hours worked (right panel): Index for
capital (machines, equipment, buildings, and structures) in both panels.
Each line represent averages per year for the plants of the manufacturing
sector. 1982 = 100. Source: EAM.
worker hours separately.
Figure 2.3 plots both Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 in a single graph to get
a visual illustration of the evolution of the demand of capital and labor.
Compared to the capital demand, the evolution of the labor demand looks
almost like a flat line, even when hours worked are considered. Figure 2.3
suggest that the manufacturing sector in Colombia was not an important
engine for job creation; its expansion is more reflected in capital inputs, and
the differences between workers and managers are not sizable compared to
the capital demand, on average.
It is not clear from Figure 2.3 that the pattern of capital and labor demand
is not just an average that is not reflecting the sectors of the manufacturing
industry when they are analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Figure 2.4 repli-
cates the exercise of Figure 2.3 for each of the three digit level sectors, and
it establishes that the pattern observed in Figure 2.3 is roughly consistent
with the experience observed in every industrial sector but one: Petroleum
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Food Beverages Tobacco Textiles
Wearing Apparel Leather Footwear Wood
Furniture Paper Printing Industrial Chemicals
Other Chemicals Petroleum Refineries Petroleum Products Rubber Products
Plastic Products Pottery Glass Mineral Products
Iron and Steel Metals Metal Products Machinery
Electric Machinery Transportation Equip. Scientific Equip. Other
Figure 2.4: Input quantities. Index for managers [green line] and workers
[red line] based on number of employees, and index for capital (machines,
equipment, buildings, and structures) [blue line]: Each line represent
averages per year per sector (three digit level) for the plants of the
manufacturing sector. 1982 = 100. Source: EAM.
Refineries. Sa´enz (2010) documents that the Petroleum Refineries sector is
an outlier in terms of investments in Research and Development, and Bucheli
and Sa´enz (2014) argue that historically the petroleum sector in Colombia
has faced high technological barriers that were critical to the early establish-
ment of oil multinationals in order to surpass these limitations. Therefore, it
is not surprise that for the period 1982-1998 the capital stock in this sector
was already at a high level, and thus its growth for the last two decades of
the twentieth century is not impressive relative to its labor demand.
2.2.3 Input Costs
In order to estimate input demands I need information on relative prices
of inputs. Unfortunately, the EAM only contains prices at the plant level
for output, materials and energy. Therefore, I used alternative sources of
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information related to wages and capital cost. The webpage of the Colombia’s
Central Bank provides the historical series for the Producer Price Index (PPI)
since 1970 under several classifications. In particular, under the category:
“PPI by use or destination of good” the subcategory of capital goods is
available. The Capital Cost Index then is measured as the capital goods’ PPI
relative to the manufacturing PPI, normalized to a base of 100 for 1982.10
Regarding labor costs, Urrutia and Ruiz (2010) present real wage series
for several sectors and periods in Colombia. They provide the real wages
discriminated by economic activity for the period 1980-2006. I constructed
the Industrial Wage Index as the industrial wages from Urrutia and Ruiz
(2010) multiplied by the consumer price index (CPI) and divided by the
manufacturing PPI, normalized to a base of 100 for 1982. I also used the
series of minimum wage deduced from the Colombian National Government
Decrees to construct the Minimum wage Index as the nominal minimum wage
divided by the manufacturing PPI, normalized to take 100 for 1982.11 I am
assuming that the relevant cost for the demand of managers and workers
is captured by the Industrial Wage Index and the Minimum Wage Index
respectively. This assumption has two caveats. First, it is possible that the
Industrial Wage Index is capturing part of the disbursements of the plants
to pay workers so this index could be underestimating the relative costs paid
for managers. Second, it might be also that some workers get paid below
the minimum wage in informal settings, although this is less likely due to
the requirements that a plant must fulfill to be considered in the EAM. It is
necessary to recall this possible biases when interpreting the price effects on
input demands, but the important contribution of this exercise is to get two
different proxies for the costs of managers and worker.
10There is an extensive literature related with computations of capital costs in Colom-
bia, but i) they consider the capital cost mostly in terms of the opportunity cost, ii) these
calculations do not vary across plants or sectors in the manufacturing industry, and iii) the
PPI of capital goods is already a major component of the capital costs in the algorithm.
For the purposes of this document, using the PPI solely to construct relative costs of in-
puts is an approach more clean and tractable compared to using of any of the algorithms
available. See Die´z, Gaita´n, and Valderrama (2011) for a short literature review and sum-
mary of the methodologies related with the computation of capital costs in Colombia.
In particular see the discussion in Die´z et al. (2011) regarding the lack of consensus to
estimate capital costs.
11The minimum wage is available since 1984. To complete the series backwards up to
1982 I will use the growth in the real wage for the industry for those two years to have
the base for 1982 for the three series.
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Figure 2.5: Input prices: Capital and labor: The Capital Cost Index is
measured as the capital goods’ Producer Price Index (PPI) relative to the
manufacturing PPI, normalized to a base of 100 for 1982. The Industrial
Wage Index is computed as the real industrial wage multiplied by the
consumer price index (CPI) and divided by the manufacturing PPI,
normalized to a base of 100 for 1982. The Minimum Wage Index is
computed as the nominal minimum wage divided by the manufacturing
PPI, normalized to take 100 for 1982. The growth rates of the Industrial
Wage Index were used to complete the series of the Minimum Wage Index
for 1982 and 1983, since the minimum wage decrees started in 1984.
Sources: Colombia’s Central Bank, Colombian National Government
Decrees, and Urrutia and Ruiz (2010).
Figure 2.5 illustrates the indexes of the costs of capital, managers, and
workers relative to the manufacturing PPI for the period 1982-1990. The
three series plotted in Figure 2.5 can be considered as second best alternatives
to the non-existent data on capital and labor costs that each plant of the
manufacturing is disbursing during the period 1982-1998. From 1982 to 1986
the cost of capital relative to the other manufacturing costs was grew about
25 per cent, but from 1986 to 1990, the capital cost index decreased a few
points (around 115). During the pre-reform period the capital cost reduction
gained momentum and it ended in 1998 below the 100 base of 1990. This
is consistent the fact that after the reform process, the average tariffs fell,
the banking sector was modernized, and the prevailing sectorial restrictions
to Foreign Direct Investment were removed(Eslava et al., 2004; Edwards &
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Steiner, 2008).
The labor costs relative to the manufacturing PPI fell during the pre-
reform period, but since 1991 they rose consistently. Moreover, during the
post-reform period the gap between industrial wages and minimum wages is
opened. This increment can be explained not only through the fall in capital
costs (since its a relative cost), but also through the fact that in spite of the
policies oriented to enhance the flexibility on hiring labor force as well as the
reduction in hiring costs, the reform period introduced also mechanisms to
provide better protection of the worker’s rights, and protection to the union
activity (Edwards & Steiner, 2008). Additionally, in 1993 a national reform
increased by 13.5 per cent the contributions of payroll to social security,
where 75 per cent of these contributions were paid directly by employers
(Eslava et al., 2004).
Figures 2.2 and 2.5 can be used to paraphrase Krusell et al.’s (2000) puzzle
within the Colombian context: While the cost of mangers has increased
more than the cost of workers, the demand of managers has increased more
relatively. Krusell et al. (2000) would suggest that the reason is to be found
in the complementarities between skilled workers, presumably managers, and
capital. I argue that capital and managers are less substitutes than workers
and managers, or that the Ricardian Effect is stronger for workers than for
managers. It is a similar message, but based on different premises.
2.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents the principal descriptive statistics. Capital, total employ-
ment hours, materials, energy, output, and demand shocks12 are in logs, and
the cost indexes are normalized to a base of 100 for 1982. For the period
1982-1998, the number of observations for all variables oscillates between 90
and 100 thousand, although the indexes for capital, managers, and workers
are repeated observations of the same sector (or plant) invariant number per
year in the panel. The average of capital is 8.44 with a standard deviation of
2.12. Its range is from -2.3 to 17.44 log points. The average number of man-
agers is 20, and the standard deviation is 54, which indicates an important
concentration in the right tail since the range goes from 0 to 1,882. The av-
12In section 2.3 I will describe in detail the construction of the demand shocks.
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Capital 8.44 (2.12) -2.3 17.44 96,232
Managers 20.04 (54.55) 0 1,882 100,112
Workers 52.12 (121.65) 0 5,229 100,112
Total Emp. Hours 10.96 (1.17) 6.68 17.81 99,102
Materials 9.89 (1.89) -1.11 17.79 90,938
Energy 11.42 (1.93) 0 20.29 99,476
Capital Cost Index 108.27 (10.07) 93.51 125.32 100,114
Industrial Wage Index 108.83 (18.84) 91.13 153.28 100,114
Minimum Wage Index 104.32 (11.21) 91.7 128.96 100,114
Materials Price Index 767.47 (962.82) 34.52 58847.97 91,540
Energy Price Index 8,394.5 (1,344,645.04) -10,872.46 373,056,000 100,114
Output 10.68 (1.78) -1.87 18.46 100,114
Demand Shocks 5.12 (2.65) -1.62 32.08 100,114
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics. 1982-1998: Capital, total employment
hours, materials, energy, output, and demand shocks are in logs, while
indexes are normalized to a base of 100 for 1982.
erage number of workers is 52, with a standard deviation of 122, showing the
same concentration pattern since the range goes from 0 to 5,229 workers. For
the whole period, the industrial sector in Colombia demanded, on average,
more managers than workers, but the standard deviation suggest an impor-
tant degree of variability in the sample. The log average of total employment
hours is close to 11, which is about 60 thousand labor hours (employees times
hours worked), with a standard deviation of 1.2. The averages for materials
and energy are 9.9 and 11.4 respectively.
Regarding cost indexes, the descriptive statistics of Table 2.1 for capital
cost and wages simply reflect the message of Figure 2.5 since they are nothing
but time series. However, for materials and energy costs, the data has infor-
mation that varies across plants. The average index for materials is 767 while
for energy is 8,394. There is an important degree of dispersion in the data
for these two inputs. The standard deviation for the materials price index is
962.82 while for energy is 1,344,645. This excessive volatility in energy prices
is possibly explained from the fact that energy consumption is measured in
Kw per hour and the bill of Kw per year, reported directly in the EAM, and
the energy prices per plant can be considered on its own a measure of capital
utilization. Prices of materials (and output) are constructed with Tornqvist
indices where weighed average for growth in prices of materials (or products)
generated by the plant are used.13
13See Eslava et al. (2004) and the technical document of the “Plant-Level Price Indices
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Panel A. Pre-reform Period. 1982-1990
Capital 8.21 (2.05) -2.3 17.22 53,034
Managers 18.23 (51.93) 0 1,553 55,298
Workers 51.96 (122.48) 0 5,229 55,298
Total Emp. Hours 10.97 (1.1) 6.95 16.13 55,055
Materials 9.60 (1.85) -1.11 17.5 51,741
Energy 11.3 (1.88) 0 20.29 54,762
Capital Cost Index 113.98 (9) 98.44 125.32 55,298
Industrial Wage Index 96.49 (3.83) 91.13 102.04 55,298
Minimum Wage Index 98.09 (3.42) 92.54 102.04 55,298
Materials Price Index 307.29 (343.94) 40.69 23,109.16 52,280
Energy Price Index 7,506.85 (1,586,504.62) 0.06 373,056,000 55,298
Output 10.49 (1.67) 5.15 18.05 55,298
Demand Shocks 5.08 (2.6) 0.07 31.76 55,298
Panel B. Post-Reform Period. 1991-1998
Capital 8.75 (2.18) -2.13 17.44 43,198
Managers 22.28 (57.53) 0 1,882 44,814
Workers 52.31 (120.62) 0 2,849 44,814
Total Emp. Hours 10.95 (1.25) 6.68 17.81 44,047
Materials 10.25 (1.88) 0.21 17.79 39,197
Energy 11.55 (1.99) 0 20.19 44,714
Capital Cost Index 101.23 (6.05) 93.51 113.16 44,816
Industrial Wage Index 124.06 (18.84) 95.26 153.28 44,816
Minimum Wage Index 112.02 (12.62) 91.7 128.96 44,816
Materials Price Index 1,380.27 (1,160.36) 34.52 58,847.97 39,260
Energy Price Index 9,489.76 (966,109.47) -10,872.46 201,600,000 44,816
Output 10.9 (1.88) -1.87 18.46 44,816
Demand Shocks 5.18 (2.72) -1.62 32.08 44,816
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics. Panel A: Pre-reform period (1982-1990).
Panel B: Post-reform period (1991-1999): Capital, total employment hours,
materials, energy, output, and demand shocks are in logs, while indexes are
normalized to a base of 100 for 1982.
Last, Table 2.1 shows that for the full sample, the average output per plant
was about 10.7 with a standard deviation of 1.8 with a minimum of 1.87 and
a maximum 18.46 log points. The “Plant-Level Price Indices for Output
and Materials” also provides data on demand shocks with different sectorial
elasticity computed in Eslava et al. (2004). The average demand shock is of
5.1 log points, with a standard deviation of 2.6. The range for this shocks
goes from 0.1 to 31.8.
In order to provide a first snapshot of the differences between pre and Post-
Reform periods in the sample, Panels A and B of Table 2.2 splits the sample
for Output and Materials” project for more details on plant level prices.
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between 1982-1990 (Pre-Reform Period), and 1991-1998 (Post-Reform Pe-
riod) and provide the main descriptive statistics for each period. The capital
increased from 8.2 to 8.8 log points. In 1982 thousand pesos, this is a dif-
ference of about 2,633, on average, for the period after the the reforms. The
average number of managers in the Pre-Reform Period is 18 while for in the
Post-Reform period is 22, a substantial difference of 5 workers per plant, on
average. The number of workers on the other hand remain virtually the same
around 55 per plant on average. The output increased in the post-reform pe-
riod on average about half log point, or 18,000 thousand pesos of 1982. Table
2.2 delivers the following stylized fact: During the post-reform era, the plants
on average increased its production and its demand of capital and managers,
while the demand of workers remained stagnant. It is also noticeable that the
number of observations between pre and Post-Reform periods was reduced in
about 10,000 observations. Even though there are 9 years in the Pre-reform
Period and only 8 years for the Post-Reform Period, Table 2.2 suggests that
some plants did not survive the new competitive environment imposed by
the market oriented reforms.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
In order test test whether the transition from cost-of-service regulation to
market oriented environments for many US electric generating plants had an
impact on cost minimization, Fabrizio et al. (2007) estimate input demands
based on a cost-minimization optimization from a Cobb-Douglas production
technology to obtain a system of input demand equations that ultimately
depend on quantities and prices. As Fabrizio et al. (2007) did, I derive
input demand equations based on the Cobb-Douglas production technology
as illustrated in equation (2.1):
Yit = Ait
n∏
j=1
X
αj
ijt, (2.1)
where Yit is the production of plant i in year t, Xijt is the demand of plant i for
input j in year t. The inputs of production considered are: capital, managers,
workers, energy, and materials (n = 5). Unfortunately, The EAM does not
contain information of the skill level of the labor force at the plant level that
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allows me to build the bridge proposed by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) from
skills to tasks to production. In other words, I am not considering a General
Equilibrium framework that considers the decisions of the households to react
to the Ricardian Effect by improving their skill level, or to migrate to other
sectors in the economy (for instance services). Therefore, as in Krusell et al.
(2000), I will focus on the production abstracting from the household sector
with the five-input production function presented in equation (2.1):
A given plant i at year t takes the input costs as exogenous parameters in
their optimization process, yielding the following FOC:
∂Yit
∂Xijt
: AitαjX
αj−1
ijt
n−1∏
k 6=j,k=1
X
αj
ikt = Cijt, (2.2)
where Cijt is the cost of input Xijt relative to inputs Xi−jt. Equation (2.2) can
be rewritten to include directly the production level, as shown in equation
(2.3):
αj
Yit
Xijt
= Cijt. (2.3)
Notice that the effects of TFP (Ait) are captured directly in equation (2.3)
in the level of production Yit. After taking logs on both sides of equation (2.3),
I get the following input demand equation in terms of prices and quantities.
logXijt = β0 + log Yit − logCijt, (2.4)
where β0 = log(αi). From equation (2.4) I can derive an econometric model
to estimate demand equations for each input exploiting the idiosyncrasy of
the observations given the level of disaggregation provided by the EAM, as
illustrated in equation (2.5):
logXijt = β0 + β1 log Yit − β2 logCijt + γi + δt + εijt, (2.5)
where γi stands for plant fixed effects, δt measures the time fixed effects,
and εijt is an idiosyncratic error term. Additionally, since I am interested
in the effects of the “market oriented reforms”, which can be thought of as
exogenous sources of variation to the relative prices of inputs, equation (2.6)
includes the interaction between the relative costs, logCijt, and the binary
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variable PR that takes 1 for the 1991-1998 period, and 0 otherwise.14
logXijt = β0 +β1 log Yit−β2 logCijt−β3(logCijt×PR)+γi+δt+εijt. (2.6)
On the right hand side of equation (2.6), notice that all regressors can be
considered as exogenous but one: log Yit, the level of production.
15 Roberts
and Skoufias (1997) argue that the planned decisions of inputs and output are
taken simultaneously, but the response to random demand shocks are more
likely to be correlated with output, since plants respond to unplanned positive
random shocks by producing more with the inputs at disposal, and the later
effect on input demands are mediated only through output decisions. This
is particularly true if plants are not operating at its full capacity, since they
can produce more output instantaneously with the same level of inputs.16
Moreover, demand shocks with different sectoral elasticity are more likely to
be perceived as industry-specific shocks to be responded with production,
than economy-wide shocks to be responded with either price changes and/or
cost restructuring that will have direct impacts (not mediated though pro-
duction) on input demand. The effects of demand shocks on inputs therefore
will only take place through the output channel (through the second stage).
Fabrizio et al. (2007) instrument plant output with a nonlinear function of
state demand. They argue that state-level electricity demand is likely to be
highly correlated with output, and less with inputs and that their approach
is particularly effective for capturing the response to demand fluctuations in
real time. In the same spirit, I argue that for the manufacturing sector in
Colombia it is more likely that plants react to positive demand shocks by
increasing their production rather than for instance, by hiring more workers
or buying more machines. In order to address this endogenenity issue I
propose to use the estimated demand shocks with different sector elasticities
estimated in Eslava et al. (2004) and available in the “Plant-Level Price
Indices for Output and Materials” dataset as a plausible instrument for the
14Notice that the level effects of the reform process are already captured by δt, the time
fixed effects.
15Roberts and Skoufias (1997) argue that input cost elasticities estimated with micro-
data are not suffering from simultaneous bias, since from the point of view of a single
plant, the supply of inputs is perfectly elastic.
16However, I consider that this strategy is weak for the estimation of energy demand
since this particular input is closely related with capacity utilization.
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production level.17 Eslava et al. (2004) estimate demand shocks to capture
the demand component of profitability with the log residual of the following
inverse-demand:
Pit = Y
−ρ
jt Djt.
With prices and production disaggregated at the plant level, it is possible
to obtain estimates of plant-level demand shock. Importantly, the estimates
for inverse elasticities of demand (−ρ) vary across sectors, providing an ad-
ditional variation at this level of disaggregation.18
Equation 2.7 illustrates the first stage regression where demand shocks are
used to address the endogeneity of the production level:
log Yit = θ0 + θ1 logDit + θ2 logCijt + θ3(logCijt×PR) + ηi +φt + νijt, (2.7)
where logDit is the demand shock faced by plant i on period t, ηi stand for
plant fixed effects, φt represents time fixed effects, and νijt is the idiosyncratic
error term of the first stage. The relevance conditions implies that θˆ1 must
be statistically, and economically significant. I cannot test whether logDit
is completely orthogonal to εijt, but the intuition described above illustrates
that the relationship between between inputs and demand shocks is to be
found in the first stage, not in the error term of equation (2.6).
Considering each input individually, equation (2.6), either estimated di-
rectly or with Instrumental Variables, is nothing but a system of equations
that can be used to understand the effects of changes in the relative prices
on more than one input. In particular, it can be used to trace the effects
of a simulated reduction in relative price of capital due to technological in-
novations on the demand on capital, managers, and workers. Consider the
following system of equations:
17Fabrizio et al. (2007) also addressed the endogenous nature of the relation between
inputs and output, but the consider as an instrument the state-level electricity demand as
a instrument for plant-output, arguing that this demand is likely to be highly correlated
with the amount of output a plant will be called to produce, but uncorrelated, with inputs
use and efficiency.
18See Eslava et al. (2004) for more details of the estimation of demand shocks.
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logXi1t = β
1
0 + β
1
1 log Yit − β12 logCi1t − β13(logCi1t × PR) + γi + δt + εijt
logXi2t = β
2
0 + β
2
1 log Yit − β22 logCi2t − β23(logCi2t × PR) + γi + δt + εijt
logXi3t = β
3
0 + β
3
1 log Yit − β32 logCi3t − β33(logCi3t × PR) + γi + δt + εijt
logXi4t = β
4
0 + β
4
1 log Yit − β42 logCi4t − β43(logCi4t × PR) + γi + δt + εijt
logXi5t = β
5
0 + β
5
1 log Yit − β52 logCi5t − β53(logCi5t × PR) + γi + δt + εijt
(2.8)
where J = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] is indexing capital, managers, workers, materials, and
energy respectively. For instance, the term β12 logCi1t represent the coeffi-
cient for relative capital costs (j = 1) on the capital demand equation. After
estimating the system of equations (2.8) with instrumental variables, I will
use the coefficients βj2, and β
j
3 to simulate capital, managers, and workers
demand after a reduction on capital relative costs due to a technological
increase. Krusell et al. (2000) argue that technological changes can be un-
derstood as declines in the relative price of capital equipment; they illus-
trate the effects of this price on demand of skilled and non-skilled workers.
Therefore, the purpose of this simulation is to test whether capital demand
stimulated by technological innovations that reduce the relative price of cap-
ital come together with reductions of labor demand, given the labor-saving
nature of technology embodied in capital. Also, this simulation provides a
testing ground to illustrate whether this effect varies between managers and
workers, and whether the replacement of labor was stronger during the post-
reform years in Colombia. Appendix B.2 explains in detail the algorithm
that I used to simulate input demands.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Input Demands: Capital, Managers, and Workers. OLS
Estimates
Table 2.3 presents the OLS estimation of equation 2.6 for capital demand.
Column 1 of Table 2.3 takes as regressors the level of production and the
Capital Cost Index from Figure 2.5. The elasticity of the production level
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output 0.899∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)
Capital Cost Index -0.987∗∗∗
(0.171)
Relative Capital -0.568∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗ -1.044∗∗∗ -0.130∗ -0.0212
Cost Index (0.077) (0.151) (0.054) (0.051) (0.042)
Relative Capital -0.190∗
Cost Index x PR (0.073)
Constant 3.433∗∗∗ -1.872∗∗∗ -1.892∗∗∗ 3.747∗∗∗ 5.234∗∗∗ 5.343∗∗∗
(0.732) (0.240) (0.281) (0.248) (0.186) (0.191)
Plant Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 96,232 88,066 88,066 88,066 88,066 88,066
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.576 0.577 0.134 0.209 0.210
Number of id 11,156 11,156 11,156
Table 2.3: Capital demand. OLS estimations: Standard errors clustered at
the three-digit sector level in parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All variables are in logs. The Relative Capital Cost Index is calculated as
the ratio of The Capital Cost Index to the sum of the Industrial Wage
Index, the Minimum Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The
Energy Price Index was not included due to its abnormal volatility in the
sample. PR = 1 for post-reform years (1991-1998).
is 0.9 with the expected sign and significant at the 1 per cent level, and the
elasticity of the Capital Cost Index is -0.99, also with the expected sign and
significant at the 1 per cent level. All standard errors in Table 2.3 are clus-
tered at the three-digit sector level. Although the signs of the coefficients
are correct, the magnitudes are close to 1, indicating the presence of unitary
elasticities with respect to costs and production. A problem with the esti-
mation of Column 1 is that Capital Cost Index is a time series and it could
be capturing other time-dependent information relevant to understand input
demand, such as the business cycle. To address this issue, Column 2 of Table
2.3 considers a Relative Capital Costs Index which is constructed as follows:
RCCIit =
CCIt
MWIt + IWIt +MPIit
, (2.9)
where RCCIit stands for Relative Capital Costs Index for plant i in year
t, CCIt is the Capital Cost Index in year t, MWIt is the Minimum Wage
Index at t, IWIt is the Industrial Wage Index at t, and MPIit represents the
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Managers Price Index for plant i at year t. The Relative Capital Costs Index
exploits the variability of the material prices reported at the plant level in
the EAM to construct a measure of relative costs that varies across plants
and years.
It would be ideal to have data for each of the components of RCCIit
disaggregated at the plant level, but the EAM does not provide such infor-
mation. As a second best alternative, RCCIit captures part of the distance
from capital costs to other plant costs. This measure has potentially some
measurement error since there can be changes in RCCIit due to changes in
the prices of materials that are not related whatsoever with capital costs.
Nevertheless, even if this is the case, this measure is still a relative price that
captures the distance between the price of capital with other costs. Ceteris
paribus on other costs, a plant with higher material costs compared to a
plant with lower material costs can be considered as plant with relatively
lower capital costs. I decided to exclude the prices of energy from RCCIit
since Table 2.1 shows that these prices display an abnormal volatility.
Column 2 of Table 2.3 illustrate that the Relative Capital Costs Index
coefficient is -0.57, with the expected sign and statistically significant at the
1 per cent, but the elasticity of the production is still 0.9. Column 3 of Ta-
ble 2.3 replicates the exercise in Column 2 but additionally it controls for
time fixed effects. The coefficient for production is virtually the same, while
the coefficient for the relative capital cost falls (in absolute value) to -0.44,
significant at the 5 per cent level. To capture idiosyncratic elements that
influence input demands, Column 4 of Table 2.3 includes plant, but not fixed
effects. With plant effects the coefficient for production drops about a third,
statistically significant at the one per cent level, but the relative cost’s elas-
ticity is above 1 in absolute value. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3 demonstrate
the utmost importance of including both time and fixed effects to reduce the
estimate biases due to idiosyncratic elements that have an influence on input
demands, so naturally, Column 5 of Table 2.3 includes both in the regression.
The coefficient for production dropped even more to 0.24, significant at the
1 percent, while the Relative Capital Costs Index’s coefficient is again below
the unitary elasticity with a coefficient of -0.13, significant at the 10 per cent
level. These coefficients display signs and magnitudes well below the unity,
but recall from Section 2.3 that under OLS there still remains an endogene-
ity issue due to the inclusion of log Yit as an explanatory variable. Last, to
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output 0.569∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Industrial Wage Index -0.00136
(0.151)
Relative Industrial Wage Index -0.129 -0.137∗ -0.0652
(0.119) (0.052) (0.042)
Relative Industrial Wage Index x PR -0.110
(0.062)
Constant -4.109∗∗∗ -4.331∗∗∗ -1.195∗∗∗ -1.121∗∗∗
(0.618) (0.298) (0.150) (0.142)
Plant Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 93,650 85,828 85,828 85,828
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.579 0.135 0.135
Number of id 10,932 10,932
Table 2.4: Managers demand. OLS estimations: Standard errors clustered
at the three-digit sector level in
parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in logs.
The Relative Industrial Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Industrial Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Minimum
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998).
understand the role of market oriented reforms on relative prices, Column 6
of Table 2.3 includes the interaction of Relative Capital Costs Index and the
binary variable PR that takes 1 for the post-reform era. While the coefficient
for production is virtually the same, Column 6 of Table 2.3 states that the
relative costs only had an impact on capital demand during the post-reform
years, since the elasticity of the interaction term is -0.19 significant at the 1
per cent level, while the elasticity of the Relative Capital Costs Index is not
significantly different from cero (both in the statistical and economic sense
of the term).
Table 2.4 illustrate the OLS estimation of equation 2.6 for managers de-
mand. Column 1 of Table 2.4 uses the Industrial Wage Index plotted in
Figure 2.5 to measure the costs in the payroll related with managers. The
production coefficient is 0.57 with the expected sign and significative at the 1
per cent level. The coefficient for the Industrial Wage has the expected sign,
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but it is not statistically different from zero. Like capital costs, the prob-
lem with the Industrial Wage Index is that it does not variate across plants.
Since this problem is symmetric to the Capital Cost Index, the solution is
symmetric as well.19 I constructed a Relative Industrial Wage Index in the
following way:
RIWIit =
IWIt
MWIt + CCIt +MPIit
, (2.10)
where RIWIit stands for Relative Industrial Wage Index for plant i in year
t. The rest of the terms are defined in the same way as in equation (2.9).
Again, this relative wage exploits the variability available for material prices
at the plant level.
Column 2 of Table 2.4 uses this relative cost. The coefficient of the pro-
duction is not altered, but the coefficient of the Relative Industrial Wage
Index is -0.13, with the expected sign although still not significant. Table
2.3 demonstrated the importance of including both time and fixed effects, so
Column 3 of Table 2.4 controls for both effects. The elasticity of production
falls to 0.28 with a positive sign and significant at the one per cent level, and
the coefficient for the Relative Industrial Wage Index remains with the ex-
pected sign and almost the same magnitude (-0.14), but now it is statistically
significant at the ten per cent level. Last, Column 4 of Table 2.4 includes the
interaction of Relative Industrial Wage Index and PR. The coefficient for
production is 0.28, significant at the one per cent level, but now the relative
price of managerial labor force is not significant, despite of the stronger mag-
nitude of the effect during the post-reform. However, none of the coefficients
of Table 2.4 should be interpreted as causal relationships due to the already
discussed endogeneity problems that arise with the inclusion of production
as a regressor.
Table 2.5 presents the OLS estimations of equation (2.6) for workers de-
mand. Column 1 of Table 2.5 uses the Minimum Wage Index to measure the
costs of workers. The elasticity of the production level is of 0.47, with the
expected sign and significant at the one per cent level. The coefficient of the
19Fabrizio et al. (2007) also face a challenge in the measurement of input prices. They
do not observe firm or plant wages for the US electric generating plants. Instead, they
use state-level average wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. With respect to capital
costs, Fabrizio et al. (2007) measure the capital input by plant capacity and vintage. They
combine the plant’s capacity in megawatts with information of unit retirements to define
plant-epochs, but they do not measure the stock of capital or the capital costs.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output 0.465∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
Minimum Wage Index -1.205∗∗∗
(0.066)
Relative Minimum Wage Index -0.448∗∗∗ -0.0424 -0.0141
(0.085) (0.039) (0.042)
Relative Minimum Wage Index X PR -0.0455
(0.048)
Constant 3.773∗∗∗ -2.362∗∗∗ -0.0416 -0.0126
(0.376) (0.202) (0.154) (0.163)
Plant Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 97,788 89,473 89,473 89,473
Adjusted R2 0.508 0.509 0.161 0.161
Number of id 11,316 11,316
Table 2.5: Workers demand. OLS estimations: Standard errors clustered at
the three-digit sector level in parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All variables are in logs. The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated
as the ratio of The Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost
Index, the Industrial Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The
Energy Price Index was not included due to its abnormal volatility in the
sample. PR = 1 for post-reform years (1991-1998).
minimum wage is -1.21, statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, an
elasticity that implies that the demand of workers reacts more than propor-
tional to changes in minimum wage. As in the case for capital and managers
demand, I will construct a relative measure of worker costs that exploits the
variability of the material prices at the plant level to overcome the challenges
of measuring worker costs with a time series. Using the same procedure that
I used to compute relative costs for capital and industrial wages, equation
(2.11) illustrates the Relative Minimum Wage Index:
RMWIit =
MWIt
IWIt + CCIt +MPIit
, (2.11)
where RMWIit is the Relative Industrial Wage Index for plant i in year t,
and all the other terms are known from equations (2.9) and (2.10).
Column 2 of Table 2.5 use the Relative Industrial Wage Index as a regres-
sor. The production elasticity remains virtually unchanged, but the relative
price coefficient drops in absolute value to 0.45, with the expected sign, and
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significant at the one per cent level. The claim of an elastic demand of work-
ers with respect to the minimum wage is not sustained once the material
prices are exploited to introduce variation to the metric used for workers
costs. Column 3 of Table 2.5 controls for time and plant effects. The co-
efficient of production is 0.313, significant at the one percent level, but the
coefficient for worker costs is not different from zero. Column 4 illustrates
that when the interaction between the Relative Minimum Wage Index and
PR is considered the coefficients for prices are still not different from zero,
although Columns 3 and 4 display the expected signs.
Overall, the picture delivered by the OLS estimations is that production
is a robust predictor of capital, managers, and workers. An ten percent
production increase will be translated into a 2.4 per cent increment of capital
demand, a 2.8 per cent increase managers demand, and a 0.31 per cent
increase in workers demand, but the price effects are not robust for these
three inputs. In particular, these estimation suggest that industrial wages
were not relevant during the pre and post-reform periods to understand the
demand for managers, and also that the relative minimum wage is orthogonal
to the demand of workers.20 However, this thought experiment is flawed in
its premise since the coefficients of production are potentially biased due to
the possible presence of shocks affecting both input demands and production
simultaneously.
2.4.2 Input Demands: Capital, Managers, and Workers. IV
Estimates
Table 2.6 illustrates the IV estimation of equations (2.6) for demands of Cap-
ital, Managers, and Workers. All Columns of Table 2.6 include time and fixed
effects. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6 provide estimates for Capital Demand.
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of production is 0.58, significapnt at the
one per cent level. With respect to capital demand, the coefficient for pro-
duction was underestimated; it is more than twice the coefficient obtained
with OLS. (See Column 3 of Table 2.3).The coefficient for relative prices is
20Estimates for energy and material are available upon request. Overall, these estima-
tions illustrated that the production effects are stronger for the demand of energy and
materials, and that the price effects are negative and significant, although the price effect
on materials was economically irrelevant.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Managers Managers Workers Workers
Panel A. Second Stage
Output 0.583∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046)
Relative Capital -0.285∗∗∗ -0.106∗
Cost Index (0.055) (0.047)
Relative Capital -0.311∗∗∗
Cost Index x PR (0.083)
Relative Industrial -0.322∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗
Wage Index (0.078) (0.063)
Relative Industrial -0.231∗∗
Wage Index x PR (0.071)
Relative Minimum -0.207∗∗∗ -0.109∗
Wage Index (0.056) (0.046)
Relative Minimum -0.157∗
Wage Index X PR (0.061)
Panel B. First Stage. Dependent Variable: Output
Demand Shocks 0.767∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Relative Capital 0.890∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗
Cost Index (0.127) (0.092)
Relative Capital 0.363∗∗
Cost Index x PR (0.106)
Relative Industrial 0.967∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.140) (0.103)
Relative Industrial 0.307∗∗
Wage Index x PR (0.105)
Relative Minimum 0.963∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.143) (0.110)
Relative Minimum 0.316∗∗
Wage Index X PR (0.101)
Constant 7.525∗∗∗ 7.294∗∗∗ 7.511∗∗∗ 7.291∗∗∗ 7.465∗∗∗ 7.249∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.404) (0.423) (0.411) (0.435) (0.422)
Observations 86,552 86,552 84,331 84,331 87,923 87,923
Number of id 9,642 9,642 9,435 9,435 9,766 9,766
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.249 0.260 0.261 0.259 0.260
F 88.35 96.37 77.02 110.2 71.46 84.55
Table 2.6: Input demands: Capital, managers, and workers. IV estimations:
Standard errors clustered at the three-digit sector level in
parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in logs.
The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Industrial
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998). Demand Shocks with different sector
elasticities come from Eslava et al. (2004). Columns (1) through (6) include
plant and time fixed effects.
-0.285, significant at the one per cent level. In absolute value it is about
twice the size of the coefficient illustrated in Table 2.3. This first exercise
illustrates that the role of production and prices was underestimated. Panel
B of Column 1 presents the first stage of this exercise. Demand Shocks with
elasticities that vary across sector are positively and strongly correlated with
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output. The coefficient is 0.77, significant at the one per cent level. The
instrumented variable is exactly identified with this unique instrument, and
the F-test for the first stage is 88.3, rejecting the hypothesis that all the re-
gressors of the first stage are equal to zero. Notice that Panel B of Table 2.3
demonstrates that the relation discussed above for the First Stage of column
1 is robust in all 6 columns.
Column 2 of Table 2.6 includes the binary variable interaction (PR) to
understand the role of market oriented reforms on capital demand. In both
periods the effect of relative prices is negative and statistically significant,
but the effect on the post-period reform is stronger. For pre-reform years
the coefficient is -0.11, statistically significant at the 10 per cent level, while
for post-reform years the coefficient of relative prices is -0.311, significant at
the three per cent level. The market oriented reforms made the demand for
capital more elastic with respect to capital relative prices.
Regarding managers demand, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.6 show that the
elasticity of production is 0.64, significant at the one per cent level. The effect
of managers demand was also underestimated, since this coefficient is more
than twice the OLS coefficient for production in the equation for managers
demand. The coefficient for relative industrial wages is -0.32, significant at
the one per cent level, which illustrates an underestimation as well of the role
of industrial wages for managers demand. Column 4 of Table 2.6 includes
the interaction between prices and PR. In both periods, the price effects are
negative. During the pre-reform years, the coefficient is -0.17, significant at
the 5 per cent level, and for post-reform years again the effect is stronger,
with a coefficient of -0.23, significant at the 5 per cent level. Compared
with the results from Table 2.4, these coefficient not only are stronger, but
now they are statistically different from zero, which stress the importance
of addressing the endogeneity for production in order to interpret quantities
and price effects on input demand.
Last, Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.6 present the IV estimation for workers
demand. The elasticity with respect to output on workers demand is of 0.65,
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, which amounts to about two
times the elasticity calculated in Column 3 and 4 of Table 2.5. Column 5
of Table 2.6 states that the elasticity of workers demand respect to relative
minimum wages is of -0.21, significant at the 1 per cent level compared to
the OLS estimation provided in Column 3 of Table 2.5 which states that this
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price is not relevant to understand the plant’s decision to demand workers,
a result that was surprising given the intense debate about minimum wage
schemes and industrial jobs. When comparing pre and post-reform periods,
Column 6 of Table 2.6 presents the estimation of the interaction of relative
prices with PR. The minimum wage effect on worker’s demand was stronger
during post reform years (-0.16, statistically significant at the ten per cent
level) than during the pre-reform period (-0.11, at the ten per cent level).
This is consistent with the introduction of payroll taxes in 1993, two years
after the market oriented reforms were implemented. Again, notice that this
results contrast the message provided in Table 2.5, where the price effects
during pre and post-reform years were not different from zero.
As a sum up, Table 2.6 shows that the OLS exercise was consistently un-
derestimating the output effects by a factor of two. The output elasticities
for the three inputs are in the range of 0.58 to 0.65. Moreover, the OLS
approach was denying the statistical relevance of price effects on input de-
mands. The IV price elasticities for capital, managers, and workers are -0.28,
-0.32, and -0.21 respectively, significant at the one percent level. This num-
bers are not only statistically significant but of great economic importance
since they imply that in fact input demands respond to price changes in a
sizable way. Moreover, Table 2.6 illustrates that compared to the pre-reform
period, the reaction for input demands with respect to input prices during
the post-reform era was stronger. The market oriented reforms in Colombia
turned input demands to be more elastic with respect to prices. This can
be considered as suggestive evidences that the goal of making factor markets
more competitive at least is reflected in labor and capital markets in more
elastic demands. Prices have a bigger role in factor (re)allocation after the
reforms of 1991.
2.4.3 Simulation
Table 2.6 provided the elasticities for input demands for three of the five
inputs used in the production function as displayed in the system of equations
(2.8). However, this exercise is still silent, at least explicitly, with regard to
the Ricardian Effect. Krusell et al. (2000) associate the arrival of vintage
capital with falls in the relative prices of new equipment. The algorithm
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Figure 2.6: Demand Predictions for Capital, Managers, and Workers:
Predictions are based on the IV elasticities from Table 2.6. The Capital
Cost Index simulation starts at three times its 1982 level, falling down
continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level.
described in Appendix B.2 provides a testing ground for the consequences
of a continuous fall in the price of capital goods that follows the spirit of
Krusell et al. (2000): The direct impact of technological process is a sustained
reduction in the price of capital equipment that diminishes the relative costs
of capital goods. This algorithm computes the predicted demands for capital,
managers, and workers, based on the IV coefficients provided in Table 2.6
and on the simulated sequence of relative costs derived by the fall in the price
of capital goods.
More concretely, the Industry Wage Index, the Minimum Wage Index and
the Materials Price Index are set to their 1982 levels in equations (2.9), (2.10),
and (2.11) while the Capital Cost Index stars at three times its 1982 level,
falling down continuously to 50 per cent its 1982 level. Figure 2.5 illustrates
that these numbers are above and below the bounds of the Capital Cost
Index alone, but the whole relative cost sequence derived does not gener-
ate implausible numbers since the other components of the Index remained
constant in the simulation.21
Figure 2.6 plots the predicted demands for capital (in logs), managers,
and workers after a drop in the price of capital goods. Other things equal,
Figure 2.6 shows that when the relative capital cost is at its highest level, the
21See Appendix B.2 for more details of the simulation algorithm.
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(a) Pre-Reform Period
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(b) Post-Reform Period
Figure 2.7: Demand Predictions for Capital, Managers, and Workers. Pre
and Post-Reform Elasticities: Predictions are based on the IV elasticities
from Table 2.6. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at three times its
1982 level, falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level.
prediction for capital demand is of 8.1 log points (3,330 thousand pesos of
1982). At this level, an establishment will demand 8 managers and 26 work-
ers. When the relative capital cost falls to its lowest level, it is predicted that
on average the capital demand will increase to 8.6 log points (5,547 thousand
pesos of 1982). Figure 2.6 also predicts that this plant will demand 7 man-
agers and 22 workers. In other words, the arrival of cheaper capital goods
creates a strong incentive to introduce more capital units in the plant, and
to reduce the labor force: On average, when capital stock is increased about
67 per cent, a plant will reduce its payroll by one manager and 4 workers.
Capital replaces labor, and this replacement is stronger for employees that
perform routine tasks in the work place. David Ricardo was right indeed.
Figure 2.7 exploits the interaction between relative input prices and the
binary variable for the post-reform years to simulate input demands for pre
and post-reform periods. For the upper bound of the simulated capital cost
level, Figure 2.7a22 predicts that the capital demanded during pre-reform
years is of 8.3 log points (4,032 thousand pesos of 1982) while Figure 2.7b
predicts that for the post-reform years the capital demand is 7.97 log points
(2,890 thousand pesos of 1982). When technical progress drives the price of
capital goods to the lowest level in the simulation, Figure 2.7a argues that
the capital input for pre-reform years is 8.5 log points (4,877 thousand pesos),
22Figures 2.6 and 2.7 have the same values in the x, y and z axis to produce straight-
forward comparisons.
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while Figure 2.7b shows that the capital stock will rise up to 8.7 log points
(6,102 thousand pesos) in the post-reform era.
Regarding labor input, Figure 2.7a predicts demands for managers and
workers of 8 and 25 respectively during the pre-reform years when capital
costs are three times their 1982 level, other things equal, and of 7 and 23
(respectively) when the capital cost is at 50 per cent of its 1982 level. For the
post-reform era, Figure 2.7b states that the predicted demand of managers
and workers is of 9 and 26 employees respectively for high capital costs; these
numbers fall to 7 and 22 (respectively) when capital costs reach the lower
bound of the simulation.
While for pre-reform years the input demand elasticities from Table 2.6
predict that the arrival of cheaper capital input will increase a plant’s capital
stock about 21 per cent, the post-reform predictions state that the capital
stock will increase 111 per cent. On the other hand, the pre-reform elasticities
imply that with cheaper capital goods a plant will cut from its payroll one
manager and two workers while post-reform input demands predict that the
cut will be of 2 managers and 5 workers. Input demand elasticities are more
responsive with respect to prices in the aftermath of the reform process of
1991. The replacement of labor is significantly stronger during the post-
reform years.
2.5 Robustness Checks
The Ricardian Effect so far has been discussed in terms of input demand
predictions for an average plant, and besides the control for time invariant
characteristics at the plant level, no other explicit efforts have been made to
control for other observable characteristics that may change over time. In
particular, with the reports of production and total number of employees in
the panel it is possible to account for the following time variant observable
characteristics at the plant level: survival, exit, incumbent, exit and exit
plant, as well as the plant’s size.
The definition for each category is as follows: (i) Survival Plant: An es-
tablishment that reported production in t and in t + 1. (ii) Exit Plant: An
establishment that reported production in t but not in t + 1. (iii) Incum-
bent Plant: An establishment that reported production in t and in t − 1.
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(iv) Entry Plant: An establishment that reported production in t but not in
t− 1.
Notice that both exit and entry plants are the complement set of plants in
the data for survival and incumbent plants respectively. Also notice that by
construction, observations for 1998 (the last year in the sample) are lost when
the comparison for survivals and exit plants is established while observations
for 1982 are lost the comparisons of incumbent and entry plants.
Regarding a plant’s size, I used the total number of employees (managers
plus workers) to create the following categories: (i) Small Plant: An estab-
lishment that reported a total number of employees below the percentile 33
of the sample (below 17 employees). (ii) Medium Plant: An establishment
that reported a total number of employees between the percentiles 33 and 66
of the sample (between 17 and 44 employees). (iii) Large Plant: An estab-
lishment that reported a total number of employees above the percentile 66
of the sample (above 44 employees).
There are important reasons to consider these time variant observables
categories besides the fact that its computation is trivial. For instance,
Hopenhayn (1992) delivers the concept of stationary equilibrium that is based
on a long run relationship that accounts for entry, exit, and the size of estab-
lishments. He considers that an important component of firm dynamics are
exit and entry rates, since there are high and low turnover industries. In a
seminal paper, Lucas (1978) links the draw of managerial abilities to the size
of firms, although the definition of size is based upon the number of workers
solely since the “span of control” of the firm’s size is in the hands of one sin-
gle manager.23 Jovanovic and Lach (1989) emphasize on the role of learning
in order to understand the S-path followed by innovation, where learning is
related with the incumbent/exit status of the plant . For instance, early en-
trants have clear advantages in terms of experience and higher revenues per
output in earlier stages, but late entrants can gain from the experience and
lessons from the “learning-by-doing” process of earlier entrants and reduce
their operating costs.
From an empirical perspective, Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler
(2013) present evidence that suggest that the connection between produc-
tivity and survival in the aftermath of the reform period is stronger: The
23How many workers the talent of the manager is able to control
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Type of Plant Baseline Survivor Exit Incumbent Entry Small Medium Large
Panel A. Higher Bound for Relative Capital Cost
Capital 3,330 3,356 3,356 3,940 702 780 2,882 17,452
Pre-Reform 4,033 4,060 4,060 4,696 987 940 3,378 19,818
Post-Reform 2,891 2,746 2,746 3,462 710 693 2,431 15,974
Managers 8 9 9 9 4 3 6 31
Pre-Reform 8 8 8 9 4 3 6 31
Post-Reform 9 9 9 9 4 3 6 31
Workers 26 27 27 27 12 9 20 90
Pre-Reform 25 26 26 26 11 8 20 88
Post-Reform 26 28 28 28 12 9 20 91
Panel B. Lower Bound for Relative Capital Cost
Capital 5,548 6,199 6,198 6,327 1,782 1,421 3,274 33,910
Pre-Reform 4,877 5,420 5,420 5,616 1,434 1,259 2,930 31,135
Post-Reform 6,102 7,139 7,139 6,908 1,766 1,536 3,687 36,260
Managers 7 7 7 7 3 2 5 25
Pre-Reform 7 7 7 8 3 2 5 25
Post-Reform 7 7 7 7 3 2 5 25
Workers 23 24 24 24 10 8 19 79
Pre-Reform 23 25 25 24 11 8 19 79
Post-Reform 22 24 24 23 10 8 19 78
Number of Obs. 100,114 85,576 9,028 85,576 8,624 35,183 31,267 33,664
Table 2.7: Input demand predictions. Robustness checks: Capital
predictions are in thousands of pesos of 1982. Panel A illustrates the input
demand predictions for the higher bound of the Capital Cost Index (three
times its 1982 level). Panel B illustrates the input demand predictions for
the lower bound of the Capital Cost Index (50 percent its its 1982 level).
effect of productivity on survival is more important for sectors that faced
the largest tariff reductions. The list of references continues, and a complete
review of the research done in this subject is beyond the scope of this section,
but this snapshot of the literature is sufficient illustrate the importance the
categories mentioned above.
In order to account for these characteristics, I created a binary variable for
each of them to create subsamples for plants that fulfill each of the categories
mentioned above. After this procedure, I estimated equation (2.6) for all the
subsamples and then I used the Algorithm described in Appendix B.2 to
simulate input demand predictions. Table 2.7 presents a short summary of
the main message derived from these exercises. The complete set of figures
and tables are in Appendix B.3. First, notice that the coefficients for output
are statistically significant in all specifications, while price coefficients are
not statistically significant in all subsamples, in particular where the small
number of observations (like the case of entry and exit plants) blow up the
standard errors. Interestingly, some price effects that are not statistically
significant recover its explanatory power once pre and post-reform effects
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are included, which is consistent with the idea that market oriented reforms
enhanced the elasticities of input demands. Additionally, figures from Ap-
pendix B.3 illustrate that the message in all subsamples (except pre-reform
periods for entry, small and medium plants) is similar: Capital replaces la-
bor, and this replacement is i) stronger for workers compared to managers,
and ii) stronger during the post-reform years.
Table 2.7 illustrates that when plants increase its plant stock after a sus-
tained reduction in prices of capital goods their demand reductions for man-
agers and workers are more or less consistent throughout the samples and in
line with the message from Figures 2.6 and 2.7. Nonetheless, there are three
challenging cases for this general pattern that deserve special attention: En-
try, small , and medium plants. My answers are as follows: For entry plants,
it is likely that this plants enter the market with vintage capital. Therefore,
the ”Ricardian Effect” is already discounted in their entry process decision,
and any evidence of The Ricardian Effect will be expected in later years,
where the plant is not anymore part of this subsample. For small plants, the
similarities for labor demand after the decrease in the price of capital is just
a matter of scale. The predicted fall in labor input does not add up to a
unit to consider a reduction in the extensive margin for the input demand.
Last, the positive slope in the prediction for managers arises from a positive,
but not statistically significant, price effect in the capital demand during
the pre-reform periods. Notice that this slope is not translated into more
demand for mangers in the predictions displayed in Table 2.7 again because
the predicted effect does not add up to the unit.
An interesting case arises when large plants are considered. As expected,
the scale of the Ricardian Effect is bigger for larger plants. However, Column
8 of Table 2.7 demonstrates that the relative changes for large plants are not
drastically different from the other subsamples. These exercises suggest that
the Ricardian Effect is not driven by the size of the plants.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, the ideas of the controversial chapter 31st of David Ricardo’s
master piece were tested using a unique plant level longitudinal database
for the manufacturing sector in Colombia. After estimating input demand
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equations for capital, managers, and workers instrumenting output with de-
mand shocks, I found that output elasticities are close to 0.6 while price
elasticities for capital, managers, and workers are -0.28, -0.32, and -0.21 re-
spectively. Moreover, these elasticities are more strong for the pre-reform
period in Colombia, where several artificial distortions in input markers were
lifted and as a consequence these markets became more competitive. In other
words, the relative prices during the post-reform era play a prominent role
in factor (re)allocation in the manufacturing sector.
Based on a simulated fall in the cost of capital goods, the coefficients
derived from the input demand estimates were used to simulate demands for
capital, managers, and workers. When a plant increases its capital stock due
to cheaper vintage capital units, it will reduce its payroll by one manager and
4 workers on average. These replacement effect is stronger during the post-
reform era, where the factor markets where more competitive. As Samuelson
(1989) claimed, “Ricardo was Right!”
This paper is a positive analysis of the Ricardian Effect. Notice that no
welfare consequences are addressed here. However, a class of interesting
questions with welfare consequences arise from the evidence regarding labor
replacement when new units of capital are demanded. Does the Ricardian
Effect overall has overall positive of negative consequences for society? This
remains an open question subject to further research, but here I would like to
provide a few research areas where a proper understanding of the Ricardian
Effect could shed some light to understand the welfare consequences of capital
demand and new technologies in input markets.
First, the influential books of Stiglitz (2012) and Piketty (2014) considered
that the role of capital on inequality is of the utmost importance. In fact,
the driver of inequality is to be found in capital rents. It would be interesting
to understand to what extent the rise in capital earnings and its impact on
inequality is driven by the replacement of the labor force (mapping labor
replacement with labor shares of income), and to integrate the household’s
decisions to acquire skills through education as a response to the Ricardian
Effect in order to perform tasks less subject to replacement. A first natural
step is to build the bridge between skills to tasks to output within a general
equilibrium framework that maps the Ricardian Effect and the household’s
reaction to income inequality.
Second, this paper estimated the Ricardian Effect only for the manufac-
106
turing sector in a developing country. Duarte and Restuccia (2010) illustrate
that the labor share in manufacturing sectors display an inverted U shape
over time. It is possible that the Ricardian Effect provides an explanation
for the slippery side of the labor share in manufacturing industries, but it
is important to understand whether there is evidence of labor replacement
in services. In particular, it would be interesting to consider whether the
Ricardian Effect is an important mechanism of sectoral transformation in
which labor is moving from one sector to another.
Last, a proper estimation of the dynamics of integration of the labor force
in the manufacturing sector, taking into account the differences between man-
agers and workers, could provide some light to the policy debate related with
job creation through corporate tax stimulus towards investment in capital, a
debate widely spread in the Colombian context.
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CHAPTER 3
WHY IS EUROPE FALLING BEHIND?
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND
SERVICES’ PRODUCTIVITY
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPE AND
THE U.S.
Joint work with Cesare Buiatti and Joao Duarte
3.1 Introduction
Labor productivity in Europe has been falling behind the United States since
the beginning of the 1990s, reversing a previously observed pattern of conver-
gence between these two economies. Figure 3.1 illustrates how this process of
catch up came to a halt and later reversed for some European countries while
the converge stopped for others. Average annual labor productivity growth
(measured as GDP per hour of work) in the U.S. accelerated from 1.3% in
the 1970–1990 period to 1.7 % from 1995 to 2006 while the European coun-
tries on average experienced a labor productivity growth slowdown between
these two time periods from 2.9% to 1.5%. The divergence is a combination
of the U.S. taking off together with a European slowdown. In other words,
the picture is glimmer for Europe either in relative or in absolute terms for
most of its countries.
From 1970 to 2009, both the European economies and the U.S. underwent
large scale sectoral (re)allocations of labor in a process commonly known as
structural change, as defined by Kuznets (1957); Herrendorf et al. (2014) and
many others. With Europe and the U.S. at their later stages of structural
transformation (the so-called post-industrial society for advanced nations),
labor reallocated further away both from agriculture and manufacturing to-
ward services. As Duarte and Restuccia (2010) suggest, through the lenses
of structural transformation it is possible to conclude that the service sector
is responsible for most cases of relative stagnation and even declines in ag-
gregate productivity observed at later stages of economic development since
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no other country experienced the productivity gains in the service sector
witnessed in the U.S.
We believe that to understand the relative under-performance of Europe
vis-a´-vis the U.S. it is crucial to break down the service sector. The service
economy is the predominant (and growing) sector for the vast majority of
advanced nations and its lack of labor productivity gains is an increasing
cause of concern for their long-run economic growth. In this paper, we use
the lenses of structural transformation following the spirit of Duarte and
Restuccia (2010) and decompose the service sector into sub-sectors compara-
ble across Europe and the U.S. to investigate how changes in labor allocation
and productivity within services help explain the service sector’s labor pro-
ductivity.
First, we use the World KLEMS database put forth by Jorgenson (2012)
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate labor productivity for the European countries
relative to the U.S. To construct PPP compatible measures of aggregate
labor productivity we used the income per capita measures from The
Maddison-Project (2013) to calculate measures of GDP per capita in 1970
relative to the U.S., and then we complete the time path with the growth
rates of real value added per hour from the World KLEMS data from
Jorgenson (2012).
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and we decompose services into 11 comparable sub-sectors between Europe
and the U.S.1 Second, we develop a structural change model that combines
the CES nonhomothetic preferences crafted by Comin et al. (2015) with pro-
duction functions whose unique input is labor as in Duarte and Restuccia
(2010) disaggregating services into 11 sub-sectors comparable between Eu-
rope and the U.S. Third, we calibrate the model to account for the the U.S.
development experience and use the model to measure comparable labor pro-
ductivity levels for the disaggregated service sector for all European countries
in our sample. Our simulations show that the model is quantitatively able
to reproduce the labor allocation in all sectors for all countries in our sam-
ple.Last, we perform counterfactual exercises to identify what kind of services
have been dragging down most of the aggregate service labor productivity in
Europe.
Our quantitative experiment suggests substantial differences in sectoral
labor productivity of services across countries. The European countries are
in generally more productive than the U.S. in communications and health
services. However, and more importantly given their large labor shares, the
European countries are less productive in wholesale and retail trade and
business services, with a relative labor productivity in 1970 average of ap-
proximately 50% and 60% of that of the U.S., respectively.
Led by the counterfactual exercises, we identify wholesale and retail trade
and business services as the two sectors that are responsible for most of the
lack of catch-up in labor productivity of services between Europe and the
U.S. In particular, we find that if Europe would have had the same gains
in labor productivity as the U.S. in wholesale and retail trade and business
services alone since 1990, it would have had higher levels of aggregate labor
productivity. In fact, if Europe had caught up with its labor productivity
of wholesale and retail trade and business services by 2009 with respect to
the U.S., the aggregate labor productivity in Europe would have closed more
than 50% of the gap with respect to the U.S. labor productivity.
This paper is related primarily to the literature of structural transforma-
tion that dates back to the works of (Kuznets, 1957) who documented the
sweeping changes across the different industries in the process of economic
development. More recent contributions to structural change build upon the
1We classify these sectors according to the ISIC Rev. 3 at one digit level.
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works of (Kongsamut et al., 2001) and (Ngai & Pissarides, 2007) who empha-
sized the role of income and sector-biased productivity channels respectively
as the drivers of structural transformation. Several attempts have been made
to incorporate both mechanisms in a single framework, such as (Buera & Ka-
boski, 2009), (Duarte & Restuccia, 2010), and (Ferreira & Silva, 2014) among
many others.2. Our paper complements (Buera & Kaboski, 2012) explana-
tion of the rise of the service sectors by showing that a large increase in the
labor share of services has also in fact been driven by business to business
services.
Our paper also talks to a vast literature that studies cross-country pro-
ductivity differences and productivity determinants, generally with empirical
methodologies. A few examples are (Baily & Solow, 2001), (Nicoletti & Scar-
petta, 2003), (Dew-Becker & Gordon, 2012), and (Cette, Lopez, & Mairesse,
2016). More closely related to our research question, (Inklaar, Timmer, &
Ark, 2008) provide some insights on what factors might be behind the dif-
ferences in productivity between Europe and the U.S. They find that the
most important factors are lower growth contributions from investment in
information and communication technology in Europe, the relatively small
share of technology-producing industries in Europe, and slower multi-factor
productivity growth. In particular, they find that the latter effect is more
notorious in the service sector. We complement their analysis by showing
which service sectors are particularly responsible for the observed differences
in productivity growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 develops a our
theoretical framework that extends the structural transformation model of
(Comin et al., 2015) to include service sub-sectors. Section 3.3 presents
our calibration strategy, discusses the test of our theory and presents the
parametrization of the model. Section 3.4 presents the results of the cali-
bration. Section 3.5 presents our numerical experiments that identify which
sectors are responsible for the widening of the gap in labor productivity be-
tween Europe and the U.S. Finally, Section ?? concludes the paper.
2For a detailed survey of the literature of structural change see (Matsuyama, 2008)
and (Herrendorf et al., 2014)
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3.2 A Model of Structural Transformation
This section presents a model of structural transformation with agriculture,
manufacturing and 11 different services where the process of structural trans-
formation depends on income and price effects. We chose the number of sec-
tors in the model to account for the same sectors explored in the previous
sector, but the model is flexible to any arbitrary number of sectors. The
model borrows the production structure from Duarte and Restuccia (2010)
and the preferences from Comin et al. (2015). There are, however, impor-
tant elements worth to emphasize. First, the model does not has capital
(as in Duarte and Restuccia (2010)), which means that there are no invest-
ment sector in this economy and that the model has no dynamic component.
Therefore, the structural transformation, namely the reallocation of labor
over time across sector, is taken as a sequence of static optimal allocations.
Second, the absence of capital implies that all the production is devoted
to consumption, placing a special emphasis on the role of preferences for the
structural transformation. By combining these two frameworks, Engel curves
and heterogeneous labor productivity growth rates are sufficient to account
for the structural transformation.
We first describe the firm’s and household’s optimization problem together
with the market clearing conditions, and then we perform general equilibrium
analysis in order to derive a system of equations that define the optimal
allocation of labor across sectors. Since our goal is to address the differences
in productivity within services, our model represents a closed economy where
domestic production is used in its entirety to satisfy domestic production in
each sector.
3.2.1 Environment
In our model economy there is an infinitely lived stand-in household of mea-
sure L that supplies labor inelastically.3 Their only endowment is time and
labor moves freely across sectors. Moreover, labor is the only input in the
economy since firms produce output with labor times its productivity.
3Alternative, one can think of a household of measure one with and endowment of
L hours each period. In this case, it is trivial the definition of the measure in spite of
allowing growth of the labor force because the structural transformation is a sequence of
static choices.
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Households
The households has preferences over their consumption stream over time, but
since we are not defining inter-temporal problems in our model (i.e. there
are no savings), there is no need to formalize the structure of preferences
toward the inter-temporal substitution of consumption. Following Comin et
al. (2015), the representative household has preferences over the consumption
of commodities (or services) produced in different sectors represented by
I∑
i
Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ c
σ−1
σ
i = 1, (3.1)
where C is the aggregate consumption4, ci is the consumption from output
produced in sector i, σ ∈ (0, 1) is the price elasticity of substitution, i ≥ 1
is the income elasticity for good i and Ωi > 0 are constant weights for each
good i,
∑
i Ωi = 1. Notice that there are no time subscripts since the model is
static. In addition, there are three main reasons5 that support the use of this
particular non-homothetic CES preference structure to explain the structural
transformation in our model of 13 sectors. First, it naturally extends for
any arbitrary number of sectors, which is not a feature by other types of
preferences such as in Boppart (2014), Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi
(2013) and Duarte and Restuccia (2010) among many others. Second, it gives
rise to heterogeneous sectoral log-linear Engel curves that are consistent with
the empirical evidence (Aguiar & Bils, 2015; Comin et al., 2015). Last, the
income effects on the relative consumption of sectoral goods and services do
not level off as income rises, contrary to structural transformation demand-
side theories that rely on Stone-Geary preferences, which is crucial to account
for the rise of services in the long-run. Therefore, these preferences allow the
demand channel to have a strong role at later stages of development. The
household’s problem is defined as follows:
Household’s Problem
4In the empirical counterpart of the model C is considered as income per capita since
there are no savings in our model.
5There is greater detail in the exposition of other useful features of the non-homothetic
preferences in (Comin et al., 2015). In our paper, we highlight the most useful ones for
our particular purpose of decomposing extensively the service sector.
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max
ci
C s.t. i)
I∑
i
Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ c
σ−1
σ
i = 1
ii)
∑
i
pici ≤ WL
iii) ci ≥ 0,
(3.2)
where W is the wage of the household, WL reflects the total disposable
income and pi is the price of output ci. We assume interior solutions, so the
First-Order Conditions are sufficient. The optimal consumption of goods for
each sector i is
ci = Ωi
(pi
P
)−σ
Ci , (3.3)
and the optimal value added share of sector i is described by
pici
PC
= Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ c
σ−1
σ
i , (3.4)
where P is the aggregate price index. Notice that the parameters i and σ
describe the income and price mechanisms of the structural transformation.
Whereas i measures the sensitivity for changes in consumption of goods
from sector i with respect of changes in income, namely the Engel curve for
sector i, σ reflects how sensitive the quantities demanded are toward changes
in prices. For the empirical relevant case of σ < 1, where all goods are gross
complements, the price effect illustrates the so-called Baumol’s cost disease in
which, in this context, labor is continuously allocated toward less productive
sectors in the long-run.
Firms
In each periods, there are 13 different goods produced in agriculture, manu-
facturing and evelen types of services, as described in the previous section.
Let I be the set of goods produced every period. There is a large number of
competitive firms in each sector i that use technology of production linear in
labor described by
yi = Aili ∀i ∈ I, (3.5)
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where yi represents the output produced by a representative firm of sector
i, Ai reflects the labor productivity of the firm and li is the labor input
demanded by the firm, measured in labor hours. The firm in this model
economy hires labor at the prevailing wage W – that is the same for each
sector i since labor is perfectly mobile – and produces output with the com-
bination of labor hours and an idiosyncratic labor productivity level for each
representative firm. The firm’s problem is described as follows:
Firms’ Problem
max
li
{piAili −Wli} ∀i ∈ I. (3.6)
Again, if one assumes interior solutions the First-Order Conditions are
sufficient to describe the optimal allocations of the firm. The optimal price
is described by
pi =
W
Ai
∀i ∈ I. (3.7)
Equation (3.7) shows that increases in sectoral labor productivity will re-
duce the price of a good produced in sector i, and increases in wages have
a positive impact on prices. However, notice that wages do not change the
relative prices in the economy since by assumption all sectors in the econ-
omy pay the same rental rate of labor, thus it is only through heterogeneous
dynamics of the labor productivity across sectors that one gets changes in
relative prices. Given the irrelevance of wages for our understanding of rel-
ative prices in the model, we consider labor as the nume´raire in our model
economy and normalize its price – the wage rate W – to one. The sectoral
price then is simply described as pi =
1
Ai
∀i ∈ I, and it is the inverse of
sectoral labor productivity, as in (Duarte & Restuccia, 2010). Given the
simplicity of the production technology, one can think that Ai aggregates
several factors that separetely affect the price of commodities, such as other
inputs of production and the quality of the labor. In this sense, Ai can be
considered as the measure of our ignorance. In the empirical section we will
address this issue by disentangling the effects on the labor productivity com-
ing solely from TFP vis-a´-vis the effects through production inputs, but for
now one can think of these factors as components embedded in Ai.
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Equilibrium Conditions
Market Clearing Conditions
As mentioned before, in this model economy in autarky all the production is
devoted to consumption since there are no savings or investments. Therefore,
for each sector i
yi = ci ∀i ∈ I. (3.8)
In addition, aggregate output and labor supply are nothing but the sum
of sectoral outputs and labor demands respectively, namely
Y =
∑
i
yi,
L =
∑
i
li.
(3.9)
General Equilibrium
Combining equations (3.4), (3.5), (3.7) and the market clearing conditions
in (3.8) one gets
Wli
PC
= Ω
1
σ
i C
i−σ
σ (Aili)
σ−1
σ ,
and after some algebra, we reach an expression for the sectorial labor demand
li =
(
P
W
)σ
ΩiC
iAσ−1i . (3.10)
Equation (3.10) illustrates the two main drivers of the structural trans-
formation in our model. First, the parameter i defines the Engel curve for
sector i, and shows how this non-homotheticity affects the labor demand for
each sector linking it directly the sector output’s income elasticity. Second,
the parameter σ shows the relation of the price elasticity of substitution on
the labor demand. As long as this parameter is smaller than one, increases in
productivity will reduce the labor hours demanded in a given sector. Equa-
tion (3.10) predicts absolute levels of labor demand, and shows that aggregate
prices and wages6 also affect the labor demand in absolute terms, but they
6Although we are normalizing the wages in this model economy, we leave them without
normalization to illustrate that as long as labor is freely mobile, wages will not have an
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are not going to affect the relative labor demand, i.e. the structural trans-
formation. Using the aggregate market clearing conditions in equation (3.9),
the equation that defines the structural transformation is given by
li
L
=
ΩiC
iAσ−1i∑I
j ΩjC
jAσ−1j
(3.11)
The labor share of sector i is affected by both income effects and sub-
stitution effects: as aggregate consumption rises one to one with aggregate
income, the labor share of sector i will rise if the income elasticity of demand
of good i is higher relative to all other sectors and will fall if the elasticity is
small relative to all other sectors. On the other hand, as labor productivity
grows, the labor share if sector i will diminish relative to other sector with
slower rates of labor productivity growth. Now we have all the elements
necessary to proceed with our Equilibrium Definition:
Definition: A Structural Transformation Competitive Equilibrium is a col-
lection of exogenous labor productivity paths {Ait} and optimal allocations
{cit, lit} such that for each period t and for each sector i, the labor shares
defined in equation (3.11) are consistent with:
α) The household’s problem defined in (3.2).
β) The firm’s optimization problem defined in (3.6).
γ) Resource constraints and market clearing conditions defined in (3.9)
and (3.8).
3.3 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the development experience of the United States
from 1970 to 2009 in order to assess the plausibility of our theory. The
parametrization involves estimating several Engel curves and one price elas-
ticity of substitution based on an econometric model derived from our theory
for each of the 13 sectors7and calibrating the time-invariant CES weights to
impact on the structural transformation.
7We use a panel data for the US and the major European economies in our analysis
to exploit the variation of sectors across countries and over time. This procedure assumes
that preferences do not change systematically across countries during our sample period,
and therefore we could exploit the variation at this level of aggregation to pin down the
Engel curves for the US.
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match perfectly the initial labor shares for each sector after normalizing the
labor productivity levels in 1970. Then, we feed in exogenous time paths of
sectoral labor productivities to generate the sectorial labor share time paths
predicted by our model.
3.3.1 Test of the Theory
There are three sets of predictions that we consider as tests of whether our
theory can successfully account for the structural transformation. First, the
labor-share time paths generated by our model for the US economy should
be roughly close to their empirical counterparts in the data. Second, after
recovering the initial productivity levels for each of the European economies,
the model should be capable of generating labor shares roughly close as well
for most sectors in the European countries. Third, the predicted aggregate
labor productivity – namely the sum of sectorial labor productivities weighted
by their participation in the labor force – should reproduce fairly close the
relative aggregate labor productivity between the US and Europe displayed
in Figure 3.1. Now we proceed to explain in detail the parametrization of
our model.
3.3.2 Parametrization
Estimation of Engel Curves and the Price Elasticity of Substitution
Consider the model’s prediction for the absolute labor demand of a sector i,
as described by equation (3.10). One can define a system of labor demand
for each sector i relative to manufacturing (sector m) to derive the following
system of relative labor demands
li
lm
=
Ωi
Ωm
Ci−m
(
Ai
Am
)σ−1
.
Taking logs on both sides one gets
log
(
li
lm
)
= log
(
Ωi
Ωm
)
+ (i − m) logC + (σ − 1) log
(
Ai
Am
)
. (3.12)
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From equation (3.12) we cand derive the following econometric model to
estimate the income and price elasticities
log
(
li
lm
)
= (1−σ) log
(
Amt
Ait
)
+(i−m) logCt+ζci +νcit for i 6= m, (3.13)
where i denotes any sector – except manufacturing – in country c and time
t. We control for fixed-effects ζci to capture time-invariant characteristics
that can potentially influence our estimates. νcim,t are the error term of the
econometric specification.
Estimating equation (3.13) imposes i − 1 cross-equation restrictions for
estimating one single price elasticity of substitution for the entire economy.
Given the simplicity of our production function, we decided to estimate equa-
tion (3.13) with prices predicted directly by the inverse of the productivity
rather than with observed prices directly, because the econometric model
derived from our theoretical framework is not suited for controlling for dif-
ferences in technology parameters that do have a direct influence on prices.
Our identification strategy exploits within country-sector and time vari-
ation to identify the income and price elasticities. We use World KLEMS
data, which is a panel disaggregated at the sector level with comparable in-
formation for the U.S., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, from 1970 to 2009. Our measurement for
the empirical counterparts of the model are as follows: Sectoral labor shares
are measured by the ratio of labor hours hired in a sector to the total labor
hours demanded in the economy. The sectoral labor productivity is measured
with the real value added per our worked. Finally, the aggregate consump-
tion C is measured directly with income per capita measures since there are
no savings in our model economy. Income per capita measures in real units
adjusted by PPP to perform cross-country comparisons are not available in
World KLEMS, so we used the OECD as a source instead.
Table 3.1 presents the estimates for the price elasticity of substitution
and the sectorial Engel curves relative to manufacturing. Our estimate of
the price elasticity of substitution is 0.69, which is in line with the findings
in the literature. The null hypothesis of a price elasticity of substitution
equal to one is rejected at the one per cent level, in favor for a σ below
one. Our estimate of the price elasticity of substitution reflects the presence
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Sector Parameter Estimate
1− σ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.06)
Agriculture agr − man -0.46∗∗∗
(0.14)
wholesale and retail and Trade trd − man 0.50∗∗∗
(0.08)
Restaurant and Hotels rst − man 0.65∗∗∗
(0.14)
Transportation trs − man 0.55∗∗∗
(0.09)
Communication com − man 0.63∗∗∗
(0.11)
Finance fin − man 0.71∗∗∗
(0.12)
Real Estate res − man 1.17∗∗∗
(0.17)
Business Services bss − man 1.76∗∗∗
(0.11)
Government gov − man 0.27∗∗∗
(0.10)
Education edu − man 0.57∗∗∗
(0.10)
Health hlt − man 0.93∗∗∗
(0.14)
Personal per − man 0.72∗∗∗
(0.16)
Number of observations 360
Fixed effects Yes
Table 3.1: Engel Curves and Price Elasticity estimates. Estimation based
on World KLEMS data for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, and the United States. Clustered
standard errors at the country level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
of a Baumol-cost disease, in line with the analytical descriptions of Baumol
(1967) and Ngai and Pissarides (2007). This means in our framework that the
economy is converging to services, as in the traditional literature of structural
transformation, and also that within services is converging toward the least
productive sectors. Of course, this is only the supply side explanation of the
structural transformation.
To account for the demand side of the structural transformation, Table 3.1
illustrates the Engel curves for each sector relative to manufacturing. The
null hypothesis is that the Engel curve for a given sector i is the same as
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the manufacturing Engel curve. This hypothesis is rejected at the one per
cent level of significance for each sector in the economy. Consistent with
the development literature, the estimate for the Engel curve in agriculture
illustrates that as long as the household grows richer, the resources devoted
for the consumption of agriculture grow less than proportional compared to
manufacturing, whereas for all the services in the economy the consumption
grows more than proportional relative to manufacturing. In addition, the
estimates of the Engel curves vary significantly across services. For instance,
whereas the difference in the income elasticity for government services relative
to manufacturing is of 0.27, for real estate and business services this difference
is above one.
Targeting the Initial Employment Shares in the U.S.
We calibrate the model by targeting the initial labor shares in 1970 for each
sector in the U.S. economy. For this, we normalize the initial productivity
levels Ai to one in each sector. As a consequence of this normalization,
the aggregate productivity is normalized to one as well, and therefore Y
L
=
A = 1. Since in our model economy the entirety of income per capita is
devoted to consumption, it follows that C = 1 for 1970 as a consequence of
the normalization of the initial sectorial productivity levels. From equation
(3.11), the normalization implies that the labor shares for the initial period
of the calibration are given by
li
L
=
Ωi∑I
j Ωj
.
Since
∑I
j Ωj = 1, the initial labor shares for each sector i are given by
each Ωi. The initial labor shares values for the U.S. in 1970 are sufficient to
account for the parameterization of each Ωi so the model and the data match
for the first period, by construction. Then, we compute the sectorial labor
productivity time paths {Ait}2009t=1970 with the observed growth rates of real
value added per worker, and the aggregate consumption time path {Ct}2009t=1970
with aggregate labor productivity growth rates, measured by the real income
per capita growth. Next, we feed these time paths in our model to derive
predictions for the evolution of the employment labor shares across sectors
as described by equation (3.11). Table 3.2 summarizes the parametrization.
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Value Target/Comment
Parameters
σ 0.69 Price elasticity est. (Table 3.1).
agr 0.53 Engel Curve est. i = agr relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
man 1 Homothetic preferences for manufacturing.
trd 1.50 Engel Curve est. i = trd relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
rst 1.65 Engel Curve est. i = rst relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
trs 1.55 Engel Curve est. i = trs relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
com 1.63 Engel Curve est. i = com relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
fin 1.71 Engel Curve est. i = fin relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
res 2.17 Engel Curve est. i = res relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
bss 2.75 Engel Curve est. i = bss relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
gov 1.27 Engel Curve est. i = gov relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
edu 1.57 Engel Curve est. i = edu relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
hlt 1.93 Engel Curve est. i = hlt relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
per 1.73 Engel Curve est. i = per relative to manufacturing (Table 3.1).
Ωagr 0.06 Labor share of sector i = agr in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωman 0.30 Labor share of sector i = man in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωtrd 0.14 Labor share of sector i = trd in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωrst 0.04 Labor share of sector i = rst in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωtrs 0.03 Labor share of sector i = trs in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωcom 0.03 Labor share of sector i = com in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωfin 0.03 Labor share of sector i = fin in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωres 0.01 Labor share of sector i = res in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωbss 0.06 Labor share of sector i = bss in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωgov 0.07 Labor share of sector i = gov in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωedu 0.07 Labor share of sector i = edu in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωhlt 0.11 Labor share of sector i = hlt in 1970 for the U.S.
Ωper 0.04 Labor share of sector i = per in 1970 for the U.S.
Time Paths
{Ai,t} {·} Ai,t+1 = Ai,t(1 + γAi,t), where γAi,t is the growth rate of
sectoral real value added per hour. Ai,t=1970 = 1.
{Ct} {·} Ct+1 = Ct(1 + γCt), where γCt is the growth rate
of real GDP per capita.
Table 3.2: Parameter values and target for the calibration to the U.S.
structural transformation experience, 1970-2009.
3.4 Quantitative Results
3.4.1 Model’s Prediction I: U.S. Structural Transformation
Figure 3.2 compares the predicted labor shares of our model to the U.S.
data for agriculture and manufacturing. The model does a remarkably good
job predicting the observed labor share paths for these two sectors during
the sample period. For agriculture, the model predicts almost perfectly the
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Figure 3.2: Structural Transformation in the U.S., 1970-2009. Agriculture
and Manufacturing. Data vs. model.
decline in the labor share. Nonetheless, notice that for 1970 most of the labor
in the U.S. economy had already migrated out of agricultural activities. The
model also does a good job predicting the observed de-industrialization of the
U.S. economy since 1970: Whereas the observed decline of the manufacturing
share of employment was from about 30 per cent in 1970 to levels short of
20 per cent in 2009, the predicted decline in the manufacturing employment
share is about 21 per cent in 2009.
Figure 3.3 compares the predicted labor shares for the different services in
the U.S. economy. The model does follow the labor share paths fairly close
for almost every sector, including the steep rise in business services (bss)
as shown in the upper right panel of Figure 3.3. The two exceptions are
wholesale and retail and trade services (trd), and government (gov). The
upper left panel of Figure 3.3 illustrates that for wholesale and retail and
trade services, the employment share has remained at a level close to 14
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Figure 3.3: Structural Transformation in the U.S., 1970-2009. Services.
Data vs. model.
per cent during the sample period, with an observed decline of only half of
a percentage point after 1990. The model, however, predicts a decline in
the labor share of this sector down to 10 per cent. For government services
(see the lower right panel in Figure 3.3) the model under predicts its labor
share decline. Whereas the government labor share falls from above 7 per
cent in 1970 to about 3 per cent in 2010, our model predicts that this share
will decrease only by less than 2 per cent for the same period. This is
not surprising. Due to market clearing conditions, the under-prediction for
wholesale and retail and trade must be accompanied by an over-prediction
in other sector (or in a combination of sectors).
To shed more light on the model’s predictions for the structural trans-
formation within services, Figure 3.4 plots the sectoral labor productivity
time paths for each service in the U.S. for the period 1970-2009. Commu-
nications (com), wholesale and retail and trade (trd), financial services (fin)
and to a lesser degree transportation (trs), business services (bss) and even
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Figure 3.4: Sectoral labor productivity in the U.S., 1970-2009. Labor
productivity is measured as the real value added per hour worked. Initial
productivity levels are normalized to 1.
government (gov) are the sectors with superior performance in labor pro-
ductivity. The productivity in communications has increased by a factor of
8 from 1970 to 2009, while the productivity has multiplied its 1970 base
more than 3.5 times in wholesale and retail and trade, and financial services.
Transportation, business services and government also have multiplied their
productivity base by a factor of 2.1 and 1.7 and 1.5 respectively. The rest
of the service sectors had experienced virtually no growth in its labor pro-
ductivity, even in sectors such as health services, whose participation in the
labor force exceeded 18 per cent in 2009.
Can the evidence presented in Figure 3.4 explain why the model is not
following closely the labor shares in wholesale and retail and trade (trd)
and government (gov)? We believe that, in spite of the simplicity of our
model economy, the answer is yes. There are two drivers of the structural
transformation in our model economy: Engel curves and heterogenous labor
productivity growth rates trough the price elasticity of substitution. We
already showed that the income elasticity for each sector belonging to services
125
is statistically superior to the manufacturing Engel curve. Are the income
elasticities in services statistically different from each other? The answer
depends on the sector. The three sectors displayed in the upper left panel
of Figure 3.3 have Engel curves that are not statistically different from each
other, but they are statistically lower than the Engel curves for real estate or
business services. Therefore, the differences in our model predictions between
wholesale and retail and trade, restaurants and hotels, and transportation
are to be found in the labor productivity differences. The upper left panel
of Figure 3.4 shows that wholesale and retail and trade has the strongest
productivity growth among these three services, and therefore, according to
our model, this sector should reduce its participation in the labor force. This
prediction is in contrast with the observed labor shares, suggesting that in the
U.S. it is not necessarily true that the labor productivity growth is shrinking
the employment participation in wholesale and retail and trade.
On the other hand, government services do have an Engel curve signifi-
cantly lower than the rest of the services with the exception of whole/sale
and retail, and it is experiencing positive productivity growth. These two
forces imply in our model a decrease in the government employment share,
but both mechanisms are not sufficient to address the deployment of the
labor force out of government services that are evident in the U.S. data.
Nevertheless, with important caveats for whole/sale and retail services and
for government, we consider that our model successfully accounts for the
structural transformation in the U.S.
3.4.2 Model’s Prediction II: Structural Transformation in
Europe
Following Duarte and Restuccia (2010), we use our model to measure the
initial productivity levels in Europe vis-a`-vis the U.S. This in an important
accounting step to overcome the lack of sectoral PPP-adjusted value added
data. Recall our preference structure is different from Duarte and Restuccia
(2010). This implies that we also need to account explicitly for the initial
income differences when backing up the initial sectorial productivity levels.
We proceed as follows: First, we use the calibrated parameters summarized
in Table 3.2 to recover the productivity levels for each sector and for each
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European country consistent with the normalization of productivity levels
in the U.S. and with the income level of each European country relative to
the U.S. Since the U.S. income level is normalized to 1 in 1970, the relative
income per capita is simply the ratio of GDP per capita of each European
country to the U.S. in 1970. We use the OECD GDP per capita measures
since they are measured USD constant prices of 2010 adjusted by PPPs,
thus PPP-adjusting the initial sectoral productivity levels that our model is
recovering. Then, we compute the labor productivity and income time paths
with the observed growth rates of sectoral real value added per hour and real
income per capita respectively, just as we did for the U.S. in the previous
section. Last, with the recovered PPP-adjusted time paths, we compute the
model’s predictions and compare the structural transformation predicted by
our model to the European data.This procedure delivers time paths that
are comparable across countries, without the risk of mismeasurement due to
exchange rates or PPP adjustments.
Measurement of Sectoral Labor Productivity in Europe
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 plot the productivity levels for each sector in each country
relative to the United States for the first and last sample periods. Figure 3.5
shows three different patterns for agriculture, manufacturing and services.
First, the agricultural productivity levels (relative to the U.S.) were either
stagnant or relative higher in 1970 compared to 2009 with the exceptions
of France and Germany, where minor improvements were experienced. The
productivity levels are surprisingly high for Great Britain, but still they show
an important fall in relative productivity between 1970 and 2009. However,
these differences are do play a minor role in the aggregate labor productiv-
ity because the structural transformation has reduced the agricultural labor
shares dramatically for each of these countries during our sample period.
Second, European countries have been catching up with the U.S. from
1970 to 2009 in manufacturing productivity without exception, although no
country reached the U.S. labor productivity during our sample period. No-
tices that whereas Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands experienced
about a two-fold increase in manufacturing productivity, the productivity
growth in manufacturing was more modest in Germany, Great Britain, Italy
and Spain.
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Last, with the notable exception of Belgium, no European country expe-
rienced a significant catch up in services relative to the U.S.; most coun-
tries have remained either stagnant or have experienced a decline. Since
the employment share in services has increased, these results confirm the
main finding of Duarte and Restuccia (2010): The reason for the European
under-performance lies in the service sector.
Figure 3.6 plots the relative labor productivity between 1970 and 2009
for each sector within services and for each European country. Within ser-
vices, European countries are in generally more productive than the U.S.
in telecommunications, education, and health services8, but they are signif-
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Figure 3.5: Recovered sectoral labor productivity levels in 1970 and 2009
for major European countries relative to the sectorial U.S. labor
productivity level. Agriculture and manufacturing.
8It is interesting to note that health services are much less productive in the U.S.
than in Europe. In addition, productivity gap widened significantly during the sample
period. The labor productivity in this sector is a source of major concern for the U.S. as it
employed approximately 17 per cent of the labor force in 2009. Nevertheless, the finding
that Europe is more productive than the U.S. in health services, as well as in education,
should be taken with some caution. Whereas in the U.S. both education and health are
services mainly provided by the private sector, in most European countries education and
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Figure 3.6: Recovered sectoral labor productivity levels in 1970 and 2009
for major European countries relative to the sectorial U.S. labor
productivity level. Services.
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icantly less productive in wholesale and retail trade. Moreover, the produc-
tivity levels for this sector have widen out between 1970 and 2009 in every
single European country.
The sector of business services in Europe is also less productive com-
pared to the U.S. without exception, although the productivity gaps have
not widened in every country. For instance, Germany and Belgium did not
experienced a fall in the relative productivity, but Italy on the other hand
experienced a dramatic increase in the productivity gap between 1970 and
2009 in business services relative to the U.S. As we will show, the employ-
ment shares of these two sectors have been relatively large in the years of our
study. Hence, the levels of labor productivity in wholesale and retail trade
and in business services do matter significantly for the differences in aggre-
gate productivity between Europe and the U.S. For the rest of the service
sectors the evidence is mixed across countries. An important case to high-
light is financial services. Austria, France, Italy and Spain were countries
with more productive financial services compared to the U.S. in 1970, and
in spite of the sharp drop in productivity, they were still more productive
in 2009, except for the case of Spain. Nevertheless, without exception, all
countries in Europe experienced an important reduction in their productivity
relative to the U.S. in financial services.
Structural Transformation Within Services in Europe
In order to address whether our model is successful in explaining the struc-
tural transformation in Europe, Figure 3.7 plots a scatter between the ob-
served labor share for each sector in 2009 and the prediction of our model
for the same period. It also plots a solid line that represents the 45 degree
line starting at the origin of the y and x-axis. The closer the pair between
the observed labor share (y-axis) and our model’s prediction (x-axis) to the
45 degree line, the more accurate our model is in capturing the process of
structural transformation.9 Figure 3.7 illustrates that the model success-
health systems are managed by the government, and the labor hired in these two sub-
sectors qualifies as public employment. This fact raises potential concerns on the extent
of comparability of sectoral productivity in education and health between Europe and
the U.S., even though we use our model to correct potential measurement biases in the
available data.
9Unlike the employment share in manufacturing, there are no well-defined hump-
shaped patterns in the structural transformation in services. For this reason we consider
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Figure 3.7: Structural transformation in the U.S. and Europe. Model vs.
Data in 2009.
fully generates sectoral employment shares roughly consistent with the data,
with a few exceptions in wholesale and retail trade for the U.S. (as previously
documented) and Belgium, and in personal services for Spain and the Nether-
lands. Nevertheless, our model succeeds overall in explaining the process of
structural transformation in Europe.
that the prediction for the last observation in the sample is sufficient to assess the model’s
capacity to generate time paths consistent with the European structural transformation.
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3.4.3 Model’s Prediction III: Aggregate Labor Productivity in
Europe vis-a`-vis the U.S.
Can our model generate the motivating facts presented in Figure 3.1? If
we consider the aggregate labor productivity to be the weighted average
of the sectoral labor productivities, where the weights are nothing but the
labor shares of employment in each sector, i.e. the structural transformation,
then our model’s predictions can be compared directly to the evidence on
aggregate labor productivity in Europe vis-a`-vis the U.S. presented in Figure
3.1.10 One can address the capacity of the model in generating the labor
productivity ratios by using our predicted labor shares for each sector to
weight the sectorial productivity levels in order to generate aggregate labor
productivity time paths for each country.
Figure 3.8 compares the model’s prediction to the data for the aggregate
labor productivity in each European country relative to the U.S. and for
the European aggregate productivity relative to the U.S. as well.11 After
matching by construction the initial observations, the model does follow very
close the observed gaps in aggregate labor productivity between Europe and
the U.S., regardless on whether the country’s convergence stopped, as in
France or Germany, or wether the country is falling behind the U.S., as in
Belgium or the Netherlands.
In summary, we judged quantitatively the model’s performance in three di-
mensions: i) The U.S. structural transformation, ii) the European structural
transformation, and iii) the aggregate labor productivity in Europe relative
to the U.S. Our exercises show that our theoretical framework is successful
in accounting quantitatively the participation of employment in agriculture,
manufacturing and several services in the U.S. and Europe, and it also ac-
counts for the aggregate differences in income per capital between these two
regions, and for each country individually. These result are reassuring that
our theoretical framework is quantitatively valid, and supports the credibility
of the numerical experiments we expose hereafter.
10Recall that we discipline the initial labor productivities in Europe with the rela-
tive, PPP-adjusted, income per capita measures, matching the model and the data by
construction for the first period.
11The aggregate productivity in Europe is computed as the average of the eight Euro-
pean countries’ aggregate productivity, weighted by their national GDP.
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Figure 3.8: Aggregate labor productivity for the European countries
relative to the U.S. Europe’s aggregate productivity is the average of the
eight European countries’ aggregate productivity, weighted by their
national GDP. Model vs. Data. The model’s aggregate labor productivity
is the weighted average of sectorial labor productivity, where the weights
are the model’s predicted labor shares for each sector.
3.5 Numerical Experiments
After illustrating the quantitative success of the theory in explaining the
structural transformation and the aggregate labor productivity for Europe
and the U.S., we proceed to use our parametrized model economy to perform
a set of numerical experiments addressed to understand the role of sectoral
analysis in aggregate productivity. Our aim is to identify which sectors are
largely responsible for the slowdown in European labor productivity during
the last two decades relative to the United States.
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3.5.1 Europe keeping the Pace with the U.S. from 1970 to
2009
Our first counterfactual experiment asks what would have happened with the
aggregate labor productivity in Europe if they have experienced the observed
sectorial productivity growth in the U.S. from 1970 to 2009. We ask this
question for each sector individually, for services as an entire sector, and
for all the sectors simultaneously. We perform the numerical experiment for
each country and for Europe as a whole. More specifically, we use our model
to predict the structural transformation in Europe with the observed U.S.
labor productivity growth rate in each sector and compute the counterfactual
aggregate productivity. Then, we compare this aggregate productivity with
our benchmark prediction from Figure 3.8to address the differences between
our counterfactual scenario and the benchmark prediction for the aggregate
productivity.12 This experiment seeks to answer which sectors are responsible
for the relative aggregate productivity slow down.
Table 3.3 illustrates our findings when we feed the labor productivity
growth rates from 1970 to 2009. The top panel of Table 3.3 show the re-
sults of this exercise when a European country counterfactually experiences
the observed labor productivity growth rate in the U.S., in order to assess
changes in aggregate labor productivity as a consequence of changes in the
productivity of a single sector. Each row of the top panel represents one of
the 13 sectors in our model economy, and each column represents a European
country with the exception of the last column, which represents Europe as a
weighted average of the countries in our European sample.
The results for agriculture are not conclusive. Whereas some countries
would have performed better such as Belgium and the Netherlands, for the
rest of the European countries our model predicts that the aggregate labor
productivity level would be actually lower. Nevertheless, with the exception
of the Netherlands, these results have minimal implications for aggregate
12As Figure 3.8 shows, our model is successful in predicting the dynamics for the ag-
gregate labor productivity. However, one can repeat this exercise by comparing the coun-
terfactual prediction directly to the observed aggregate productivity level. We decided
to compare the counterfactual scenarios to our benchmark predictions because our model
successfully accounts for the aggregate labor productivity and because by comparing mod-
els’ predictions we can address with certainty that the differences arise solely due to the
numerical experiment. However, if one decides to compare directly to the actual data the
conclusions would not change dramatically.
134
AUT BEL FRA DEU ITA GBR ESP NLD Europe
γi = γ
USA
i
agr -0.1 1.3 -1.6 -1.2 -0.2 -0.2 -1.5 6.3 0.4
man -11.0 -14.3 -12.2 -7.6 -4.2 -9.2 -4.9 -7.7 -8.9
trd 4.3 6.5 3.9 3.4 7.7 1.8 6.3 7.1 5.1
rst -0.0 -0.1 -1.6 -1.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5
trs -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.6 0.9 -0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.2
com -1.2 1.5 -7.0 2.0 4.8 2.6 -7.0 -2.5 -0.9
fin 0.6 1.0 3.7 2.4 17.7 1.0 2.2 1.9 3.8
res -0.3 -0.7 -0.3 -0.7 4.8 -0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4
bss 1.3 -0.2 4.0 0.6 11.7 2.6 6.6 -2.7 3.0
gov -0.2 0.4 -1.0 -2.8 0.5 -1.8 3.5 0.4 -0.1
edu -1.7 -1.4 0.5 -1.4 -0.9 0.4 -1.7 -0.1 -0.8
hlt -3.7 -10.9 -5.9 -10.1 -7.3 -4.7 3.8 -8.4 -5.9
per -1.0 -2.3 -1.8 -1.1 1.2 0.9 -1.5 -1.3 -0.9
γi = γ
USA
i,i∈ser -3.5 -7.7 -6.4 -8.6 44.7 1.2 13.3 -6.1 3.4
γi = γ
USA
i,∀i -14.3 -20.4 -19.5 -16.8 38.6 -8.4 5.9 -7.5 -5.3
Table 3.3: Numerical experiment: Europe keeping the U.S. Pace for the
period 1970 - 2009. Percentage change of the 2009 aggregate labor
productivity level. Benchmark prediction vs. counterfactual.
productivity. As a whole, Europe would have had an increase in aggregate
labor productivity of 0.4% had they experienced the U.S. productivity in
agriculture. These minor results are not surprising. All these economies are
at advanced stages of development, with low levels for the size of agriculture
in the economy even for 1970, and in steady decline since then.
On the other hand, the message for manufacturing is not ambiguous. Had
the European countries experienced the U.S. labor productivity growth in
manufacturing during our sample period, their aggregate labor productivity
in 2009 would be lower regardless of the country. Naturally, Europe as a
whole would have had a lower aggregate productivity. The upper bound
of this decline is Italy, with a predicted drop of 4.2%, whereas the lower
bound is Belgium, with an staggering drop of 14.7%. Manufacturing is not
responsible for the European underperformance vis-a´-vis the U.S. On the
contrary, it helped Europe in its path toward convergence during our sample
period.
With regards to services, our counterfactual experiment suggests that the
slowdown in the aggregate labor productivity comes mainly from three sec-
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tors: wholesale and retail trade (trd), financial services (fin) and business
services (bss). It also suggests that Europeans are significantly more produc-
tive in health services (hlt). Let’s discuss the results of each of these four
sectors in detail.13
First, during the sample period, the aggregate labor productivity in every
single European country would have increased significantly had the wholesale
and retail trade sector experienced the U.S. labor productivity growth in
Europe. The lower bound for this prediction is for Great Britain, with an
increase in aggregate labor productivity of 1.8%, whereas the upper bound is
Italy with an increase of 7.7%. The prediction for Europe indicates that this
sector alone would have been responsible for an aggregate labor productivity
5.1% higher than our benchmark prediction in 2009.
Second, financial services also would have helped to reduce the labor pro-
ductivity gap had the European countries experienced the same labor pro-
ductivity growth observed in this sector for the U.S. Europe as a whole would
have had a labor productivity level 3.8% higher than our benchmark predic-
tion. Furthermore, every single European country would have experienced
higher aggregate labor productivity if their financial services were as produc-
tive as in the U.S., although the results for Italy are substantially higher to
the rest of Europe.
Third, with the exception of Belgium and the Netherlands, the labor pro-
ductivity would also be higher for the European countries if they have had
the U.S. labor productivity growth in business services. Once again, the or-
der of magnitude of this result is substantially higher for Italy compared to
the rest of Europe.
Last, our results also illustrate that Europe would have had lower aggregate
productivity have they had the U.S. labor productivity growth observed in
health services. With the exception of Spain, every single European country
would have underperformed have they had the U.S. labor productivity growth
in the health sector. It is well known that the U.S. is the advanced economy
with the most expensive health sector, and our simple models shows that part
of these higher costs are captured by its relatively lower labor productivity
in this sector. Nevertheless, the question of productivity in health services
is one of great difficulty. Labor productivity is measured as the real value
13For the rest of the sectors the results are ambiguous depending on the country, and
the aggregate effect on labor productivity is not large.
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added per worker, but without a proper adjustment for quality it is difficult
to address whether more health services per hour reflect more productivity
in the health sector. Still, our model captures reasonably well the idea that
the U.S. provides health services that are much more expensive compared to
their European counterparts.
The middle and lower panel of Table 3.3 show what would have happened
if Europe would have experienced the productivity growth rates observed in
the U.S. in all services and all sectors simultaneously, respectively. Europe
would have experienced some convergence during this period if their services
have experienced the U.S. labor productivity growth; the aggregate labor
productivity would have been 3.4% higher than our benchmark prediction.
However, if all sectors had grown like the U.S., the gains obtained in services
would be out-weighted by a poorer performance in manufacturing, which
helped the convergence during our sample period, yielding an overall loss
of the aggregate labor productivity of 5.3% compared to our benchmark
prediction.
3.5.2 Europe keeping the Pace with the U.S. from 1990 to
2009
It has been established in this paper that the aggregate productivity in Eu-
rope was converging to the U.S. before 1990 and after this year, a process of
either slowdown or falling behind started, depending of the country that one
is considering. Our second counterfactual experiment asks what would had
happened if Europe have continued with the U.S. labor productivity growth
rates after 1990, which is the period where the process of convergence came
to a halt. We followed the same set of exercises from the previous section,
with the only difference that the U.S. growth rates that are counterfactually
feed start in 1990 rather than in 1970.
Table 3.4 shows the results of the numerical experiments for the period
1990-2009 by comparing the benchmark prediction to the counterfactual ag-
gregate labor productivity. There are some important differences with the
numerical experiments for the period 1970-2009 worth highlighting.
First, whereas the results for agriculture are still negligible, the sharp drop
in the aggregate labor productivity with the U.S. manufacturing labor pro-
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AUT BEL FRA DEU ITA GBR ESP NLD Europe
γi = γ
USA
i
agr -0.3 1.3 -0.8 -1.5 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -0.3
man -2.8 -1.5 -1.4 -1.3 3.1 0.9 2.5 -1.7 -0.3
trd 4.0 4.3 4.2 2.3 4.2 1.6 3.0 2.4 3.2
rst 0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.7 -0.1 0.0
trs -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.8 -0.4 0.2
com -0.9 1.0 -4.2 -0.1 -3.3 -6.5 -3.0 -5.9 -2.9
fin -1.0 -0.5 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.3 -0.7 0.4
res 0.2 2.2 -0.0 0.0 2.6 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.8
bss 0.9 2.2 2.6 3.1 4.5 2.8 3.7 -0.8 2.4
gov 0.1 0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5
edu -0.4 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 1.5 -2.4 0.4 0.1
hlt -1.9 -3.4 -1.2 -8.1 -1.6 -0.2 0.4 -5.7 -2.7
per -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4
γi = γ
USA
i,i∈ser 0.7 5.7 2.6 -2.3 7.4 -0.3 3.6 -11.6 0.7
γi = γ
USA
i,∀i -2.4 5.4 0.4 -5.2 10.6 0.9 6.0 -14.2 0.2
Table 3.4: Numerical experiment: Europe keeping the U.S. Pace for the
period 1990 - 2009. Percentage change of the 2009 aggregate labor
productivity level. Benchmark prediction vs. counterfactual.
ductivity for the period 1970-2009 virtually vanishes when we feed the pro-
ductivity growth rates only since 1990. This confirms our previous finding:
Manufacturing was responsible for the catch-up observed during the 1970s
and 1980s. After these years, the productivity growth in manufacturing is not
as critical as before to understand the aggregate labor productivity mainly
because the weight of manufacturing has fallen due to the ongoing process
of structural transformation.
Second, wholesale and retail trade (trd) and business services (bss) con-
tinue to be of great importance to account for the European slowdown that
took place after 1990. The aggregate labor productivity would have been sig-
nificantly higher in every European country had they experienced the U.S.
labor productivity growth in these two sectors, with the only exception of
the Netherlands for the case of business services (bss). On the other hand,
financial services (fin) are no longer critical to account for the slowdown, in
contrast with the counterfactual for the whole sample period.
Third, the results for health services are in the same direction compared
to the entire sample period, but the order of magnitude of the result is
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about half of what it was for the 1970-2009 period, although still represent
a large distance between the benchmark and the counterfactual aggregate
productivity for each country, again with the exception of Spain. In addition,
for the period between 1990 and 2009 a new sector emerges in which the
Europeans would be worse off if they have had the U.S. labor productivity
growth: Communications. With the exception of Belgium, all countries in
Europe would have had lower aggregate productivity have they had the U.S.
labor productivity in communications, and this difference is large in France,
Italy, Great Britain, Spain and the Netherlands.
Last, the middle and lower panel of Table 3.4 illustrate that for this period,
the European countries would be modestly more productive have they had
the U.S. labor productivity growth observed in the service sector. In addition,
they would have been virtually the same have they had the labor productivity
growth in each sector in the economy since 1990.
3.5.3 Europe Sectors Catching Up with the U.S. Productivity
Levels in 2009
After identifying the sectors largely responsible for the European slowdown,
our last numerical experiments ask how much the aggregate labor produc-
tivity would have grown if either wholesale and retail trade (trd), financial
services (fin), or business services (bss) would have had the productivity
growth needed to catch up with the U.S. labor productivity level in each sec-
tor by 2009. We assume that this convergence takes place only in one sector
at a time to compute the annualized growth rate consistent with the catch
up to the U.S. labor productivity in the sector in question while keeping the
observed growth rates for the rest of the sectors.
Table 3.5 shows the implied change in aggregate productivity when each of
these three sectors mentioned before converges to the U.S. labor productivity
level in 2009.14 Have Europe converged to the U.S. productivity level in
2009 in whole sale and retail trade (trd) or in business services (bss), the
aggregate productivity gains would be substantial. For instance, Europe
as a whole would have had an aggregate productivity level 25.8% higher
14Our model is suited to perform this numerical experiment for any sector in the econ-
omy, but for the sake of space, we decide to show only the three sectors that we identify
as largely responsible for the European slowdown during the period 1970-2009.
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AUT BEL FRA DEU ITA GBR ESP NLD Europe
trd 19.0 30.6 15.0 22.1 33.8 22.7 33.8 29.4 25.8
bss 10.3 13.4 17.7 15.1 13.3 24.2 15.3 27.9 17.1
fin -1.9 4.6 -2.3 5.8 -2.5 2.3 1.8 4.3 1.5
Table 3.5: Numerical experiment: Europe catching up the U.S. sectoral
productivity level in 2009. Implied (annualized) growth rates under full
catch-up in whole sale and retail trade (trd), business services (bss) and
financial services (fin). Percentage change of the 2009 aggregate labor
productivity level (benchmark prediction vs. counterfactual).
had they converged in whole sale and retail trade, and of 17.1% have their
productivity converged in business services. These two sectors alone are
largely responsible for the European slowdown relative to the U.S. Moreover,
no European country would have experienced a reduction of its observed
aggregate labor productivity have their labor productivity converged to the
U.S. by 2009 in either of these two sectors. Whereas the lower bound of the
prediction is of 15% if France have had a catch up in whole sale and retail
trade, the lower bound of the increase in aggregate labor productivity is of
10.3% for Austria have they experienced a catch up in business services.
On the other hand, financial services (fin) are not unambiguously a source
of slowdown between Europe and the U.S. The last row of Table 3.5 shows
that have Europe experienced a full catch up in the labor productivity of
financial services relative to the U.S. 2009 level, Austria, France and Italy
would have had lower aggregate labor productivity. Moreover, even Germany
– the most successful counterfactual scenario with an aggregate productivity
5.8% higher compared to its 2009 benchmark prediction – falls short when
compared to the lower bound of the predictions for wholesale and retail trade
(trd) or for business services (bss).
Figure 3.9 illustrates the effect of a full catch up wholesale and retail trade
(trd) on the aggregate labor productivity over time, from 1970 to 2009. Had
the European countries converged to the 2009 labor productivity levels in
wholesale and retail trade, they would have continued their path toward
convergence after 1990, with a mild deceleration in a few countries. Figure
3.9 shows that every single country in Europe would have had improved its
position relative to the U.S. without exception. Moreover, Austria and France
would have virtually closed the labor productivity gap with the U.S. and
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Figure 3.9: Aggregate labor productivity in Europe vis-a´-vis the U.S. under
full catch up in the labor productivity in the wholesale and retail trade
(trd) sector. Benchmark prediction vs. counterfactual.
Belgium would have surpassed the American aggregate labor productivity
level by 2009. The rest of the countries still would have not closed the gap,
but they would not have fallen behind either have they closed the gap in
wholesale and retail trade. Europe as a whole would have closed more than
half of the gap in labor productivity have they closed the labor productivity
gap in this specific sector alone.
As W. W. Lewis (2004, p. 34) puts it, “In the United States, wholesalers
[...] began to consolidated their warehouses and improve the productivity
of the operations in those warehouses. This change was the largest single
contribution to the productivity acceleration in the U.S. economy in the late
1990s not the efforts of Microsoft of Silicon Valley”.
Similarly, Figure 3.10 illustrates the effect of a full catch up in business
services (bss) on the aggregate labor productivity time path between 1970
and 2009. The results are qualitatively similar to our previous numerical
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Figure 3.10: Aggregate labor productivity in Europe vis-a´-vis the U.S.
under full catch up for the labor productivity in the business services (bss)
sector. Benchmark prediction vs. counterfactual.
experiment illustrated in Figure 3.9, but the magnitude of the effect from
catching up in business services is much smaller compared to a full catch up
in wholesale and retail trade. Still, if Europe would have experienced a full
catch up in the productivity of business services by 2009, the aggregate labor
productivity would have been higher in every single country, and with the
exception of Italy every country would have continued to close the aggregate
productivity gap with respect to the U.S. after 1990 when Europe started
to fall behind. Moreover, Belgium and Great Britain would have closed
the aggregate productivity gap by catching up to the U.S. only in business
services, and Europe as a whole would have closed about two thirds of the
aggregate productivity gap with respect to the United States.
Overall, our counterfactual experiments highlight the importance of sec-
toral analysis on accounting, through the lenses of a theory of structural
transformation, which are the sectors responsible for the widening labor pro-
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ductivity gap between Europe and the U.S. After opening the service sector
into 11 comparable sectors, we find that wholesale and retail trade, business
services and to a lesser extent financial are the sectors largely responsible for
the aggregate productivity gap. Had these sectors kept the pace with the
U.S., the gap would have vanished significantly by 2009.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a multi-sector model of structural transformation
that disaggregates services in order to quantitatively study the labor pro-
ductivity differences between Europe and the U.S. in the service sector. We
conclude that the structural transformation within the service sector is an im-
portant phenomenon, which helps understand why European countries have
suffered a lower labor productivity than the U.S., especially since the 90’s.
Although the reallocation of labor toward the various types of services has
followed similar patterns both in Europe and the U.S., the levels of labor
shares are largely different among service sub-sectors and between the two
regions. At the same time, the service sub-sectors’ labor productivities are
remarkably different between the U.S. and Europe. Hence, the interaction of
cross-country variations in labor share and labor productivity within the ser-
vice sector is a major determinant of differences in the aggregate productivity
of these economies.
We identify wholesale and retail trade and business services as the types
of services that principally caused low service productivity in Europe, and
ultimately lead to the divergence of European aggregate productivity from
U.S. levels since the 90’s. Wholesale and retail trade has always employed
a large share of labor, while business services has experienced an astonish-
ing increase in its employment share over the period of our analysis. These
patterns are similar both in the U.S. and in Europe. However, labor produc-
tivity growth in these sectors has been particularly slower in Europe than in
the United States. High and/or increasing labor shares and underperforming
labor productivity growth in these two sectors is at the core of the outcome
uncovered by our quantitative analysis.
Our findings, together with the rising importance of services in the econ-
omy, imply that the efforts of a deeper understanding of the labor productiv-
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ity differences between Europe and the U.S. should be focused on wholesale
and retail trade and business services. Preliminary empirical findings of our
own suggest that insufficient capital deepening – both in information and
communication technologies (ICT) and in physical capital – and lower TFP
levels are responsible for the differences in these two sectors.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER
1
A.1 Shooting Algorithm
The first step is to redefine the per capita variables dividing by their bal-
anced growth path values to find a steady state. Defining A1−Θtt = Axt, the
aggregate production function is
Yt = A
1−Θ
t K
Θ
t L
1−Θ
t ,
using the fact that in the long run the economy converges to a one-sector
neoclassical growth model with constant capital income shares (Θt → Θ).
Dividing by Lt and assuming no unemployment, on gets an expression for
income per capita as yt =
Yt
Lt
, then
yt = A
1−Θ
t k
Θ
t .
Defining Jt+1
Jt
= (1 + γJ) for any arbitrary variable J one gets
1 + γy = (1 + γA)
1−Θ(1 + γk)Θ.
In the balance growth path, the only source of growth is the exogenous
technical rate γA, thus γA = γk = γy. Assuming that Act = Axt
1 the aggre-
gate price Pt is equal to one in each and every period. Therefore,
Yt = Ct +Xt
and
1If the production of output is independent of its destination as final consumption or
investment good, it is reasonable to neglect the differences between the TFP of consump-
tion and investment goods.
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yt = ct + xt
Aside: xt =
Xt
Lt
= Kt+1
Lt
− Kt
Lt
(1− δ)
= Kt+1
Lt
− kt(1− δ).
End of Aside
Using the aside, one gets
yt = ct +
Kt+1
Lt
− kt(1− δ).
To find an expression for the growth rates in the balanced growth path,
one can find the ratio yt+1
yt
using the fact that kt+1
kt
=
(
Kt+1
Lt+1
)/(
Kt
Lt
)
, which
yields the expression
1 + γy = 1 + γc +
γK
γL
− γK
γL
,
therefore γy = γc = γk = γA, i.e. all per capita variables are growing
according to the TFP growth rate. Dividing the per capita variables by the
balance growth path values one gets
kˆt =
kt
(1 + γA)t
; cˆt =
ct
(1 + γA)t
; yˆt =
yt
(1 + γA)t
.
Since all variables are growing at the same rate in the balanced growth
path, one can simply use γ as the TFP growth rate. The household’s prefer-
ences with the redefined variables are described by
∞∑
t=0
βt log(1 + γ)tcˆt,
and the resources’ restriction is
cˆt + (1 + n)(1 + γ) ˆkt+1 = yˆt + kˆt(1− δ),
where Lt+1
Lt
= (1 + n).
Given the non-increasing returns to scale in the production function and
the convex and locally non-satiated preferences of the household, the Sec-
ond Welfare Theorem implies that the Social Planner’s problem supports a
competitive equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the Social Planner’s problem
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is described as follows:
Social Planner’s Problem
max
{cˆt, ˆkt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt log(1 + γ)tcˆt s.t. i) kˆt
Θ
+ (1− δ)kˆt ≥ cˆt + (1 + n)(1 + γ) ˆkt+1
ii) kˆ0 > 0.
(A.1)
The first-order conditions yield the following Euler equation
ˆct+1
cˆt
=
β(Θ ˆkt+1
Θ−1
+ (1− δ))
(1 + n)(1 + γ)
, (A.2)
and the steady state capital is
kˆss =
[
Θ
1
β
(1 + n)(1 + γ)− (1− δ)
] 1
1−Θ
. (A.3)
For the shooting algorithm, I need to express the Euler equation (A.2) as a
second order differential equation with respect to the capital. The consump-
tion can be expressed as the first order differential equation
cˆt = kˆt
Θ
+ kˆt(1− δ)− (1 + n)(1 + γ) ˆkt+1. (A.4)
Plugging (A.4) into (A.2) one gets
ˆkt+1
Θ
+ ˆkt+1(1− δ)− (1 + n)(1 + γ) ˆkt+2
kˆt
Θ
+ kˆt(1− δ)− (1 + n)(1 + γ) ˆkt+1
=
β(Θ ˆkt+1
Θ−1
+ (1− δ))
(1 + n)(1 + γ)
. (A.5)
With values for the parameters, kˆt and ˆkt+1, one can use equation (A.5) to
solve for ˆkt+2. The shooting algorithm uses equation (A.5) to solve for the
entire time-path for {kˆt} and consequently, for the paths of {Ct,Wt, Rt} as
a function of {At, Kt}. The computation of the shooting algorithm involves
the following steps:
1. With values for the parameters, compute the steady state capital kˆss
(equation (A.3)) and define kˆ0 as one per cent of the steady state cap-
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ital.
2. Take a guess for kˆ1.
3. Compute kˆ2 using equation (A.5).
4. Compute the entire time-path {kˆt} recursively using equation (A.5).
5. Check in each period of the time-path {kˆt} for the following two con-
ditions:
(a) In each period, kˆt should be ascending.
(b) While ascending, the level for kˆt should still be below kˆ
ss before
the last period of the time-path.
6. If both conditions from step 5 are met, then the time-path for kˆt is
optimal. If not, the capital is either not converging to its steady state
value or converging too fast. If this is the case, then go back to step 2
with a different guess until the two conditions from step 5 are met.
A.2 Estimation of Income and Substitution Elasticities
To derive a system of relative labor demands I use the closed model econ-
omy framework mainly for three reasons. First, the system is more tractable
without trade since not all the sectors in the economy are open to make a
comparison one to one between sectors with regards to the trade adjustment
term. Second, preference parameters should be independent on the nation-
ality of the consumption good so in principle opening the economy does not
bring much value to discover the “deep structural parameters” pertinent to
the intra-temporal choice. In addition, after including trade controls as a
robustness check for income and price elasticities I found that it is safe to
disregard the open economy assumption for this particular exercise.2
From the definition of the expenditure shares and equation (1.16) from the
intra-temporal optimal allocations one obtains
pitcit
PtCt
= Ωi
(
pit
Pt
)1−σ
Ci−1t . (A.6)
2Comin et al. (2015) also found similar estimates for income and price elasticities with
and without trade controls.
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Additionally, using equation (1.23) the demand for sectors j ∈ {a, s} rela-
tive to manufacturing is
lj
lm
=
(1− θj)pjtcjtPtCt
(1− θm)pmtcmtPtCt
. (A.7)
Combining equations (A.6) and (A.7) and taking logs on both sides yields
log
(
lit
lmt
)
= log
(
1− θj
1− θm
)
+(1−σ) log
(
pj
pm
)
+(j−m) logCt+log
(
Ωj
Ωm
)
,
(A.8)
for j ∈ {a, s}. From equation (A.8) I obtain the following estimating equa-
tions for the labor demand in agriculture and services relative to manufac-
turing
log
(
lat
lmt
)
= α0+α1 log
(
1− θat
1− θmt
)
+(1−σ) log
(
pat
pmt
)
+(a−m) logCt+νam,t,
(A.9)
and
log
(
lst
lmt
)
= α3+α4 log
(
1− θst
1− θmt
)
+(1−σ) log
(
pst
pmt
)
+(s−m) logCt+νsm,t.
(A.10)
Equations (A.9) and (A.10) must be estimated jointly with the cross equa-
tion restriction for the elasticity of substitution. The elasticities of interest
are (1−σ), (a− m) and (s− m). α1 and α3 represent country fixed effects
to control for the time invariant parameters Ωi.
3 An important difference
with respect to Comin et al. (2015) is that sector fixed effects in this frame-
work does not control for the capital intensity changing over time, so α2 and
α4 should be estimated explicitly to control for the capital intensity in order
to estimate income and price elasticities.
The variables of interest are Ct,
pat
pmt
, and pst
pmt
. For the panel estimations, Ct
is measured as the expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in millions
of 2011US$) available at the Penn World Tables (version 9.0).4 For prices at
3Unlike Duarte and Restuccia (2010), I am not using the model to compare productiv-
ity levels across countries, so the weights on the preferences do change across countries in
order to account for the initial observations consistent with the normalization of sectoral
TFP.
4To construct the time series of real income in the model I used the growth rates of
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(1) (2)
1− σ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.12) (0.09)
a − m -0.639∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05)
s − m 0.270∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.04)
Trade Controls No Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 283 126
R2 0.960 0.955
Table A.1: Estimates for income and substitution elasticities. Ct is
measured as the expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in millions of
2011US$) available at the Penn World Tables (version 9.0). Prices at the
sector level are measured as the ratio of nominal value added to real value
added per sector from World KLEMS. Trade controls are the trade balance
in logs available at the Penn World Tables (version 9.0). Controls for
measures of capital intensity included. The countries included are Belgium,
Canada, Spain, Great Britain, Japan, South Korea and the United States.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
the sector level I used the ratio of nominal value added to real value added
per sector from World KLEMS to obtain sectoral prices.
Table A.1 presents the estimation of equations (A.9) and (A.10) with and
without trade controls (measured as the log of the balance of trade). Only
the coefficients for income and substitution elasticities are reported. Column
1 presents the baseline estimation without trade controls. The estimated
elasticity of substitution is of 0.68, which is in line with other estimates in
the literature, and it still it is statistically lower than one. Recall that this
elasticity is computed controlling for the role of capital income shares on the
system of relative labor demands.
the trended income per capita available at the Maddison-Project since I’m not interested
in the business cycle. However, for purposes of estimating equations (A.9) and (A.10) the
variation of income levels is critical. For this reason I consider expenditure-side real GDP
at chained PPPs instead of the Maddison’s income per-capita levels. Nevertheless, after
some inspection, the growth rates of income for these two different sources are very similar
although the expenditure-side real GDP present slightly more volatile series, making them
more desired for the purposes of the estimation.
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With regards to the income elasticity, if one normalizes m to 1, or in
other words, if one imposes homothetic preferences on the consumption of
manufactures, the interpretation of the Engel curves is straightforward. The
income elasticity for agricultural goods a is 0.36, which reinforces the notion
of Engel curves for agriculture in the traditional literature of development: As
long as income grows, households devote a smaller proportion of the income
growth toward the consumption of food. Additionally, the income elasticity
of services is 1.27, which means that households consume disproportionally
more services as long as they become wealthier.
The key message of Table A.1 are not the punctual estimates of income
elasticities but rather their relative ranking across sectors. Relative to man-
ufactures, the income elasticity for agricultural goods is inferior while the
opposite is true for services. Column 2 of Table A.1 controls the estimation
of income and price elasticity for trade and shows that the message is not
altered and the punctual estimates are not altered dramatically. For the
calibration of the model I will use the estimates illustrated in Column 1 of
Table A.1.
A.3 Computation of Sectoral TFPs.
The computation of Sectoral TFPs with time-varying capital intensities is
straightforward. From the production technology (equation (1.17)) TFP lev-
els are defined as
Ait =
yit
iit
(
θit
1− θit
Wt
Rt
)−θit
.
Taking the total derivative with respect to time one gets
A˙it
Ait
=
˙( Yit
Lit
)
(
Yit
Lit
)−θ˙it [log(Wt
Rt
)
+ log θit + log(1− θit)− 1
]
−θit
 ˙(1− θit)
(1− θit) +
˙(Wt
Rt
)
(
Wt
Rt
)
 ,
(A.11)
where x˙ ∼ ∆x = xt−xt−1. Adjusting the labor productivity is just a matter
of using the observed growth rates in capital income shares and the computed
time series for relative input prices to obtain TFP measures consistent with
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time-varying capital intensities.
A.4 Model’s Main Prediction with Exogenous
Aggregate Time Series
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Figure A.1: Labor shares in Korea over time, 1970-2010. Data vs. model.
The aggregate time series {Ct, WtRt } are computed with exogenous growth
rates to illustrate that the hump-shape does not depend on any assumption
used in the aggregation of the model to a one-sector neoclassical growth
model.
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A.5 Predicted Manufacturing Labor Share with
Implied Balance of Trade
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(a) Average Capital Income Shares
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(b) Initial Capital Income Shares
Figure A.2: Predicted manufacturing labor share with implied balance of
trade for Korea, 1970-2010.
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(a) Average Capital Income Shares
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(b) Initial Capital Income Shares
Figure A.3: Predicted manufacturing labor share with implied balance of
trade for the United States, 1948-2010.
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A.6 Pattern of Development in South Korea
Exports Primary ISI Primary EOI Secondary ISI/EOI
Rice, beans. Food, beverages Textiles and apparel, Automobiles, ship-
tobbaco, textiles, electronics, plywood building, steel and
clothing, footwear wigs, intermediate metal products, petro-
cement, light manu- goods (chemicals, chemicals,textiles and
factures (wood, petroleum, paper, apparel, electronics,
leather, ruber, and and steel products). videocassete recorders,
paper products). machinery.
Note: ISI = import-substituting industrialization; EOI = export-oriented industrialization.
Table A.2: South Korean pattern of development. Source: Gereffi (1990, p.
20).
A.7 Predicted Capital Income Shares for Other
Countries
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Figure A.4: Brazil. Implied capital income shares
159
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t
S
h
ar
e
(D
at
a)
0.69
0.70
0.71
0.72
0.73
0.74
0.75
C
ap
it
al
In
co
m
e
S
h
ar
e
(P
re
d
ic
ti
on
)
Right Axis
(a) Manufacturing
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Prediction
Prediction. No Agriculture
Data (PWT)
(b) Aggregate
Figure A.5: Costa Rica. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.6: Denmark. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.7: Spain. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.8: France. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.9: Italy. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.10: Mexico. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.11: Malaysia. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.12: Peru. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.13: Taiwan. Implied capital income shares
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Figure A.14: South Africa. Implied capital income shares
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER
2
B.1 EAM Classification of Production and
Non-Production Personnel
Non-Production Personnel (Managers):
Includes the people who run the economic, financial and admin-
istrative aspects of the establishment and who are responsible
for developing and driving overall company policy, as managers,
assistant managers and directors paid. This includes: adminis-
trative officers, typists, supervisors, security personnel, orderlies,
service personnel who do not work in the production area, ven-
dors, dealers and/or distributors. Excludes personnel warehouses,
administrative offices , management , storage and other auxiliary
units that do not depend directly on the property or that are
located in a different physical location of the production plant
(EAM, 2011, pp.25).
Production Personnel (Workers):
Corresponds to the employees dedicated to the manufacture, pro-
cessing, assembly, installation, maintenance, inspection, storage,
packing, loading and unloading workers, such as workshop or in-
ternal messengers, firemen, cleaners equipment, supervisors and
foremen working manually, drivers transporting supplies, materi-
als or products only within the establishment, maintenance work-
ers and repair (mechanical, electrical , etc.) of machinery and
industrial equipment. Administrative managers, typists, supervi-
sors principally engaged in the surveillance of working personnel,
164
security personnel, orderlies, service personnel who work in the
production area (EAM, 2011, pp.26).
B.2 Simulation Algorithm
In principle, the coefficients of production and relative costs are sufficient to
simulate input demands. However, the system of equations portrayed in (2.8)
consider time and fixed effects that are desirable to include in the simulation
to be able to predict more accurately the input levels. The inclusion of time
fixed effects is particularly relevant capture the impact of the market oriented
reforms on relative prices with the interaction term coefficient. Therefore,
the simulation algorithm that I used is as follows:
1. Obtain ¯ˆxj =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xˆij, namely the average of the predictions for the
demand of each input j based on the estimation of (2.8) with instru-
mental variables, where xij = logXij and N is the total number of
observations in the sample. Notice that here i represents individual
observations rather than plants while j still represents the inputs in-
dexed in J .
2. Obtain c¯j =
1
n
∑n
i=1 cij, the average relative cost for each input used in
the prediction stored in step 1, where cij = logCij.
3. Compute βˆj2 × c¯j, the coefficient of relative costs times the average
relative cost from step 2 and subtract this product from the average
input demand obtained in step 1, i.e. ¯ˆxj − βˆj2 × c¯j.
4. Generate a sequence {c˜j} of relative costs for each input that reflects a
reduction in capital costs. This sequence will have observations above
and below the average relative costs stored in step 2. Therefore, by
construction the simulation will necessary cross at some point through
the average input demand.
5. Multiply each element of the sequence of relative costs with the coef-
ficient βj2, and add this product to the quantity stored in step 3, i.e.
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{x˜j} = ¯ˆxj − βˆj2 × c¯j + βˆj2 × {c˜j}. This will generate a simulated se-
quence of input demands based on the IV coefficients and the simulated
sequence of relative costs.
The same algorithm is extended to include the interaction term between
the relative costs and the binary variable PR to generate simulated input
demands that capture the effect of market oriented reforms on relative prices.
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B.3 Robustness Checks: Figures and Tables
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Figure B.1: Survivor plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers. Predictions are based on the IV elasticities from Table B.1. The
Capital Cost Index simulation starts at three times its 1982 level, falling
down continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level. Survivor plants are
defined as establishments that reported production in t and in t+ 1.
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(a) Pre-Reform Period
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(b) Post-Reform Period
Figure B.2: Survivor plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers. Pre and post-reform elasticities: The predictions are based on the
IV elasticities from Table B.1. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at
three times its 1982 level, falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its
1982 level. Survivor plants are defined as establishments that reported
production in t and in t+ 1.
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Figure B.3: Exit plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers: Predictions are based on the IV elasticities from Table B.2. The
Capital Cost Index simulation starts at three times its 1982 level, falling
down continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level. Exit plants are defined
as establishments that reported production in t but not in t+ 1.
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(a) Pre-Reform Period
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(b) Post-Reform Period
Figure B.4: Exit plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers. Pre and post-reform periods: Predictions are based on the IV
elasticities from Table B.2. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at
three times its 1982 level, falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its
1982 level. Exit plants are defined as establishments that reported
production in t but not in t+ 1.
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Figure B.5: Incumbent plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers,
and workers: Predictions are based on the IV elasticities from Table B.3.
The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at three times its 1982 level,
falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level. Incumbent plants
are defined as establishments that reported production in t and in t− 1.
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(a) Pre-Reform Period
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(b) Post-Reform Period
Figure B.6: Incumbent plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers,
and workers: Pre and post-reform periods: Predictions are based on the IV
elasticities from Table B.3. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at
three times its 1982 level, falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its
1982 level. Incumbent plants are defined as establishments that reported
production in t and in t− 1.
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Figure B.7: Entry plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers: Predictions are based on the IV elasticities from Table B.4. The
Capital Cost Index simulation starts at three times its 1982 level, falling
down continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level. Entry plants are defined
as establishments that reported production in t but not in t− 1.
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(a) Pre-Reform Period
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(b) Post-Reform Period
Figure B.8: Entry plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers: Pre and post-reform periods: Predictions are based on the IV
elasticities from Table B.4. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at
three times its 1982 level, falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its
1982 level. Entry plants are defined as establishments that reported
production in t but not in t− 1.
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Figure B.9: Small plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers: The predictions are based on the IV elasticities from Table B.5.
The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at three times its 1982 level,
falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level. Small plants are
defined as establishments with a number of employees below the percentile
33 in the sample (17 employees).
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(a) Pre-Reform Period
Log Capital
6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4
Ma
na
ge
rs
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
W
o
rk
e
rs
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
(b) Post-Reform Period
Figure B.10: Small plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers. Pre and post-reform elasticities: Predictions are based on the IV
elasticities from Table B.5. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at
three times its 1982 level, falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its
1982 level. Small plants are defined as establishments with a number of
employees below the percentile 33 in the sample (17 employees).
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Figure B.11: Medium plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers,
and workers: The predictions are based on the IV elasticities from Table
B.6. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at three times its 1982 level,
falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level. Medium plants
are defined as establishments with a number of employees between the
percentile 33 (17 employees) and percentile 66 (44 employees) in the sample.
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(a) Pre-Reform Period
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(b) Post-Reform Period
Figure B.12: Medium plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers,
and workers. Pre and post-reform elasticities: Predictions are based on the
IV elasticities from Table B.6. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at
three times its 1982 level, falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its
1982 level. Medium plants are defined as establishments with a number of
employees between the percentile 33 (17 employees) and percentile 66 (44
employees) in the sample.
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Figure B.13: Large plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers: The predictions are based on the IV elasticities from Table B.7.
The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at three times its 1982 level,
falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its 1982 level. Large plants are
defined as establishments with a number of employees above the percentile
66 in the sample (44 employees).
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(a) Pre-Reform Period
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(b) Post-Reform Period
Figure B.14: Large plants. Demand predictions for capital, managers, and
workers. Pre and post-Reform elasticities: Predictions are based on the IV
elasticities from Table B.7. The Capital Cost Index simulation starts at
three times its 1982 level, falling down continuously to 50 per cent of its
1982 level. Large plants are defined as establishments with a number of
employees above the percentile 66 in the sample (44 employees).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Managers Managers Workers Workers
Panel A. Second Stage
Output 0.653∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.061) (0.061) (0.055) (0.055)
Relative Capital -0.343∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗
Cost Index (0.066) (0.052)
Relative Capital -0.372∗∗
Cost Index x PR (0.115)
Relative Industrial -0.330∗∗∗ -0.173∗
Wage Index (0.088) (0.068)
Relative Industrial -0.275∗∗
Wage Index x PR (0.104)
Relative Minimum -0.178∗∗ -0.0820
Wage Index (0.066) (0.053)
Relative Minimum -0.178∗
Wage Index X PR (0.078)
Panel B. First Stage. Dependent Variable: Output
Demand Shocks 0.694∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075)
Relative Capital 0.808∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗
Cost Index (0.134) (0.089)
Relative Capital 0.384∗∗
Cost Index x PR (0.134)
Relative Industrial 0.883∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.148) (0.098)
Relative Industrial 0.322∗
Wage Index x PR (0.131)
Relative Minimum 0.874∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.147) (0.102)
Relative Minimum 0.344∗
Wage Index X PR (0.135)
Constant 7.833∗∗∗ 7.622∗∗∗ 7.784∗∗∗ 7.582∗∗∗ 7.725∗∗∗ 7.520∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.407) (0.417) (0.414) (0.423) (0.422)
Observations 74,775 74,775 73,109 73,109 75,902 75,902
Number of id 8,439 8,439 8,304 8,304 8,539 8,539
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.255 0.268 0.269 0.267 0.268
F 86.29 81.20 85.05 99.43 89.99 88.34
Table B.1: Input demands for survivor plants: capital, managers, and
workers. IV Estimations: Standard errors clustered at the three-digit sector
level in parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in
logs. The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Industrial
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998). Demand Shocks with different sector
elasticities come from Eslava et al. (2004). Columns (1) through (6) include
plant and time fixed effects. Survivor plants are defined as establishments
that reported production in t and in t+ 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Managers Managers Workers Workers
Panel A. Second Stage
Output 0.803∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.221) (0.069) (0.069) (0.075) (0.076)
Relative Capital -0.390 0.00917
Cost Index (0.311) (0.506)
Relative Capital -0.453
Cost Index x PR (0.525)
Relative Industrial -0.410∗∗ -0.399
Wage Index (0.145) (0.228)
Relative Industrial -0.0120
Wage Index x PR (0.134)
Relative Minimum -0.299∗ -0.394∗
Wage Index (0.120) (0.155)
Relative Minimum Wage 0.105
Index X PR (0.127)
Panel B. First Stage. Dependent Variable: Output
Demand Shocks 0.656∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.085) (0.100) (0.099)
Relative Capital 1.216∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗
Cost Index (0.124) (0.185)
Relative Capital 0.241
Cost Index x PR (0.181)
Relative Industrial 1.195∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.094) (0.170)
Relative Industrial 0.264
Wage Index x PR (0.166)
Relative Minimum 1.366∗∗∗ 1.142∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.135) (0.167)
Relative Minimum 0.248
Wage Index X PR (0.129)
Constant 7.960∗∗∗ 7.732∗∗∗ 7.494∗∗∗ 7.229∗∗∗ 7.780∗∗∗ 7.540∗∗∗
(0.411) (0.410) (0.469) (0.486) (0.504) (0.522)
Observations 1,746 1,746 1,836 1,836 2,127 2,127
Number of id 823 823 850 850 983 983
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.244 0.247 0.248 0.246 0.247
F 76.74 70.41 65.21 66.13 59.31 58.55
Table B.2: Input demands for exit plants: capital, managers, and workers.
IV Estimations: Standard errors clustered at the three-digit sector level in
parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in logs.
The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Industrial
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998). Demand Shocks with different sector
elasticities come from Eslava et al. (2004). Columns (1) through (6) include
plant and time fixed effects. Exit plants are defined as establishments that
reported production in t but not in t+ 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Manages Managers Workers Workers
Panel A. Second Stage
Output 0.541∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.052) (0.047) (0.047)
Relative Capital -0.264∗∗∗ -0.0999∗
Cost Index (0.054) (0.044)
Relative Capital Cost -0.286∗∗∗
Index x PR (0.085)
Relative Industrial -0.313∗∗∗ -0.169∗
Wage Index (0.079) (0.076)
Relative Industrial -0.217∗∗
Wage Index x PR (0.080)
Relative Minimum -0.211∗∗∗ -0.132∗
Wage Index (0.057) (0.054)
Relative Minimum -0.126
Wage Index X PR (0.065)
Panel B. First Stage. Dependent Variable: Output
Demand Shocks 0.774∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077)
Relative Capital 0.908∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
Cost Index (0.128) (0.101)
Relative Capital 0.333∗∗
Cost Index x PR (0.112)
Relative Industrial 0.988∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.146) (0.111)
Relative Industrial 0.272∗
Wage Index x PR (0.113)
Relative Minimum 0.982∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.145) (0.118)
Relative Minimum 0.286∗
Wage Index X PR (0.108)
Constant 7.621∗∗∗ 7.404∗∗∗ 7.666∗∗∗ 7.474∗∗∗ 7.620∗∗∗ 7.427∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.406) (0.415) (0.409) (0.422) (0.416)
Observations 75,708 75,708 72,494 72,494 75,135 75,135
Number of id 8,510 8,510 8,224 8,224 8,442 8,442
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.246 0.249 0.250 0.248 0.249
F 75.73 64.74 57.76 51.69 75.30 66.99
Table B.3: Input demands for incumbent plants: capital, managers, and
workers. IV Estimations: Standard errors clustered at the three-digit sector
level in parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in
logs. The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Industrial
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998). Demand Shocks with different sector
elasticities come from Eslava et al. (2004). Columns (1) through (6) include
plant and time fixed effects. Incumbent plants are defined as establishments
that reported production in t and in t− 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Manages Managers Workers Workers
Panel A. Second Stage
Output 0.834∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.137) (0.100) (0.097) (0.106) (0.105)
Relative Capital -0.520 -0.209
Cost Index (0.301) (0.629)
Relative Capital -0.299
Cost Index x PR (0.440)
Relative Industrial -0.312∗ 0.0172
Wage Index (0.146) (0.292)
Relative Industrial -0.338
Wage Index x PR (0.202)
Relative Minimum -0.239∗ -0.0429
Wage Index (0.105) (0.203)
Relative Minimum -0.209
Wage Index X PR (0.229)
Panel B. First Stage. Dependent Variable: Output
Demand Shocks 0.632∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.108) (0.083) (0.081) (0.104) (0.102)
Relative Capital 0.183 -0.459
Cost Index (0.234) (0.407)
Relative Capital 0.613
Cost Index x PR (0.319)
Relative Industrial 0.726 0.123
Wage Index (0.441) (0.408)
Relative Industrial 0.617
Wage Index x PR (0.324)
Relative Minimum 0.527 0.0548
Wage Index (0.384) (0.358)
Relative Minimum 0.501
Wage Index X PR (0.257)
Constant 7.095∗∗∗ 6.440∗∗∗ 7.510∗∗∗ 6.860∗∗∗ 6.899∗∗∗ 6.411∗∗∗
(0.624) (0.666) (0.758) (0.705) (0.813) (0.765)
Observations 678 678 1,568 1,568 1,860 1,860
Number of id 333 333 736 736 869 869
Adjusted R2 0.185 0.194 0.187 0.193 0.187 0.191
F 8.696 14.89 23.79 23.77 14.94 15.36
Table B.4: Input demands for entry plants: capital, managers, and workers.
IV Estimations: Standard errors clustered at the three-digit sector level in
parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in logs.
The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Industrial
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998). Demand Shocks with different sector
elasticities come from Eslava et al. (2004). Columns (1) through (6) include
plant and time fixed effects. Entry plants are defined as establishments that
reported production in t but not in t− 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Managers Managers Workers Workers
Panel A. Second Stage
Output 0.425∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.115) (0.085) (0.085) (0.060) (0.059)
Relative Capital -0.335 -0.163
Cost Index (0.174) (0.171)
Relative Capital -0.281∗∗
Cost Index x PR (0.097)
Relative Industrial -0.289∗ -0.132
Wage Index (0.119) (0.080)
Relative Industrial -0.231∗∗
Wage Index x PR (0.079)
Relative Minimum -0.104 0.00489
Wage Index (0.085) (0.072)
Relative Minimum -0.170∗∗∗
Wage Index X PR (0.049)
Panel B. First Stage. Dependent Variable: Output
Demand Shocks 0.543∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.098) (0.092) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094)
Relative Capital 0.857∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
Cost Index (0.201) (0.153)
Relative Capital Cost 0.446∗∗
Index x PR (0.122)
Relative Industrial 1.005∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.217) (0.166)
Relative Industrial Wage 0.436∗∗
Index x PR (0.125)
Relative Minimum 0.951∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.223) (0.176)
Relative Minimum 0.446∗∗∗
Wage Index X PR (0.121)
Constant 7.840∗∗∗ 7.533∗∗∗ 7.899∗∗∗ 7.570∗∗∗ 7.827∗∗∗ 7.509∗∗∗
(0.581) (0.550) (0.562) (0.538) (0.575) (0.548)
Observations 28,184 28,184 25,566 25,566 28,144 28,144
Number of id 5,116 5,116 4,787 4,787 5,076 5,076
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.109 0.113 0.116 0.108 0.112
F 52.15 64.65 79.09 84.35 72.48 51.90
Table B.5: Input demands for small plants: capital, managers, and workers.
IV Estimations: Standard errors clustered at the three-digit sector level in
parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in logs.
The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Industrial
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998). Demand Shocks with different sector
elasticities come from Eslava et al. (2004). Columns (1) through (6) include
plant and time fixed effects. Small plants are defined as establishments
with a number of employees below the percentile 33 in the sample (17
employees).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Managers Managers Workers Workers
Panel A. Second Stage
Output 0.453∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.070) (0.052) (0.052) (0.039) (0.039)
Relative Capital -0.0711 0.0795
Cost Index (0.080) (0.088)
Relative Capital -0.312∗∗
Cost Index x PR (0.095)
Relative Industrial -0.125 -0.0345
Wage Index (0.066) (0.067)
Relative Industrial -0.154∗
Wage Index x PR (0.061)
Relative Minimum -0.0557 -0.0535
Wage Index (0.042) (0.041)
Relative Minimum Wage -0.00401
Index X PR (0.037)
Panel B. First Stage. Dependent Variable: Output
Demand Shocks 0.679∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.085) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
Relative Capital 0.669∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗
Cost Index (0.088) (0.081)
Relative Capital 0.263∗
Cost Index x PR (0.099)
Relative Industrial 0.741∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.096) (0.084)
Relative Industrial 0.208∗
Wage Index x PR (0.088)
Relative Minimum 0.727∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.100) (0.088)
Relative Minimum 0.201∗
Wage Index X PR (0.082)
Constant 7.463∗∗∗ 7.322∗∗∗ 7.428∗∗∗ 7.295∗∗∗ 7.387∗∗∗ 7.265∗∗∗
(0.480) (0.480) (0.474) (0.469) (0.481) (0.472)
Observations 26,319 26,319 26,468 26,468 27,177 27,177
Number of id 4,421 4,421 4,458 4,458 4,533 4,533
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.206 0.213 0.213 0.215 0.216
F 45.13 34.72 56.54 48.99 68.18 56.04
Table B.6: Input demands for medium plants: capital, managers, and
workers. IV Estimations: Standard errors clustered at the three-digit sector
level in parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in
logs. The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Industrial
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998). Demand Shocks with different sector
elasticities come from Eslava et al. (2004). Columns (1) through (6) include
plant and time fixed effects. Medium plants are defined as establishments
with a number of employees between the percentile 33 (17 employees) and
percentile 66 (44 employees) in the sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Capital Managers Managers Workers Workers
Panel A. Second Stage
Output 0.646∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.082) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.086)
Relative Capital -0.371∗∗∗ -0.252∗
Cost Index (0.097) (0.112)
Relative Capital -0.212∗
Cost Index x PR (0.099)
Relative Industrial -0.337∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.075) (0.097)
Relative Industrial -0.0108
Wage Index x PR (0.103)
Relative Minimum -0.198∗∗∗ -0.150∗
Wage Index (0.056) (0.064)
Relative Minimum -0.0799
Wage Index X PR (0.087)
Panel B. First Stage. Dependent Variable: Output
Demand Shocks 0.613∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.102) (0.107) (0.107) (0.105) (0.105)
Relative Capital 0.727∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗
Cost Index (0.126) (0.091)
Relative Capital 0.191
Cost Index x PR (0.139)
Relative Industrial 0.799∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.146) (0.105)
Relative Industrial 0.152
Wage Index x PR (0.139)
Relative Minimum 0.798∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗
Wage Index (0.143) (0.106)
Relative Minimum 0.145
Wage Index X PR (0.134)
Constant 9.121∗∗∗ 9.005∗∗∗ 9.038∗∗∗ 8.934∗∗∗ 9.032∗∗∗ 8.938∗∗∗
(0.516) (0.509) (0.532) (0.529) (0.518) (0.515)
Observations 29,907 29,907 30,127 30,127 30,371 30,371
Number of id 3,309 3,309 3,344 3,344 3,353 3,353
Adjusted R2 0.288 0.289 0.294 0.294 0.293 0.294
F 81.91 89.20 80.15 81.01 71.93 75.77
Table B.7: Input demands for large plants: capital, managers, and workers.
IV Estimations: Standard errors clustered at the three-digit sector level in
parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All variables are in logs.
The Relative Minimum Wage Index is calculated as the ratio of The
Minimum Wage Index to the sum of the Capital Cost Index, the Industrial
Wage Index and the Materials Price Index. The Energy Price Index was
not included due to its abnormal volatility in the sample. PR = 1 for
post-reform years (1991-1998). Demand Shocks with different sector
elasticities come from Eslava et al. (2004). Columns (1) through (6) include
plant and time fixed effects. Large plants are defined as establishments
with a number of employees above the percentile 66 in the sample (44
employees).
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